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A SECURE AND USER-CENTRIC EDOCUMENT TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL 
– SOLVING THE DIGITAL SIGNING PRACTICAL ISSUES 
 




Whilst  our  paper-based  records  and  documents  are  gradually  being  digitized, 
security concerns about how such electronic data is stored, transmitted, and accessed 
have increased rapidly. Although the traditional digital signing method can be used to 
provide  integrity,  authentication,  and  non-repudiation  for  signed  eDocuments,  this 
method  does  not  address  all  requirements,  such  as  fine-grained  access  control  and 
content status validation. What is more, information owners have increasing demands 
regarding  their  rights  of  ownership.  Therefore,  a  secure  user-centric  eDocument 
management system is essential. Through a case study of a secure and user-centric 
electronic qualification certificate (eCertificate) system, this dissertation explores the 
issues and the technology gaps; it identifies existing services that can be re-used and 
the services that require further development; it proposes a new signing method and the 
corresponding system framework which solves the problems identified. In addition to 
tests  that  have  been  carried  out  for  the  newly  designed  eCertificate  system  to  be 
employed  under  the  selected  ePortfolio  environments,  the  abstract  protocol  (named 
eCert  protocol)  has  also  been  applied  and  evaluated  in  two  other  eDocument 
transmitting situations, Mobile eID and eHealthcare patient data. Preliminary results 
indicate that the recommendation from this research meets the design requirements, and 
could form the foundation of future eDocument transmitting research and development. 
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Glossary 
Definitions for eCertificate-related terms and their relationships are given below. 
Authorization  and  Authentication: Authorization is the concept of allowing 
access to resources only to those permitted to use them. It is a process of verifying that 
a known person has the authority to perform a certain operation. Authentication is the 
process of verifying a person’s identity. Thus, an authorization process makes use of 
the authentication process to identify system users; users can only gain authority after 
they have passed the authentication process. 
Certification: Certification is a process of confirmation that a certain person is 
qualified  to  a  stated  level,  in  a  particular  field.  This  includes  the  process  of 
identification  (who  you  are)  and  verification  (what  qualification  you  hold).  The 
outcome of a certification process is a certificate. E-Certification will be referred to as 
an  e-Assessment  process,  such  as  a  student  goes  through  when  their  learning  is 
assessed in order to determine whether to grant them an award of achievement. For 
example, a student may take an on-line test, or series of tests, to be granted the award 
of the European Computer Driving Licence. 
eCertificate:  A  “paperless  reward  certificate”.  eCertificate  is  the  term  used 
throughout this thesis to mean the digital  form  of qualification certificate.  It is the 
electronic qualification information that is associated with individuals – the electronic 
document itself. In this thesis, eCertificate is not the public key certificate or any other 
kinds of authentication certificate. It is described in more detail in section 3.2. 
Identification: Identity is referred to as attribution to yourself (consciously or 
unconsciously) of the characteristics that make you different from others
1. In terms of 
                                                 
1 TechTarget. (2007). Definition. Available: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/ eCert 
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certificate  of  qualification,  identification  is  a  process  of  identifying  a  person,  i.e.  
confirming that he/she is who they say they are. This may be done through documents, 
such as passports or birth certificates, and through physical and biometric recognition, 
such as fingerprints or signatures. Identification may also be carried out by computer, 
such as an on-line authentication system, which involves an identification process. 
Validation:  Validation  refers  to  a  checking  process  to  confirm  that  the 
stakeholder’s  requirements  are  satisfied.  It  is  often  invoked  in  the  process  of 
identification and verification. This includes checking that the documents are up to date 
(not  expired),  applicable  and  acceptable  by  the  specified  situation.  For  example,  a 
library card may not be acceptable as a proof of identity outside the library, and a 
student who was awarded a “First Aid” certificate three years ago may not pass the 
validation check if the award is only valid for two years before they must attend a 
refresher course. In the case of eCertificates, it is also especially important to check in 
case an award has been revoked for any reason. While verification checks whether an 
eCertificate is a forgery for example, validation checks whether a genuine eCertificate 
is still valid in the current context. 
Verification: Verification is an additional proof of something that was believed 
(fact,  hypothesis  or  theory)  correct
2.  It  is  usually  an  in ternal  quality  process  of 
determining  compliance  with  a  regulation,  standard, or  specification.  In  terms  of 
certificate of qualification, verification is an on -line checking process, which verifies 
that an eCertificate is not a forgery and has not been tam pered with, by looking for a 
match against a trusted system. 
Certification  processes:  A  paper-based  certificate  system  will  include 
certification,  identification,  validation,  verification,  authorization  and  authentication 
during its issue, distribution, and verification processes. The relationships of the terms 
and processes for the proposed eCertificate system is available in Appendix J. 
 
                                                 
2 webopedia. (2007). Definition. Available: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/ eCert 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
This  chapter  introduces  the  research  background,  describes  the  problems 
currently being faced and describes the research challenge. It also states the research 
contribution and methodologies, and outlines the structure of the whole thesis. 
This  chapter  is  entirely  the  researcher’s  own  work,  Some  sections  have  been 
published in conference papers [29, 36] and on the eCert project website [28]. 
1.1 Research Background 
Education certificates provide physical evidence of our achievements, milestones 
of our learning journeys, and are important documents that everyone needs for further 
study  or  employment.  However,  these  paper-based  certificates  also  come  with 
management problems: they are easily lost or damaged, and they are hard to prove 
genuine when presented. 
The field of eLearning provides technological developments, such as ePortfolios, 
which are being explored as an improvement over paper-based portfolios in the job and 
course application process. However, forged certificates exist due to poor security in 
ePortfolio systems. The students’ claimed achievements within ePortfolios need to be 
verified. Professor Abrami, of the Centre for the Study of Learning and Performance 
(CSLP) at Concordia University in Montreal, notes that it is difficult to authenticate the 
evidence in ePortfolios [1]. 
Whilst  paper-based  records  and  documents  are  gradually  digitized,  concerns 
about  how  such  electronic  data  is  stored  and  transmitted  have  also  increased.  The 
traditional “Fortress” [44, 122] approach security method, which is systems orientated eCert 
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to  protect  the  system  against  misuse  from  both  outside  attackers  and  uninformed 
legitimate users, is being challenged. The world within which users operate is changing 
– there is now a need to deal with peer-to-peer networking, social networking and 
linked data. In this environment, the prevention of unauthorized modification and loss 
of records is vital. Such concerns are compounded by the knowledge that institutions 
that  the  public  ought  to  be  able  to  depend  upon  for  maintaining  the  security  of 
documents appear to have inadequate systems in place. In the UK, the government has 
been responsible for the loss of 10 million personal records that included bank account 
details [152], and other examples exist of serious breaches of security protocol. 
Besides the potential for human error, as noted above, there is also legitimate 
concern  that  confidential  personal  data  could  be  passed  to  other  organisations  for 
financial  gain.  Without  a  system  of  checks  in  place,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
confidential  data  will  not  be  abused.  In  this  context,  it  is  understandable  that 
information owners have increasing demands regarding their rights of ownership. As a 
result, there are now pressing calls for secure and user-centric systems in a wide range 
of domains, which aim to give owners the opportunity to choose where and how their 
information is collected and stored. 
1.2 Benefits of eCertificate Research 
Students build up portfolios of their achievements as they study, which are then 
presented when they apply for jobs or for further study. The field of eLearning provides 
technological developments in ePortfolios, which enable greater power and flexibility 
in displaying achievements; and is being explored as an improvement over paper-based 
portfolios in the job and course application process. In the UK, a number of projects 
have been implemented, such as the eP4LL [124] project. Research indicates that such 
ePortfolios offer a number of advantages over paper-based ones, such as the potential 
for the inclusion of a rich set of materials, e.g. dynamic art or films that would be 
impossible to include in a paper-based portfolio. eCert 
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The  government  body,  the  Joint  Information  Systems  Committee  (JISC)
3, is 
funding the project, eCert, to research for a potential solution for secured  electronic 
qualification award certificate (eCertificate) that can be used as standalone or serviced 
within ePortfolio systems. The aim of the project is to clarify design requirements, 
propose a solution with a demonstrator that shows how these requirements can be met. 
Students would benefit from eCertificate development as such an approach would 
solve  the  certification  problem,  and  engender  an  atmosphere  of  support  and 
encouragement in terms of maintaining a life-long commitment to personal growth and 
development. 
The eCertificate challenge represents a special instance of a digitally signed 
eDocument (i.e. one which involves non-static content; requires authentication, lifelong 
availability, maintains  ownership rights, and needs to be transmitted to two or more 
parties, whether known or not).  The eCertificate solution could be applied in other 
eDocument transmission domains to solve their security and ownership issues. 
1.3 The Challenges 
Digital  signatures  are  being  used  in  eDocuments  to  provide  authentication, 
integration, and non-reputation. For example: currently, there are many commercial 
systems  offering  eDocument  signing  services.  However,  these  traditional  digital 
signatures and existing commercial systems are considered insufficiently secure, and do 
not satisfy the user-centric eCertificate requirements as the eCertificate system presents 
special challenges: 
  The involvement of non-static content - the signing key may not be alone 
in  being  compromised,  its  content,  the  award  qualification,  may  be 
withdrawn; 
                                                 
3 Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC)  “supports United Kingdom post-16 and higher education 
research by providing leadership in the use of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) in 
support of learning, teaching, research and administration. JISC is funded by all of the UK post-16 and 
higher education funding councils.”  http://www.jisc.ac.uk/  eCert 
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  Owner control demands – the student, as the owner of the eCertificate, 
needs to have control over its usage; 
  Lifelong  availability  requirements  –  verifiable  throughout  a  student’s 
lifetime; 
However, at present it appears that the traditional digital signature systems and 
existing commercial systems provide no method for: 
  Checking whether content revocation is in place – only the signing key 
revocation is checked; 
  Independent  user-centric  control  -  Third  party  access  control  of  an 
eCertificate needs to rely on the issuing institution’s or signing service 
provider’s support systems. In this case, a re-sign process will need to 
take place to generate the distinct access key. However, the owner still has 
no control over the distributed eCertificates, which in turn, may be passed 
on without owners’ consent. 
  Lifelong availability – At present, this relies on the issuing institution’s or 
service  provider’s  willingness  to  hold  the  certificate  over  time  or  the 
guarantee that the organisation remains in business. 
Evidence in support of these claims is considered and discussed in Chapter 3. 
Despite significant efforts by industry these problems are still largely unsolved. So the 
design and development of eCertificate is a contribution with potential for significant 
impact in a number of domains such as the ones considered in Chapter 7 and 8. The 
user-centric approach has ensured that barriers to adoption have been removed. 
Without  an  efficient  user-centric  security  control  in  place,  a  digitally  signed 
eCertificate would be useless as it still could not be trusted and the owner could not 
control its confidentiality or guarantee its availability. These issues also affect other 
digitally  signed  eDocuments  in  similar  situation,  e.g.  eContracts  with  dynamic 
contents. 
The problems that the public are facing need answers. In order to overcome the 
problems  of  education  certificates  and  to  enable  qualification  information  to  be 
distributed securely, efficiently, and with owners’ consent, it is necessary to design an eCert 
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Figure 1-1 Outline of the research background and the challenge, published in [28, 29] 
 
This eCertificate challenge requires the system to handle the certification and 
verification processes, and meet the lifetime validation requirement, whilst satisfying 
document ownership rights. 
1.4 Hypotheses and Research Methods 
The researcher believed that the current technology is ready for the design and 
implementation of the eCertificate system, so that an eCertificate can be secured and is 
verifiable lifelong, and the student owner can have control over its use independently 
from its issuing body. What’s more, the concept of the eCertificate solution can be 
applied  to  related  eDocument  transmission  and  verification  domains  to  solve  their 
security and ownership issues. eCert 
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Two research methodologies have been selected for this research:  the Service 
Orientated Reference Model (SORM) [173] was employed for the eCertificate system 
development,  to  investigate  how  services  fit  together  to  provide  the  required 
functionalities.  The  Delphi  method  [88]  was  used  for  guiding  and  evaluating  the 
decisions making during the eCertificate system development, alongside the SORM 
methodology. 
1.5 Original Contributions 
Through the eCertificate case study, this research has produced results such as: 
  the identification and addressing of a particular content validation issue; 
this has been called the eCertificate square problem in this thesis; 
  a new signing method to address owner control requirements, enabling 
authorized  modifications  of  the  access  values  to  a  signed  eDocument 
without the need for digital re-signing; 
  a  new  system  structure  which  works  with  the  proposed  new  signing 
method. The new system forms a framework resulting in a centralized 
verification  system  for  secured  and  owner-controlled  distributed  data, 
independent from the issuing bodies to ensure lifelong availability. 
This research has also proposed an abstracted eCert protocol, which have been 
tested through two evaluation studies. This abstracted eCert protocol can be applied 
across a variety of application domains, not just the ones originally selected. It can also 
be applied to the “big picture” of secured eDocument transmission and verification, 
thereby resolving the related security issues with existing eGovernment, and eBusiness 
systems. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The rest of this thesis is organised in the following way: eCert 
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Chapter  2  defines  the  research  focus,  the  research  hypothesis,  and  the 
methodologies employed. 
Following the selection of SORM methodology, the literature review is carried 
out in Chapter 3, which examines eCertificate-related areas to find out what is being 
studied in the field. 
Domain  Research  presented  in  Chapter  4  explores  what  systems/projects  are 
already available alongside the literature, what can be adapted, and what limitations 
need  to  be  overcome,  in  order  to  make  an  informed  decision  to  investigate  the 
eCertificate system. 
Chapter 5 presents the eCertificate case study. It follows the steps of SORM, 
describes the use cases, the technical gap, and the outcome of service profiles analysis. 
From service profile, design, to system implementation, Chapter 6 presents how 
the system was developed under the SORM methodology. 
Chapter 7 shows the system testing and evaluation using the Delphi methodology. 
The proposed eCertificate system is then abstracted as the eCert protocol, and 
evaluated in Chapter 8 to test the usage of the eCert solution in a wider domain. 
The thesis ends with the conclusion in Chapter 9, summarising the research, and 
proposals for future work. 
   eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 8 
 eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 9 
Chapter 2   Research Hypothesis 
and Methodology 
This chapter describes the research hypotheses and methodologies, indicating the 
focus  of  the  research  and  the  methods  employed.  This  chapter  is  entirely  the 
researcher’s own work. 
2.1 Research Direction 
In order to solve the current paper-based certificate management issue, satisfy the 
requirement of proving the achievements claimed in an ePortfolio, while addressing the 
increasing issue of privacy within eDocument and answering the calls for enhanced 
owner control, it is necessary to design a secure eCertificate system that is as valid as 
the  paper-based  certificates,  and  can  be  verified  in  a  legal  context.  It  needs  to  be 
available throughout the student owner’s life, be able to be withdrawn, and be used 
either  as  a  standalone  application  or  serviced  within  other  applications,  such  as 
ePortfolios. The students, as the owner of the eCertificate, need to have the ownership 
right and be able to control its usage. Such an eCertificate also needs to be easy to use 
and suit users  with  low  IT skill  levels  while  maintaining high security  methods  to 
prevent forgery and providing a verification service. We need to secure the eCertificate 
system, not just the eCertificate alone. 
2.2 Research Hypotheses 
This research is intended to establish the claim that: eCert 
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Hypothesis 1: the current technology has the required features that can be used or 
adapted to support the design and implementation of the eCertificate system, so that an 
eCertificate  can  be  secured,  rendered  permanently  verifiable  and  allow  the  student 
owner to have control over its use independently from its issuing body. 
Hypothesis 2: the concept of the eCertificate solution can be applied to related 
domains, such as other eDocuments that face similarly complex situations, to solve 
their security and ownership issues. 
2.3 Research Plan 
In order to test the hypotheses, the research is  planned in three steps:  1) use 
eCertificate  as  a  case  study  to  research  a  solution  for  the  problem  of  eDocument 
transmitting; 2) design and build a demonstration system to test and evaluate the design 
and  hence  test  the  hypothesis  1  to  a  satisfactory  extent;  3)  apply  the  eCertificate 
solution to another instance of eDocument transmission in order to test the use of the 
eCertificate concept in a wider eDocument transmitting domain, and hence  test the 
hypothesis 2 to a satisfactory extent. 
2.4 Research Methodology 
To make the research process efficient, the principles of research methodology 
have been studied, and as a result, two research methods have been selected. 
2.4.1 What Research Methodology Is 
While research is a journey of discovery, research methodology is “the science of 
studying  how  research  is  done  scientifically”.  Sridhar  [148]  describes  research 
methodology as “a way of systematically solving the research problem by logically 
adopting various steps.” Saunders and Lewis describe it as “the theory of how research 
should be undertaken, including the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon 
which  research  is  based  and  the  implications  of  these  for  the  method  or  methods 
adopted.” eCert 
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Saunders  and  Lewis  summarise  research  methodology  in  the  following  way 
[135]: 
  “All business and management research projects can be placed on a basic-
applied continuum according to their purpose and context.” 
  Research  projects  are  “undertaken  for  different  purposes”,  and  can  be 
categorized as “exploratory, descriptive and explanatory”. 
  “The  main  research  strategies  are  experiment,  survey,  case  study,  action 
research, grounded theory, ethnography and archival research.” 
  Research projects may be “cross-sectional” or “longitudinal”. 
  Quantitative  and  qualitative  are  used  to  “differentiate  both  data  collection 
techniques and data analysis procedures”. 
  “Using  multiple  methods  can  provide  better  opportunities  to  answer  a 
research question and to evaluate the extent to which findings may be trusted 
and inferences made.” 
Adams and Cox [4] have described three evaluation techniques: questionnaires, 
in-depth interviews, and focus groups. They state that questionnaires are “usually paper 
based or delivered online and consist of a set of questions which all participants asked 
to complete”; interviews are “usually conducted on a one-to-one basis … require a 
large amount of the investigator’s time during the interviews and also for transcribing 
and coding the data”; focus groups “usually consist of one investigator and a number 
of  participants  in  any  one  section.”  They  also  point  out  that  the  benefit  of  using 
questionnaires is that they “can be delivered to a large number of participants with 
little effort”, while interviews can be “flexible and in-depth”, and focus groups “often 
result in useful data in a shorter space of time.” 
In  some  research,  the  combined  use  of  “quantitative  and  qualitative  data 
collection techniques and data analysis procedures” can bring benefits. Morse [134] 
describes  it  as  “to  obtain  different  but  complementary  data  on  the  same  topic.” 
However, it can not be easily applied to all situations, depending on “what is being 
studied, how it can be studied and what the goals of the research are” [5]. Adams, Lunt 
and Cairns pointed out that “there are many complex, socially based phenomena in 
HCI that cannot be easily quantified or experimentally manipulated or, for that matter, eCert 
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ethically researched with experiments,” such that researchers in HCI are “turning to 
more  qualitative  methods  in  order  to  deliver  the  research  results  that  HCI  needs.” 
Adams also stated that “With qualitative research, the emphasis is not on measuring 
and  producing  numbers  but  instead  on  understanding  the  qualities  of  a  particular 
technology and how people use it in their lives, how they think about it and how they 
feel about it” [5]. 
2.4.2 Benefits of Research Methodology 
Sridhar [148] summarised the benefit of research methodology as: 
  “Advancement of wealth of human knowledge” 
  “Tools of the trade to carry out research; provides tools to look at things in 
life objectively” 
  “Develops a critical and scientific attitude, disciplined thinking or a ‘bent of 
mind’ to observe objectively (scientific deduction & inductive thinking); skills 
of research will pay-off in long term particularly in the ‘age of information’ 
(or too often of misinformation)” 
  “Enriches practitioner and his practices; provides chance to study a subject in 
depth; Enable us to make intelligent decisions; understand the material which 
no other kind of work can match” 
  “As consumers of research, output helps to inculcate the ability to evaluate 
and  use  results  of  earlier  research  with  reasonable  confidence  and  take 
rational decisions” 
2.4.3 The Selected Research Methodologies 
A number of appropriate methodologies have been shortlisted. A brief description 
and comparison of these methodologies is available in Appendix K. According to the 
earlier findings that multiple methods can “provide a better view” into a research topic 
[135],  and  since  the  goal  of  this  research  was  to  understand  the  issues  and  find  a 
solution for the problem rather than measuring and benchmarking the proposed system, eCert 
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a software development research methodology, Service Orientated Reference Model 
(SORM), and a qualitative based research methodology, Delphi, were chosen. 
2.4.4 The SORM Methodology 
The  Service-Oriented  Reference  Model  (SORM)  is  a  “community-driven” 
methodology for “understanding how services fit together to provide functionality for a 
particular domain” [174]. It was initially invented to develop the e-learning framework 
reference model for assessment in 2006.  
2.4.4.1  The background 
The e-Framework for Education and Research is “initiative by the UK’s Joint 
Information  Systems  Committee  (JISC)  and  Australia’s  Department  of  Education, 
Science and Training (DEST)”. It aims to produce an “evolving and sustainable, open 
standards based service oriented technical framework to support the education and 
research  communities”  [112].  The  e-Framework  “supports  a  Service  Oriented 
Architecture  (SOA)  for  developing  and  delivering  education,  research  and 
administration systems”, which provide benefits that “maximise the flexibility and cost 
effectiveness with which systems can be deployed and enabled to work together at the 
institutional,  national,  and  international  levels”  [112].  A  core  benefit  of  SOA  is 
“interoperability,  as  service  interfaces  are  described  in  a  standardized  manner; 
providing portability as the service can be consumed or implemented on any platform 
that  supports  the  required  protocols.”  It  has  been  “the  backbone  to  help  build 
interoperable tools for eLearning,” [20], such as ePortfolio and eAssessment. 
Framework Reference Model for Assessment (FREMA) was a project aiming to 
provide a structured navigation method for all standards, services and use cases of the 
assessment  domain  within  the  eFramework  [173].  To  assist  the  project,  SORM 
methodology was employed to encapsulate the eFramework research process and it has 
successfully performed the complex and difficult task. eCert 
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2.4.4.2  The layered SORM methodology 
The SORM suits varies domains, and is conceptualised into a number of layers 
with defined relations between the layers: “For tightly constrained domains, it may be 
possible to define a vertical slice through the layers, such that each layer exactly maps 
onto its vertical neighbours. For broader domains where each layer is smaller in scope 
but more concrete than the one below it, a Community Reference Model approach is 




Figure 2-1 The Abstract Layers of a SORM, reprinted from [173] 
 
  The layered model starts from a Domain Definition, which provides an 
overview  of  the  reference  model,  as  it  “contains  instances  from  the 
ontology of domain resources (such as standards, people, and projects) 
and also the ontological relationships between them” [173]. eCert 
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  Identifying  Common  Usage  Patterns  is  the  process  of  “scoping  the 
domain into a manageable subset”. The patterns should include “all key 
activities”  from  domain  experts,  both  the  “areas  that  lie  unarguably 
within the domain” or “the reflection of the resources” [173]. 
  With the usage patterns defined, they can then be formalised into  Use 
Cases to “formal descriptions of user activity in both diagrammatic and 
narrative form” [173]. 
  A Gap Analysis is then performed against the framework to identify if 
any of the use cases require services “missing a formal definition” [173]. 
  With the result from the Gap Analysis, a series of Service Profiles for 
each  required  service  can  be  generated.  These  Service  Profiles  are 
“abstract  descriptions  of  a  service  that  may  be  fulfilled  by  several 
different  Service  Implementations  that  potentially  expose  different 
concrete  interfaces.”  They  can  be  collaborated  with  other  services  to 
“fulfil its own specific use case” [173]. 
  Reference Implementation is the “most concrete layer” of the service 
profiles, although “not all services will necessarily be implemented” while 
“some may be wrappers around existing software.” The implementations 
are not necessary “as definitive enterprise level pieces of code”, but can 
be used as “exemplars that validate the service profiles and demonstrate 
any interoperability” [173]. 
2.4.4.3  Reason for choosing the SORM methodology 
The eCertificate research fits well into the e-Framework as it relates to education 
and  many  of  the  eLearning  systems;  an  eCertificate  will  be  the  end  result  of 
successfully  passing  an  assessment,  and  it  can  be  used  in  an  ePortfolio.  From 
employing  the  SORM  methodology,  we  are  taking  the  same  SOA  approach  that 
supports  the  education  and  research  communities,  which  will  not  only  assist  the 
research  process,  but  can  also  maximise  the  interoperability  between  systems  and 
software across the e-Framework. eCert 
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2.4.5 The Delphi Methodology 
The  Delphi  methodology  is  a  “structured  communication  technique  that 
originally developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method which relies on a 
panel of experts” [88]. 
2.4.5.1  The background 
Delphi is widely accepted as a “forecasting tool”. It has been used successfully in 
technology  forecasting  for  “thousands  of  studies”  and  has  been  applied  “with  high 
accuracy” in other areas, such as business, economic trends, health and education [88]. 
The technique has also been adapted for use in “face-to-face meetings, called mini-
Delphi  or  Estimate-Talk-Estimate  (ETE)”,  and  in  web-based  experiments,  as  a 
“communication technique for interactive decision-making and e-democracy” [88]. 
The principle of Delphi methodology is that  “forecasts  (or  decisions)  from  a 
structured  group  of  individuals  are  more  accurate  than  those  from  unstructured 
groups” [131]. Such a process “is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a 
whole,  to  deal  with  a  complex  problem”  [88],  which  has  also  been  referred  to  as 
“collective intelligence” by Hiltz [78]. 
Delphi methodology has three main characteristics: “structuring of information 
flow”, “regular feedback”, and “anonymity of the participants”. These characteristics 
“help the participants focus on the issues”, and makes Delphi stand out from other 
methodologies” [88]. 
  Structuring  of  information  flow:  the  experts’  initial  answers  and 
comments on the questions will be collected, processed, and irrelevant 
content will be filtered out by the panel director. This not only avoids the 
negative effects but also “solves the usual problems of group dynamics”. 
  Regular feedback: the participating experts can access others’ responses, 
review  and  comment  on  their  own  forecasts  in  different  stages  of  the 
process; this can improve the discussion result. 
  Anonymity of participants: the identities of the participants may remain 
anonymous during the whole process to prevent domination by or from eCert 
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others, which also “allows free expression of opinions and encourages 
open critique”. 
The  panel  director  who  coordinates  the  Delphi  method,  “also  known  as  a 
facilitator”,  has  the  responsibility  for  selecting  the  panel  of  experts,  setting  the 
questions,  collecting  and  analyzing  responses,  and  identifying  the  common  and 
conflicting viewpoints. 
2.4.5.2  The four phases of Delphi 
The method starts by selecting a group of domain experts who hold knowledge 
on an issue and a set of initial designed questions. The process undergoes “four distinct 
phases” [88]. 
First  phase  –  exploration:  the  aim  of  this  phase  is  to  explore  the  subject  by 
collecting information from the expert panel that they feel “is pertinent to the issue”. 
The  second  phase  –  agreement  analysis:  this  phase  involves  “the  process  of 
reaching an understanding of how the group views the issue,” what participants agree 
and disagree on, what they think is of “importance, desirability, or feasibility.” 
These first and second phases may be carried out for two or more rounds. After 
each round, the experts’ forecasts and the reasons that support their forecasts will be 
summarised, their viewpoints will be identified, filtered, and analyzed. The experts are 
“encouraged  to  revise  their  earlier  answers  in  light  of”  the  others’  opinions.  It  is 
believed  that  through  this  process,  “the  variety  of  answers  will  decrease  and  tend 
towards one direction”. 
The third phase – further exploration: if there is “significant disagreement”, then 
it will be explored to “bring out the underlying reasons for the differences” and the 
possibility of solving them. 
The last phase – final evaluation: the process will stop “after a pre-defined stop 
criterion”,  such  as  “number  of  rounds”,  or  “stability  of  results”.  “All  previously 
gathered  information  will  be  analyzed”  and  the  evaluations  will  be  “fed  back  for 
consideration”. eCert 
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2.4.5.3  Reasons for choosing the Delphi methodology 
Delphi was first developed for the field of science and technology forecasting 
[40], and later extended to many other areas, including technology in education and 
policy-making. It has been applied successfully with high accuracy in many cases [14, 
77]. 
The nature of eCertificate research lies in the field of technology and education, 
and aims to identify the existing issues and technology gaps and find solutions to the 
problem. This is not easy in a field of rapid change such as technology, where the 
degree of uncertainty is so great. Delphi would be the right tool to collect the latest 
opinions from experts in the field, and through the controlled process, help with finding 
a way towards a final design decision. 
Employing Delphi will benefit this research by gaining the latest knowledge of 
“collective intelligence” and finalising the design decision with the help of the panel 
experts in a reasonable time. 
2.4.6 Applying the Selected Research Methodologies 
The comparison demonstrates that for this research, a combination of SORM and 
Delphi is considered to be most suitable. As multiple methods can provide a better 
vision of a research topic, employing these two methodologies together would provide 
a  better  research  outcome.  The  SORM  was  selected  to  investigate  the  eCertificate 
framework, and the Delphi research methodology was identified to guide and evaluate 
the eCertificate system design alongside the SORM methodology. 
  From  literature  review,  and  domain  research,  to  eCertificate  use  case,  gap 
analysis, services investigation, and system design and implementation, the 
research processes of the eCertificate system development  were carried out 
following the SORM methodology. 
  In parallel with the SORM methodology, Delphi methodology was employed 
step-by-step alongside the eCertificate system development. Domain experts’ 
opinions were collected and analysed to guide the system design decisions. eCert 
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o  managers, IT security experts, and exam board officers were selected at 
national level to represent the eCertificate stakeholders; 
o  group discussions were employed to investigate the related issues and 
guide the new system design; 
o  design adjustments were made according to the outcome at each round. 
o  At the final round discussion, the developed system was brought back to 
the selected stakeholders to test whether it met the requirements, and 
any issues were addressed where required. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the research hypotheses were raised after the research direction 
was identified. The research methodologies, SORM and Delphi, were selected and a 
plan of how to apply these methodologies to the eCertificate case study was set up, to 
be used as a step-by-step guide in the future research, which would lead the researcher 
to create a design to be implemented and tested both the eCertificate domain and two 
other related domains. 
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Chapter 3   Literature Review 
The  first  step  of  the  SORM  methodology  is  Domain  Definition.  In  order  to 
provide an overview of the eCertificate domain, the literature review has looked into 
eCertificate usage and security related areas, which include certification, ePortfolio, 
system security, encryption, privacy, and ownership right. 
 
Usage, Privacy & ownership
Certification & certificate
ePortfolio















Areas to be secured
 
Figure 3-1 Related areas of eCertificate 
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The  relationships  between  the  literature  review  topics  are  shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 3-1. 
  An eCertificate is an end product of a successful certification process 
  Security control will be the key factor of a successful system 
  Its  structural  design  will  affect  adaptability  to  other  systems,  such  as 
ePortfolios, which is one of its main usage areas 
  Its social impact, such as privacy and ownership need to be addressed 
From Figure 3-1, we may also note that the eCertificate system involves three 
processes: issue, distribution, and verification. Google Scholar and some online digital 
libraries, such as ePrint, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and WebCat, were used as 
the web-based tool for the literature search. Relevant key words, such as “certificate 
and certification process”, “digital signing method”, “ePortfolio systems”, “computer 
security”, “encryption methods”, and “privacy issues”, were used during the search. 
Materials were selected based on first scanning of abstracts and conclusions, and then 
the details of content, where applicable. Recent publications with a high number of 
citations were chosen over the others.  
This  chapter  summarises  the  eCertificate  related  work  published  in  literature.  
The chapter is expressed in the researcher’s own words. 
3.1 EPortfolio 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  develop  a  greater  understanding  of  how  to 
explore the domain of eCertificate for ePortfolios. 
3.1.1 Definition of ePortfolio 
A portfolio is commonly referred to as a large, flat, thin case, usually leather, for 
carrying collected pieces of creative work, such as loose papers or drawings or maps, to 
be shown to potential customers or employers. In finance, a portfolio is an appropriate eCert 
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mix  of  investments  held  by  an  institution  or  a  private  individual
4.  In terms of 
educational institutions, a portfolio is “a collection of evidence that is gathered together 
to show a person’s learning journey over time and to demonstrate their abilities” [24]. 
An  electronic  portfolio  is  also  known  as  an  “ePortfolio”,  “efolio”,  “digital 
portfolio”, or “webfolio”. Butler [24] defines it as: “an electronic version of a paper-
based portfolio, created in a computer environment, and incorporating not just text, but 
graphic, audio and video material as well.” Abrami and Barrett [1] define it as: “a 
digital container capable of storing visual and auditory content...designed to support a 
variety of pedagogical processes and assessment purposes.” Challis [27] defines it as a 
“selective and structured” collection of information “gathered for specific purposes 
and showing/evidencing one’s accomplishments and growth”; It is “stored digitally and 
managed  by  appropriate  software;  developed  by  using  appropriate  multimedia 
customarily  within  a  web  environment”  and  can  be  “retrieved  from  a  website,  or 
delivered by CD-ROM or by DVD”. 
ePortfolios are a growing area of eLearning research. They provide a useful way 
for  users  to  “document  their  academic  achievements”,  support  applications  to 
employers  and/or  further  education  institutions  during  the  transition  points  of  the 
user’s/(owner’s) career [71]. It has been “encouraged, with the intention that such a 
system  should  ultimately  replace  the  current  paper-based  system”.  A  number  of 
projects have been implemented, such as eP4LL [108], which have led to a reference 
model for ePortfolios [123]. 
3.1.2 Types of ePortfolios 
There  are  six  major  types  of  ePortfolios  catalogued  in  IMS  ePortfolio  [79]: 
“Assessment  ePortfolios,  Presentation  ePortfolios,  Learning  ePortfolios,  Personal 
Development ePortfolios, Multiple Owner ePortfolios, and Working ePortfolios”. 
                                                 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ eCert 
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  Assessment ePortfolios: for demonstrating achievements to “an authority by 
relating  evidence within  the ePortfolio”, and often “gain  score against the 
initial requirements set by that authority”. 
  Presentation ePortfolios: for “evidence learning or achievement to an audience 
in  a  persuasive  way”  and  are  “often  used  to  demonstrate  professional 
qualifications.” 
  Learning ePortfolios: to “document, guide, and advance learning over time”, 
often  to  plan  and  reflect  on  learning,  and  “diverse  learning  experiences. 
Learning ePortfolios are most often developed in formal curricular contexts”. 
  Personal development ePortfolios: for personal development planning, could 
include a learning ePortfolio, “but goes beyond that, as it is often related to 
professional  development  and  employment,”  and  “also  possibly  used  as  a 
presentation ePortfolio.” It contains “records of learning, performance, and 
achievement  which  can  be  reflected  on,  and  outcomes  of  that  reflection, 
including plans for future development”. 
  Multiple Owner ePortfolios allow “more than one individual to participate”. 
They could be a combination of the portfolio types that mentioned above, but 
most  likely  take  the  form  of  a  Presentation  ePortfolio  and  a  Learning 
ePortfolio.  They  are  also  used  to  “represent  the  work  and  growth  of  an 
organization or organizational unit”. 
  Working ePortfolios “often include multiple views”, each view could be an 
ePortfolio of any type. It is “the larger archive from which the contents of one 
or more ePortfolios may be selected. The whole of a working ePortfolio is 
generally accessible only to its subject, while views are made accessible to 
other individuals and groups”. 
Lorenzo and Ittelson [89] summarized ePortfolios in a slightly differently. They 
catalogued ePortfolios in three types as: “for students while studying, for graduates 
while  moving  into  or  through  the  workforce,  and  for  institutions  for  program 
assessment or accreditation purposes” [89]. eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 25 
  “for students while studying: Students in college mainly use the ePortfolio for 
critical reflection and learning purposes” 
  “for graduates while moving into or through the workforce: For showcasing 
their qualifications and competencies in job interviews, and promotion” 
  “for  institutions  for  program  assessment  or  accreditation  purposes:  for 
institution-wide  reflection,  learning  and  improvement  to  demonstrate 
institutional accountability, to make accreditation processes more visible, and 
to show collective student progress” 
Even  though  ePortfolios  represent  a  technical  change  in  physical  terms,  the 
concept is maintained. 
3.1.3 The ePortfolio Reference Models 
The  UK’s  Joint  Information  Systems  Committee  (JISC)  funded  projects  for 
ePortfolio reference models. From those, Blowers [20] identified that the EP4LL and 
RIPPLL projects are theose most related to our interest of portfolio data exchange. 
They are summarized below. 
EP4LL (ePortfolios for Lifelong Learning): The initial aim of the EP4LL project 
was to “produce a reference model of an ePortfolio capable of providing and receiving 
services  from  other  ePortfolios  in  other  episodes  of  learning”  and  “facilitating 
admissions  and  transitions  between  study  and  employment  at  different  levels.”  It 
outlined a series of web services for the use case of a student applicant to university 
[124]. The services would allow an applicant to build an application from an institution 
template, whilst selecting evidence from their ePortfolio to support it, and to create a 
submission [124]. It also identified that current ePortfolio interoperability standards, 
such as IMS ePortfolio, can be a hindrance if too complex [124]. 
RIPPLL  (Regional  Interoperability  Project  on  Progression  for  Lifelong 
Learning): The project “established a model of cross-sector collaboration” utilizing 
ePortfolios  and  is  currently  the  closest  to  a  reference  implementation,  due  to  its 
“symbiotic  relationship”  with  the  ePortfolio  reference  model  [72].  RIPPLL  utilized eCert 
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knowledge gained to develop “practical tools to assist transitions of learning” within a 
federation of institutions in the Nottingham area. This allowed ePortfolio data that was 
created during time at FE colleges to be included and transferred to other institutions 
[72]. Again to aid feasibility, interoperability was required and the RIPPLL tools are 
compliant with the UKLeaP XML schema, a UK localised version of the IMS Learner 
Information Profile (LIP) schema [72, 129]. RIPPLL also tackles the authentication 
issue between institutions. It links by using a SSO (Single-Sign-On) system, where the 
identity  of  a  user  is  supported  by  their  home  institution  when  accessing  another 
institution’s systems [72]. 
However,  although  these  models  define  the  use  cases  for  the  exchange  of 
portfolio  data,  from  an  e-certification  perspective  they  are  limited,  as  there  is  no 
mechanism  to  authenticate  the  veracity  of  the  portfolio  data  transmitted  between 
institutions. Neither have explicitly described the security issues raised by transmitting 
data between multiple parties which are not always identifiable. 
3.1.4 Benefits of ePortfolios 
Based on Challis [27], Abrami and Barrett [1], Strudler and Wetzel [151], and 
Butler’s  [24]  points  of  view  on  the  usage  of  the  ePortfolio,  and  comparing  the 
differences between the ePortfolio and the traditional model, the main benefits made in 
the literature for ePortfolio are: 
  “efficient  storage,  easier  searching,  and  simple  retrieval,  manipulation, 
refinement and reorganization of records”; 
  “reduced effort and time”; 
  “more comprehensive and rigorous”; 
  “cost-effective distribution”; 
  “instantly accessible, easy to carry and share with peers, supervisors, parents, 
employers and others”; 
  “allow an organizational structure that is not linear or hierarchical”; eCert 
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  “showcase the technological skills of the creator”; 
  “potential larger audience, by providing access to a global readership if they 
are based on the web” 
  “use more extensive material: pictures, sound, animation, graphic design and 
video”; 
  “multimedia  technology,  general  literacy,  communication  and  problem 
solving skills development”; 
  “personal accomplishment, psychological benefits”; 
  “engage assessment”;  
  “allows fast feedback, evidence and reflection of work and learning”; 
  “privacy protected”; 
3.1.5  Criteria for Successful ePortfolio Adaptation 
Ahn [7] believes that “planning is a key element of success”.  Butler [24] thinks 
that  “motivation  can  be  encouraged  through  enabling  student  decision-making, 
ensuring  students  have  ownership  of  their  portfolios,  and  public  access  to  and 
recognition of students’ work over the web”. While Klenowski et al. [84] think that “a 
portfolio should be a reflective process, through which students construct meaning and 
understanding out of their learning”. Strudler and Wetzel [151] have also pointed out 
that “the purpose of the portfolio should be clearly connected to the curriculum and 
goals  of  the  program  they  are  studying”,  and  that  students  should  have  adequate 
resources and sufficient access to technology to complete the portfolio. Yancey [175] 
compiled a series of success factors in the form of questions. 
  “What is/are the purpose/s?” 
  “How familiar is the portfolio concept? Is the familiarity a plus or a minus?” 
  “Who wants to create an electronic portfolio, and why?” eCert 
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  “Who wants to read an electronic portfolio, and why?” 
  “Why  electronic?  What  about  electronic  is  central  to  the  model?  And  is 
sufficient infrastructure (resources, knowledge, and commitment) available for 
the electronic portfolio?” 
  “What processes are entailed: what resources are presumed?” 
  “What faculty development component does the model assume or include?” 
  “What skills will students need to develop?” 
  “What curricula enhancement does the model assume or include?” 
  “How will the portfolio be introduced?” 
  “How will the portfolio be reviewed?” 
3.1.6 Issues in ePortfolios 
As  ePortfolios  would  be  the  main  platform  where  the  eCertificate  was  to  be 
presented, the issues that ePortfolio systems faced might also be expected to have an 
impact on eCertificate. Therefore, identifying and addressing these related issues in 
eCertificate design was the key for successful ePortfolio integration. 
 Many issues surrounding ePortfolios were found during this research; some of 
them, such as privacy protection, needed to be resolved and successfully implemented 
before they could be seen as benefits. The main issues identified in the literature were: 
  students’  skills/abilities:  the  students’  technical  skill  level  may  affect  the 
creation  of  their  portfolio,  “the  danger  is  that  students  will  end  in  being 
assessed more on their technology prowess” [1]. 
  Qualification data verification: providing verified access to qualification data 
was a main issue. Projects working on this area, such as the LIPID project, 
which  “investigated  the  use  of  a  middleware  solution  to  provide  verified 
qualifications  data  from  an  MIS  system  (student  record  system)  into  a 
student’s ePortfolio.” [67] eCert 
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  work verification: it is “very difficult to authenticate the evidence in ePortfolio 
– is it really the student’s own work” [1]. 
  Access rights and system authentication: the issue centred on the questions of 
who would have access to the ePortfolios, and how their identities could be 
authenticated.  Studies  on  the  Shibboleth-based  authentication  system  to 
explored the potential solution. 
  Interoperability  and  data  transfer:  middleware  and  standards  needed  to  be 
developed  to  enable  transfer  of  data  between  incompatible  systems.  Many 
projects have investigated this area, that “worked on the standards involved in 
data transfer, and with JISC-CETIS are taking this work forward through the 
Portfolio  SIG,”  such  as  IMS  LIP,  HR-XML,  UKLeaP,  LEAP  2.0,  IMS 
ePortfolio.  Projects  like  SHEEL  have  “developed  a  technical  middleware 
solution  called ioNode which enable the transfer  of  student  data  in  a LIP 
compliant way” [67]. 
  Legal  issues:  there  are  legal  issues  invoked  in  ePortfolios,  such  as  data 
protection,  copyright,  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR),  ownership  and 
stewardship. “There were projects running for the last 2 years on exploring 
the legal issues surrounding the lifelong learner record and ePortfolios. The 
study has written a number of FAQs and reports around the legal issues and 
accessibility …and guidance have been produced.” For example, the EPICS 
project produced a toolkit for projects, which “helps to think through the main 
issues in planning, implementing and planning an ePortfolio project” [67]. 
  Connection speed and data storage capacity  were also mentioned as issues 
from institutions in the literature. 
3.1.7 Barriers to Implementation 
Grey [67] pointed out that it can be difficult to engage learners in planning and 
reflection, since students often need to feel the potential benefits for their investment. 
At the same time, a number of barriers to the implementation were summarized by 
Butler [24] from the issues raised in the literature [25, 151]: eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 30 
  “The need for adequate hardware and software”; 
  “The accessibility of that hardware and software”; 
  “Lack of technology skills amongst students and staff”; 
  “Technical problems with the equipment or electronic portfolio system”; 
  “The need for support when problems are encountered”; 
  “Maintenance of the hardware”; 
  “Adequate storage space and server reliability”; 
  “Demands on staff time”; 
  “How to use students’ time efficiently”; 
  “How to overcome issues of ownership and intellectual property”; 
  “Problems with security and privacy of data”; 
  “Lack of features or of control over those features”; 
  “The need for access and permission controls”; 
  “How to transport electronic portfolios into new systems as students move 
on”; and 
  “The  need  for  common  standards  between  different  electronic  portfolio 
systems.” 
3.1.8 Discussion 
From the research results, there are six types of ePortfolios. One that most relates 
to  the  eCertificate  is  the  presentation  ePortfolio,  which  is  used  for  students  and 
graduates to give evidence of learning or achievement and showcase their qualifications 
and competencies while moving into or through the workforce or further education. eCert 
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After reviewing the ePortfolio research domain, it is apparent that concerns have 
been raised regarding the security aspects of the ePortfolio data transitional processes. 
The eP4LL (EPortfolios for Lifelong Learning) project developed a reference model for 
ePortfolios  for  the  eFramework.  The  RIPPLL  (Regional  Interoperability  Project  on 
Progression  for  Lifelong  Learning)  has  tackled  the  authentication  issue  between 
institutions it links to by using a SSO (Single-Sign-On) system, where the identity of a 
user is supported by their home institution when accessing other institutions’ systems. 
However, although the eP4LL models define the use cases for the exchange of portfolio 
data,  they  did  not  address  the  security  issues  raised  by  transmitting  data  between 
multiple and not always known parties; and there still is no mechanism to authenticate 
the veracity of the ePortfolio data transmitted between institutions in RIPPLL.  Rees 
Jones,  an  eP4LL  project  member,  admitted  “Security  and  Trust:  the  (ePortfolio) 
Reference Model sidestepped this key issue” [125]. Even though the issues of work 
authentication, qualification data verification, access rights and system authentication 
were mentioned in the literature, either there is little information since they are still 
under development, or these are simply referred to as ‘future development’. One of the 
suggested methods in the literature was through referees and digital signing for their 
references  [159],  but  this  method  is  clearly  not  secure  enough.  Referees  can  only 
provide opinions on how they think you are as a person for the period that they know 
you; they cannot prove  your qualifications and works, especially the ones that you 
obtained before they knew you. 
ePortfolio  would  be  the  main  platform  where  eCertificates  are  presented, 
therefore,  besides  adaptation  that  ensures  the  eCertificates  could  be  recognised  by 
various  ePortfolio  systems,  verifiable  qualification  awards  with  secured  supported 
evidence (involving various file types) would be the main requirement for eCertificates 
to be presented in ePortfolio systems. 
Lots of the issues that the ePortfolio face, also apply to the eCertificate system, 
such  as  qualification  data  verification,  access  rights,  system  authentication,  data 
interoperability and transfer, data protection, and copyright. Of all the barriers that the 
ePortfolio faces, users’ lack of technology skills would be the main one to affect the 
eCertificate. If the eCertificate system required digital signing from end users (very 
likely), then the students need to have the knowledge of how to generate and use the eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 32 
key pairs. This is considered as a big task for most students as it possibly requires 
degree level computing skills. To overcome this, the eCertificate system might need to 
develop a sub-system to help with this. 
3.2 Certification and Certificates 
A certificate is the end product of a successful certification process. Therefore, it 
is  necessary  to  understand  the  domain  of  certification  in  order  to  determine  an 
appropriate structure for the eCertificate system. 
3.2.1 Definition of Certification 
Certification  is  defined  as  an  “independent  third  party  confirmation  that  a 
product,  system,  service  or  installer  meets,  and  continues  to  meet  the  appropriate 
standard” [23]. It can be summarized into three catalogues: 
  professional certification: “a person is certified as being able to competently 
complete a job or task, usually by the passing of an examination”; 
  product  certification:  “processes  intended  to  determine  if  a  product  meets 
minimum standards, similar to quality assurance”; 
  cyber security certification: “usually referred to as accreditation, and is also 
referred as eCertification”, such as “organizational certification and digital 
signatures” 
Certification  is  used  in  all  areas  around  us,  such  as  accountancy,  business, 
computer  technology,  economic  development,  as  well  as  the  health  and  education 
sectors. For example, in accountancy and finance, qualified accountants are the experts 
who have successfully passed their certification process, working in public practices, 
private corporations, the financial industry and government bodies [59]. eCert 
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3.2.2 Certification Processes 
Anderson and Fuloria [10] have described the processes, the causes of failure, 
and the need for success for evaluating and certifying products and systems in the 
domain of information security. They claimed that certification is “often used where a 
third party is expected to rely on the protection provided by the evaluated product”. 
Evaluation, “means having a system closely examined by engineers at the National 
Computer Security Center,” as part of the product certification process, which can go 
wrong in nine ways, such as inadequate testing criteria, inappropriate protection profile, 
framework abuse, and target scope which is either too narrow or ambiguous. They 
stated that, for proper product certification, “the vendor would have had to file the 
evaluation report with GCHQ, which would have published it.” However, the Common 
Criteria for  Information Technology Security Evaluation that “permit systems to be 
evaluated  against  a  protection  profile,”  are  not  “well  matched  to  the  needs  of  the 
control systems world,” and suggested that a certification scheme could do better by 
adding “usability testing to its evaluation process” and should “take the whole product 
lifecycle into account.” 
The attention of research on the certification process was drawn onto the 
catalogue of professional certification, since it is the one that directly relates to the 
eCertificate of qualification. 
According to the examples of the certification process in the IT industry from 
Microsoft [100] and Novell [109], the process for achieving their professional 
certification consists of four steps. 
  Search and choose a certification exam from the variety on offer; 
  Choose a preferred study method to prepare for the exam. This can be either 
Instructor-led  Training  (attend  classes  for  interactive  training),  Self-study 
Training  (buy  a  kit;  this  is  a  self-study  cost-effective  training  option,  for 
people  “with  busy  schedules  requiring  flexibility”),  or  Technical  Skills 
Assessment (TSA) to “evaluate your current level of knowledge”; eCert 
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  Register for an exam and take the test in order to be certified. There may be an 
option for the test method, such as practical tests, which “requires completing 
technical scenarios and applying knowledge in a real-world setting; standard 
tests, which consist of computer-based point-and-click, matching, fill-in-the-
blank and multiple-choice questions”. 
  Award the certificate when the test is passed successfully. 
3.2.3  Benefits of Certification 
Earning  professional  certification  not  only  validates  your  expertise,  but  also 
“demonstrates your skills and capabilities to current and future employers and peers”. 
Microsoft summarized the benefit as: “validates your hands-on experience, shows off 
your skills and expertise; matches your current or desired job role with an existing or 
evolving technology; makes connections around the world” [102] 
3.2.4 Issues Related to Certification 
In theory, a qualified person who has successfully passed the certification process 
should be better for the job than an unqualified person, but this is not always true. ISO 
9000 certification is “one of the most popular quality assurance systems in the world”. 
A quality/operations management study which tested “the strength of the relationship 
between ISO 9000 certification and organizational performance in the presence and 
absence of a total quality management (TQM) environment” [156] indicated that ISO 
9000 certification “is not shown to have a significantly positive effect on organizational 
performance in the presence or absence of a TQM environment. This supports the view 
that  on  average  ISO  9000  certification  has  little  or  no  explanatory  power  of 
organizational performance”. 
Other drawbacks included the students’ stress on their exam experience, the need 
to withdraw mis-issued certificates (e.g. plagiarism was found after the certificate has 
been  issued),  and  the  time  limitation  of  some  certificates  (e.g.  a  3  year  First  Aid 
Certificate). In the latter two cases, certificate revocation or recertification is required. eCert 
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Shore and Scheiber [144] stated that “as the certifying boards become established … 
find it desirable to issue certificates that are valid for a stated period”. 
3.2.5 Types of eCertificates 
A certificate is commonly known as a confirmation and proof document that a 
person  has  passed  a  specific  test  or  study.  Certificates  in  different  domains  have 
different levels and also vary between countries. However, the term eCertificate could 
be referred to in many other domains besides qualification award certificates. 
3.2.5.1  eCertificate as e-voucher and e-currency in online marketing 
In online marketing, an e-voucher or e-currency is also called an eCertificate. It 
refers to an online gift card that is equivalent to the plastic gift card in the physical 
world. It is defined as: “a powerful tool to help you combine the effectiveness of face-
to-face sales with the broad based reach of the online marketing…single-use special 
offer  certificate  that  you  define  and  customize.”  [42].  It  integrates  traditional  sales 
methods with the powerful online payment process. It can be used anywhere at any 
time, provided you have network access. 
For example, the DigiProofs eCertificate [42], offers a system for professional 
photographers to provide their clients with the ability to view proofs online. With the 
use of the eCertificate process, photographers are able to pre-generate and distribute the 
eCertificate codes embedded in their order forms. Once customers send in payment 
with  the  order  forms,  the  photographer  activates  the  associated  eCertificate  codes 
online. Customers are then able to view and select the image(s) of their choice, and 
redeem the prepaid package. 
By using an eCertificate approach with its online payment system, companies can 
increase  viewing  exposure,  maximize  orders,  and  bring  in  add-on  sales  while 
simplifying manual payment processes. eCert 
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3.2.5.2  eCertificate as an e-card and printable certificate templates 
Online printable certificate templates and e-cards that have certificates as their 
topic are also  called eCertificates. There  are plenty of free online  applications that 
provide such services to help users create their own eCertificates, such as SmartDraw 
[145] and activ8 [3]. These systems provide a choice of certificate design templates, 
and take a name and a message as input (which varies according to the application), 
and then produces the required personal eCertificate. By using this type of software, a 
professional  certificate  can  easily  be  achieved.    However,  there  is  no  control  on 
security,  therefore  anyone  can  create  such  eCertificates  with  their  preferred 
qualifications. 
3.2.5.3  eCertificate as Public key certificate in system authentication 
In computer security and cryptography, eCertificates refer to digital certificates, 
also known as an identity certificates or a public key certificate. It is “an attachment to 
an electronic message used for security purposes”. It is “an electronic credit card that 
establishes credentials when doing business or other transactions on the Web” [139]. 
FDA ESG describes public key certificate as “an electronic document which conforms 
to the International Telecommunications Union’s X.509 specification” [54]. A public 
key certificate typically contains the following attributes [139]: 
  “The owner’s public key” 
  “The  owner’s  name,  which  can  refer  to  a  person,  a  computer  or  an 
organization” 
  “The expiration date of the public key” 
  “The location (URL) of the issuer (the CA that issued the Digital Certificate)” 
  “Serial number of the Digital Certificate” 
  “The digital signature of the certificate, produced by the issuer’s (the CA’s) 
private key” eCert 
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VeriSign [165] introduced the concept of classes of public key certificate. The 
classes are differentiated by the level of confidence that can be placed in the certificate 
based on knowledge of the process used to verify the owner’s identity. 
  “Class 1 for individuals, intended for email” 
  “Class 2 for organizations, for which proof of identity is required” 
  “Class 3 for servers and software signing, for which independent verification 
and  checking  of  identity  and  authority  is  done  by  the  issuing  certificate 
authority” 
  “Class 4 for online business transactions between companies” 
  “Class 5 for private organizations or governmental security” 
The “most common use of public key certificates is for HTTPS-based web sites”, 
which belong to class 3. With an eCertificate in place, a Web browser will validate 
whether an SSL based Web server is authentic, in other words, if it has been attacked or 
if “the web site is who it claims to be”. This means that the user can “feel secure that 
their interaction with the Web site has no eavesdroppers and that the web site is who it 
claims to be”. 
Public key certificates can be structured. For a hierarchy of structured certificates 
that are used within a company, the only need is to trust the top level. However, the 
“Internet is a large federation of networks for inter-company, inter-organizational, and 
international communication,” which is governed by its members, “a board called the 
Internet Society”; “there really is no “top” for the Internet”. Therefore, there are many 
root CAs “largely structured around national boundaries” [117].  
3.2.5.4  eCertificates as qualification award certificate is new in 
research 
There  was  no  information  regarding  eCertificates  as  qualification  award 
certificates  in  the  literature  when  this  research  started  in  2007.  This  indicated  that 
eCertificates was a new field in research. This was true not only across UK, but also 
worldwide. eCert 
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  In 2009, after two years into this research with the eCertificate system 
design proposed and published, the UK government funded JISC called 
for a research  project  to investigate such  an eCertificate system.  As a 
result of successfully wining the bid, this research had been run as the 
eCert project since 2010 to develop a demo system to prove the proposed 
design from the technical level [28]. 
  Also in 2009, the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations  of  the  Australian  government  established  the  Australian 
Flexible  Learning  Framework,  and  set  up  the  eWork  project  to 
“investigate  existing  learner  information  verification  services  and 
systems” to “identify the verification needs of third parties” [92] [93] 
3.2.6 Fake Certificates 
There are lots of fake certificates abound. The phase “create fake certificate” was 
entered in Google UK search in March 2008, and returned 240 000 results of fake 
certificate services and stories. The quality of the fake certificates varies. The “Easy 
Certificate  Software”
5 provides  “Great-looking  Certificates  in  minutes”;  the  “Fake 
Certificate  Factory”
6  offers  “Replacement  University  Certificate  British  designed 
professional style”; while the “Diploma Centre”
7 stated that they could create authentic 
fake university diplomas, such that their fake diplomas would pass any quality check. 
3.2.7 File Structure and Format of an eCertificate 
The eCertificate file structure and format were the main investigation points in 
eCertificate system design as they affect the interoperability of such an eDocument 
within other systems. 
While the main content of an eCertificate could be mirrored from the paper-based 
certificate, the digital signature scheme [128] also provided information that a digitally 
                                                 
5 http://www.SmartDraw.com 
6 http://www.DiplomasandTranscripts.co.uk 
7 http://www.nd-center.com/ eCert 
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signed eDocument file would contain the digital signature and the public key certificate 
with the signed eDocument. Europass [53] provides an example of a transcript file that 
a  qualification  certificate  could  bind  with.  Further,  many  organisations  require 
additional  evidence  to  support  online  qualification  claims,  e.g.  examples  of  work 
achieved. However, there is no correct answer or guideline found in the literature for 
what an eCertificate file should contain.  
Simple Procedures Online for Cross-border Services project (SPOCS) [147] has 
proposed  an  eDocument  structure,  which  answers  the  needs  of  the  EU  Directive 
2006/123/EU. Its structure design consists three layers: 1. the payload layer, to handle 
the eDocument which comes with various file formats and the official signatures; 2. the 
metadata layer, to provide a minimum set of semantic information about the document; 
3.  The  optional  common  authentication  layer,  to  handle  the  authentication  and 
additional signatures. It has also introduced a new concept: the Omnifarious Container 
for  eDocuments  (OCD),  which  is  “an  extension  of  the  Virtual  Company  Dossier 
concept that has been introduced by the European Public Procurement on Live Project 
(PEPPOL)” [115]. The container “is a physical object, e.g. a PDF or ZIP,” and “holds 
the capability to carry inside any electronic documents.” The idea of the OCD was 
interesting and could be applied to the eCertificate study, as the eCertificate would be 
composed of various files, in different formats, with multiple purposes 
3.2.8 Discussion 
From the research results, the certification process for an academic achievement 
involves  the  processes  of  registration  and  examination,  and  can  be  paper-based, 
computerized,  or  practical.  A  certificate  is  considered  as  a  result  of  a  successful 
certification  process,  whether  this  process  is  computerized  or  not.  Therefore,  an 
eCertificate should also be a result of a successful certification process, whether this 
process is carried out through eCertification or not. In other words, eCertificates should 
be a digital form of certificate that certify facts in exactly the same way as a paper-
based certificate does; it is not for eCertification only! 
The drawbacks of this certification study highlight that the certificates sometimes 
come with time limitations, such that “re-certification is required” [144], together with eCert 
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the fact that there are many fake certificates around, and mis-issued certificates exist 
widely (e.g. as in the case of widespread plagiarism). System support for validation and 
revocation is therefore mandatory. 
The search for eCertificates in the literature has retrieved considerable material 
about public key certification, which is related, but has different concepts. A public key 
certificate binds a public key to an identity. When used as an attachment to a digital 
signature, a valid public key certificate can verify that the key used to sign an electronic 
document or message belongs to the specified individual or organisation. However, the 
eCertificate that is referred to in this research is a digital form of the traditional paper-
based certificate, especially those related to educational achievements, and can be used 
within eLearning and ePortfolios. It is a “paperless reward certificate,” a kind of digital 
qualification certification. It is the electronic qualification information that is associated 
with individuals – the electronic document itself. It is not a digital signature or any 
other kinds of authentication alone. According to this idea, an eCertificate can involve 
public  key  certificate  in  its  signing  process.  These  two  terms  are  analyzed  and 
compared in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 eCertificate VS public key certificate, published in [30] 
  public key certificate   eCertificate 
Issued by   a CA   an exam board 
Purpose   Verify whether who you are and 
what you have are true 
 State who has achieved what 
Usage   Usually used within a selected 
environment or group of 
organizations  
 Can be used anywhere in the 
world 
Verification 
of who you 
are  
 Identify the person from outside the 
system 
 The person is an “insider”, 
the institution should have 
had the identification when 
he/she enrolled for a course. 
Verification 
of what you 
have 
 Verify materials that are from 
anywhere outside the system 
 materials are usually paper based 
 user needs to provide all the 
materials for proof 
 Exam results are in the exam 
board’s own database system 
 No proof is required from the 
student for the achievement. 
Trust   Anyone can be a CA, need to trace 
and find a CA that you trust, this 
may invoke many level of CAs 
 A CA may be invoked to 
provide an eCertificate of 
authentication for an 
eCertificate of qualification. 
The CA is for exam boards, 
aim to certify that they are 
official, recognized 
organizations, ideally the 
“Ministry of Education” 
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In  order  to  issue  an  eCertificate,  the  system  will  need  to  have  access  to  the 
personal data as well as the qualification record, to identify the person who it is being 
issued  to,  and  to  verify  that  they  have  passed  the  relevant  exams.  These  data  and 
records are all required in digital form. This is unlike the certification process, where 
data and records do not have to be computerized. Therefore, this will be the barrier for 
the  use  of  eCertificates  for  some  certification  organizations,  if  they  don’t  have  a 
computerized system for their records. Even though this is unlikely to be the case, it 
cannot be assumed. 
The idea of the OCD could be applied to the eCertificate design to manage the 
various  files,  different  formats  and  multiple  purposes  that  an  eCertificate  file  may 
involve. However, it does not seem to address the security issue that appears in the 
eCertificate case, but this can be investigated further in the design stage. 
3.3 Security 
Security control will be a key factor of a successful system. The purpose of this 
section is to find out what areas of an eCertificate system need to be secured. 
3.3.1 Definition of Security 
Security is defined as the “condition of being protected against danger or loss. In 
the  general,  it  is  a  concept  similar  to  safety”  with  “an  added  emphasis  on  being 
protected from dangers that originate from outside”, that “something not only is secure 
but  that  it  has  been  secured”.  Security  can  mean  traditional  physical  security,  IT 
security, or the combination of the both. There are a wide range of issues involved in IT 
security alone. Federal Standard 1037C defines security as “1. A condition that results 
from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensures a state of 
inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 2. With respect to classified matter, the 
condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information 
that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. 3. Measures taken by a military 
unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which 
may, impair its effectiveness.” [55]. eCert 
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3.3.2 The Goals of Computer Security 
To  build  a  secure  computing  system,  we  also  need  to  find  the  right  balance 
among the three goals: confidentiality, integrity and availability (also known as the CIA 
Triad). 
Confidentiality is also called secrecy or privacy. It ensures that “computer-related 
assets are accessed only by authorized parties”. Integrity means that “assets can be 
modified” only when they are under authorized control of “who or what can access 
which resources and in what ways”. Availability means that “assets can be accessed to 
those authorized at appropriate times”. It applies to both data and services [117]. 
Their  relationships  can  be  summarized  as:  protection  of  confidentiality  can 
restrict availability and affect integrity. Enhanced integrity will reduce confidentiality 
and availability. Wide availability will put integrity and confidentiality at risk. 
3.3.3 Types of Security 
In order to further understand how security controls apply to data, programs, the 
systems, the communications links, the devices, the environment, and the personnel, 
the  following  topics  were  reviewed:  data  security,  database  security,  information 
security,  computing  security,  program/application  security,  network  security,  and 
human controls in security. 
  Data Security: 
o  It ensures that data “is kept safe from corruption and that access to it is 
suitably controlled. Thus data security helps to ensure privacy. It also helps 
in protecting personal data”.  
o  The ways that we secure our data is changing. Ablisser et al. describe that 
“in the old days, data security and privacy were easily provided by storage 
in a locked box or file cabinet. Conversion of such records into digital data 
in  databases  on  local  and  wide  area  networks  markedly  increases  the 
provider’s exposure to liabilities” [9]. eCert 
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o  Data security is also there to ensure individuals are treated fairly. In the 
UK, the Data Protection Act [162] “is used to ensure that personal data is 
accessible to those whom it concerns, and provides redress to individuals if 
there are inaccuracies. It states that only individuals and companies with 
legitimate and lawful reasons can process personal information and cannot 
be shared”. 
o  The International Standard ISO/IEC 17799 covers data security [120], “is 
intended  as  a  common  basis  and  practical  guideline  for  developing 
organizational  security  standards  and  effective  security  management 
practices  …  One  of  its  cardinal  principles  is  that  all  stored 
information/data, should be owned so that it is clear whose responsibility it 
is to protect and control access to that data”. 
o  Encryption is one of the effective ways to secure data. The most common 
cryptosystems are DES, AES, and RSA. The applications of cryptography 
include  hash  functions,  key  exchange  protocols,  digital  signatures,  and 
certificates [117]. 
  Database Security: 
o  Protecting data is the heart of many secure systems. In many cases, this 
relies on the database management system (DBMS). The requirements of 
database  control  include  “physical  database  integrity,  logical  database 
integrity,  element  integrity,  audit  ability,  access  control,  user 
authentication, and availability” [117]. 
o  Databases may contain sensitive data, and these sensitive data may also be 
subject to different levels of degree which could challenge access control. 
o  There are five main approaches for ensuring confidentiality in multilevel 
secure  databases:  integrity  lock,  trusted  front  end,  commutative  filters, 
distributed databases, and restricted views. 
  Information Security: eCert 
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o  Information security is defined as “protecting information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, 
or destruction” [57]. The three components: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability are “the core principles of information security”. Information 
Systems  can  be  categorized  into  three  sections:  hardware,  software  and 
communications,  and  three  levels  or  layers:  physical,  personal  and 
organizational.  
o  Many  organizations  including  governments,  military,  and  business 
companies,  collect  confidential  information  about  their  employees, 
customers,  and  products,  which  is  then  “processed  and  stored  on 
computers,  and  transmitted  across  networks”.  While  the  information 
satisfies  the  organizations’  needs,  the  organizations  become  exposed  to 
information leaks, unauthorised access and abuse of their data. Protecting 
confidential information is now a legal requirement in many domains. In 
some cases, “information security has a significant effect on privacy, which 
is also viewed very differently in different cultures”. 
o  In  principle,  information  security  includes  system  authentication;  non-
repudiation; risk management; administrative, logical and physical controls; 
information classification; access control, and cryptography. 
  Program/application security: 
o  Application  security  is  “the  use  of  software,  hardware,  and  procedural 
methods to protect applications from external threats. Security measures 
built into applications and a sound application security routine minimize 
the  likelihood  that  hackers  will  be  able  to  manipulate  applications  and 
access, steal, modify, or delete sensitive data” [155]. 
o  Yoder and Barcalow claimed that “the goal of application security is to 
keep  unwanted  perpetrators  from  gaining  access  to  application  areas 
where  they  can  find  confidential  information  or  can  corrupt  data.  … 
making an application secure is much harder than just adding a password 
protected login screen”. [177] eCert 
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  Computer security: 
o  Pfleeger [117] has catalogued the security flaws in computing development 
into two general classes: one is compromise or change data, and the other 
one is affect computer service. Pfleeger has also stated three controls on 
these  activities:  “development  controls,  operating  system  controls,  and 
administrative  controls”.  The  “development  controls  limit  software 
development  activities”;  the  operation  system  provides  controls  to  limit 
“access to computing system objects”, while the “administrative controls 
limit the kinds of actions people can take”. 
  Network security: 
o  Network  security  consists  of  an  “underlying  computer  network 
infrastructure, policies adopted by the network administrator to protect the 
network  and  the  network-accessible  resources  from  unauthorized  access 
and the effectiveness (or lack) of these measures combined together”.[94] 
o  Network assets include the network infrastructure, applications programs, 
and data. The strongest network controls are solid authentication, access 
control,  and  encryption.  There  are  three  controls  that  are  specific  to 
networks:  firewalls,  intrusion  detection  system,  and  secure  e-mail. 
Wesinger claimed that firewalls “provide enhanced network security and 
user transparency” [170]. Network security can be assessed: e.g. Gleichauf 
has proposed a method and system for “adaptive network security using a 
network vulnerability assessment” [64]; Boyle has proposed an “apparatus 
and method for providing multi-level security for communication among 
computers and terminals on a network“ [22]; and Hershey has proposed a 
system and method “using a parallel finite state machine adaptive active 
monitor and responder” [75] 
  Human controls in security 
o  Most of the computer-based security breaches are “caused by either human 
or environmental factors”. This can be “the administration of security” (e.g. 
the security planning and risk analysis), the economics of cyber security eCert 
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(e.g. the cost and benefit analysis of spending in security), the ownership 
and  usage  of  the  collected  data,  and  the  law  and  ethics  that  control 
malicious behaviour.[127] 
3.3.4 Security Components and Assurance 
Security  has  three  components:  requirements,  policy,  and  mechanisms. 
“Requirements  define  security  goals.  Policy  defines  the  meaning  of  security. 
Mechanisms  enforce  policy”.  “These  components  exist  in  all  manifestations  of 
security” [18]. 
Lee  [86]  referred  to  the  security  policy  as  “a  statement  of  intent  about  the 
required control over access to data”. He has also summarized it into three types that 
are  “generally  used  in  secure  computer  systems”:  confidentiality  policy,  integrity 
policy, and availability policy. 
Security  assurance  is  used  for  “measuring  how  well  requirements  conform  to 
needs, policy conforms to requirements, and mechanisms implement the policy”.[83] 
3.3.5 Security Problem 
To build a secure computing system, we need to find out what threats it faces, 
what vulnerabilities it has, and what controls it needs. 
Pfleeger [117] defines a threat to a computing system as “a set of circumstances 
that has the potential to cause loss or harm”; a vulnerability as “a weakness in the 
security  system”;  and  control  as  “an  action,  device,  procedure,  or  technique  that 
removes  or  reduces  a  vulnerability,  and  used  as  a  protective  measure”.  The 
relationships of these three terms are described in his book Security in Computing as: 
“A threat is blocked by control of vulnerability”. Pfleeger [117] also catalogued the 
threats  to  a  computing  system  in  four  main  attacks:  interruption,  interception, 
modification, and fabrication; he stated that the vulnerabilities resources/components of 
a computing system that “subject to attacks are hardware, software, and data”; and he 
pointed out that controls can be applied to “data, programs, the systems, the physical 
devices, the communications links, the environment, and the personnel”. eCert 
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3.3.6 Issues in Security Implementation 
Acquisti and Grossklags have well described our system users that “consumers 
often  lack  enough  information  to  make  privacy-sensitive  decisions  and,  even  with 
sufficient  information,  are  likely  to  trade  off  long-term  privacy  for  short-term 
benefits”[2]. Martinovic and Ralevich agree with the view, and said that “individuals 
are often willing to trade privacy for convenience or bargain the release of personal 
information in exchange for relatively small rewards and are reluctant to adopt privacy 
technologies”  [96].  Adams  and  Sasse  commented  on  password  security  [6]  that 
“because security mechanisms are designed, implemented, and breached by people, 
human factors should be considered in their design”. 
Martinovic  and  Ralevich  pointed  out  that  “one  way  of  protecting  privacy  is 
reduction  of  stored  sensitive  information  to  the  necessary  minimum  and  raising 
awareness of threat of identity theft”; and security “has to be built-in instead of being 
added-on”, so that the system can avoid user flaws and “does not require from users to 
gain knowledge and understanding of what needs to be done in order to further protect 
their privacy, prevent unauthorised access, or maintain data confidentiality” [96]. 
3.3.7 Discussion 
One of the purposes of this section is to find out what kinds of securities will be 
required by eCertificates, but there is no clear answer. The catalogue of security topics 
is very big and very confused: many of them overlap, and are catalogued in different 
places at the same time. Different people have different views of grouping them. Terms 
such as data security and information security are “frequently used interchangeably; 
they are interrelated and share the common goals of protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information” [153]. Their differences “lie primarily in the 
approach to the subject, the methodologies used, and the areas of concentration” [85]. 
To secure a computer-based system, there is a need to find out what threats it 
faces, what vulnerabilities it has, what controls it needs; and consider them through five 
components: hardware, software, data, policies  and people. There is also a need to 
determine  the  right  balance  between  the  three  goals:  confidentiality,  integrity  and eCert 
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availability. In the case of eCertificates, there is a need to consider all these areas in our 
design, and find the right balance among the goals, to minimise stored data, and to 
build-in system security support functions so that the system is user friendly while 
maintaining a high level of security. 
From the understanding of security at this research stage, the eCertificate system 
involved  data  security,  database  security,  information  security,  program  security, 
network security, and human controls in security. 
Any  issues  in  computing  security,  such  as  hardware,  operating  systems,  and 
firewalls,  were  considered  as  not  directly  related  to  an  eCertificate  system,  and 
therefore were ignored in further research of the eCertificate framework. 
The literature review has just scratched the surface of security, in order to have an 
overview  of  the  security  design  for  the  eCertificate  system.  The  technical  part  of 
security methods research was carried out alongside the project. 
3.4 Encryption and the Digital Signature 
Application 
Encryption is a technique to address the block, intercept, modify, and fabricate 
attacks  during a message transmission. Pfleeger described it as  “probably the most 
fundamental building block of secure computing, it is a means of maintaining secure 
data in a secure environment” [117]. 
Since  encryption  is  the  method  for  security,  eDocument  related  encryption 
applications were investigated for the purpose of eCertificate security, such as water 
marking and digital signature. 
Water  marking  is  one  of  the  methods  used  in  protecting  digital  data  from 
unauthorized  copying.  “By  embedding  a  cryptographic  string,  or  water  mark,  a 
legitimate author can demonstrate the origin of the file” [117]. However, although 
water marking can protect unauthorized copying and indicate who the issuer is, for use eCert 
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in our eCertificate case, it could not prove that the issuer was an authorized educational 
body. 
Digital signature, on the other hand, turned out to be the most suitable for an 
eCertificate  system  as  it  can  not  only  detect  unauthorized  modification,  but  also 
addresses the trust issues by providing the chain of authorities. 
3.4.1 Definition of Encryption 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger defined encryption as “the process of encoding a message 
so  that  its  meaning  is  not  obvious”,  while  decryption  is  “the  reverse  process, 
transforming an encrypted message back into its normal, original form” [117]. 
Encryption can be symmetric (encryption and decryption keys are the same) or 
asymmetric (encryption and decryption keys come in pairs, so that a message encrypted 
with the encryption key can only be decrypted by the corresponding decryption key). 
Both of the encryption systems provide authentication, proof that a message received 
was sent by the declared sender while the keys have not been compromised. 
3.4.2 Symmetric Cryptosystems 
The most widely used symmetric (Private Key) cryptosystems today are Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
3.4.2.1  Data Encryption Standard  
DES is an encryption algorithm, published as a National Bureau of Standards in 
1977. Pfleeger and Pfleeger describe it as a “careful and complex combination of two 
fundamental building blocks of encryption: substitution and transposition” [117] 
DES uses a 56-bit key size, which, according to Johnson [81], was a compromise 
result between 64 and 48 bits by the National Security Agency (NSA) and International 
Business  Machines  Corporation  (IBM).  Stallings  [149]  claimed  that  the  reason  for 
reducing  the  key  size  was  to  fit  on  a  single  chip.  However,  rapidly  increasing 
availability of computational power, which made many attacks, such as the brute force, eCert 
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a possibility, the 56-bit key size was considered as too small and insecure for many 
applications. A classic example is a DES key that was broken in 22 hours and 15 
minutes,  which  was  a  result  of  a  public  collaboration  by  distributed.net  and  the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation in January 1999. 
Double DES and Triple DES was also developed to enhance the security of DES. 
Triple DES has been approved by NIST for sensitive government information up to the 
end of 2030 [104, 107], and according to Microsoft TechNet product documentation 
[101,  107],  “Microsoft  Outlook  2007,  Microsoft  OneNote,  and  Microsoft  System 
Center  Configuration  Manager  2012  are  using  Triple  DES  for  password  control”. 
However, as there are some analytical results that show the “theoretical weaknesses in 
the cipher”, DES has been superseded, and the Advance Encryption Standard (AES) 
has been developed to adjust the security needs. 
3.4.2.2  Advanced Encryption Standard  
As  announced  by  NIST,  the  AES  was  established  in  2001,  originally  called 
Rijndael [106]. Westlund stated in a NIST report that AES was going to supersede DES 
in 2002 [172]. According to Schneier et al., AES is based on “the design principle of 
substitution-permutation  network”,  and  is  considered  as  “fast  in  both  software  and 
hardware” [138]. AES is a “variant of the original Rijndael, which has a restricted 
block size of 128 bits”, and is described in Kelsey et al.’s paper as having “10 rounds 
for 128-bit keys, 12 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys” [56]. 
After  a  5-year  long  standardization  and  evaluation  process,  the  U.S.  government 
announced in June 2003 that the “AES could be used to protect top secret  information” 
[74].  
The first successful attack against the full AES was published in 2011, named 
Key-recovery attacks [16, 21]. Before this, there had been many other attacks targeted 
at the AES, such as the XSL attack [137], the related-key attack [17], and known-key 
distinguishing  attack  [62].  However,  they  are  either  theory  only  or  just  work  for 
specific key lengths but not the full AES. 
There are other types of attack also affecting the security of the system that the 
AES employed, such as the cache-timing attack announced by Bernstein in 2005 [15] eCert 
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and the “near real time” secret key recovery published by Bangerter et al. in 2010. 
These  “side-channel  attacks”  do  not  target  the  “underlying  cipher”  but  the 
implementation of the cipher on system, which leads to the data leak [13].  
3.4.3 Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
Asymmetric Cryptosystems, also called Public Key Cryptosystems, are the most 
common. The most widely used asymmetric cryptosystems today are RSA and DSA. 
3.4.3.1  Rivest-Shamir- Adelman Algorithm 
RSA is named for its inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman in 1978. The RSA 
algorithm is “similar to the Merkle-Hellman method, … finding terms that add to a 
particular sum or multiple to a particular product”; it is based on the “underlying 
problem of factoring large numbers” [117]. 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger’s described it in [117] the RSA algorithm uses two keys: 
the  encryption  key  e  and  the  decryption  key  d.  The  key  generation  starts  from  a 
selection of two prime numbers p and q, which should be quite large, “typically, p and 
q are nearly 100 digits each”; n is a product of p and q, in this case, it could be around 
200 digits long, which is about 512 bits; “depending on the application, 768, 1024, or 
more bits may be more appropriate.”; A relatively large integer e is next to be chosen, 
such that “e is relatively prime to (p-1)*(q-1)”, and then d is selected as “e*d = 1 mod 
(p-1)*(q-1)”; “A plaintext message P is encrypted to ciphertext C by C = P
e mod n; the 
plaintext is recovered by P = C
d mod n”, where “P = C
d mod n = (P
d)




Ireland has pointed out that one of the weaknesses of RSA is when the same key 
is used for encryption and signing: “Given that the underlying mathematics is the same 
for encryption and signing, only in reverse, if an attacker can convince a key holder to 
sign an unformatted encrypted message using the same key then she gets the original” 
[80]. 
The inventors, Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman, explained that the operation of the 
RSA starts from creating and publishing the public key while keeping the private key eCert 
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secret. They claimed that “anyone who has the public key can encrypt a message, but if 
the public key is large enough, only someone with the private key can feasibly decode 
the message” [128]. 
There are attacks against plain RSA, such as the chosen plaintext attack and the 
chosen-ciphertext attack. Ciphertexts can be easily decrypted if the “low encryption 
exponents (e.g., e = 3) and small values of the m, (i.e. m < n
1/e)” were chosen [39, 73]. 
While the underlying RSA computations are always the same, some advanced 
schemes  have  been  developed  with  variants  on  how  they  can  be  used  inside  an 
encryption. One such is the Padding scheme, which has been designed to increase the 
security by “embedding some form of structure into the value m before encrypting”. 
The  PKCS#1  is  the  standard  “designed  to  securely  pad  messages  prior  to  RSA 
encryption [82].  
3.4.3.2  EI Gamal and Digital Signature Algorithms 
Besides the well known RSA, EI Gamal devised another public key algorithm in 
1984. This algorithm “is not widely used directly, but it is of considerable importance 
in the U.S. Digital Signature Standard (DSS) of the NIST” [117]. 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger described this: The EI Gamal algorithm [47] key generation 
starts from a selection of a prime number p and two integers, a and x, such that “a < p 
and calculate y = a
x mod p”; also the prime p “should be chosen so that (p - 1) has a 
large prime factor q”. When signing a message m, a random integer k will be chosen, 
where the k need to be not been used before, satisfying 0 < k < p – 1, and is relatively 
prime to (p - 1). The message signature (r and s) is then computed through r = a
k mod p 
and s = k
-1 (m - xr) mod (p - 1), where “k
-1 is the multiplicative inverse of k mod (p - 1), 
so that k * k
-1  = 1 mod (p - 1)”. When verifying a message, the public key y will be 
used to “compute y
r r
s mod p and determine that it is equivalent to a
m mod p” [117]. 
The  Digital  Signature  Algorithm  (DSA)  is  also  referred  to  as  the  Digital 
Signature Standard (DSS). It was proposed by the NIST in August 1991, specified in 
FIPS 186 [45], with the latest version of FIPS 186-3 in 2009 [46]. DSA is “the EI 
Gamal Algorithm with a few restrictions”, such as [117] eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 54 
  “The size of p is specificallyfixed at 2
512 <p < 2
512” which makes the p at 
about 170 decimal digits long; 
  “q, the large prime factor of (p – 1) is chosen so that 2159 < q < 2160”; 
  Use of a hash value, H(m), instead of the full message text m 
  “the computations of r and s are taken mod q” 
Pomin  and  Stern  [118]  clearly  state  that  RSA  and  DSA  are  “two  completely 
different algorithms, RSA keys can go up to 4096 bits, where DSA has to be exactly 
1024 bits”. 
DSA is “faster for signature generation but slower for validation”, but when used 
for encryption, DSA is “slower when encrypting but faster when decrypting”. Security 
of DSA and RSA are considered equivalent when compared with equal key length. 
According to Schneier [136], “both DSA and RSA with the same length keys are just 
about identical in difficulty to crack.” 
3.4.4 Symmetric vs Asymmetric 
Although the symmetric encryption can provide a “two-way channel” between 
two users with only one shared secret key, there are three main issues found in the 
literature  of  employing  a  symmetric  key  system,  which  are  in  the  areas  of  key 
compromise, distribution, and management.  Pfleeger and Pfleeger summarised them in 
their book [117] as: 
  Once a key is compromised, all the encrypted information under them can be 
revealed.  To  avoid  this,  keys  need  to  be  changed  frequently  so  that  “a 
compromised key will reveal only a limited amount of information” 
  Key  distribution  is  a  problem,  and  it  requires  handling  by  hand  or  using 
methods such as 2-piece key distribution. 
  Key management is the biggest problem: “the number of keys needed increases 
at a rate proportional to the square of the number of users”, in which “n users 
who want to communicate in pairs need n*(n-1)/2 keys”. It is most suitable for a 
small group of people exchanging secret information directly; methods such as eCert 
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“clearing  house”  or  “forwarding  office”  would  be  required  when  a  wide 
network exchanging is involved. 
On the other hand, the asymmetric system which uses a public key and a private 
key, only requires one key pair per user. However, to perform a public key encryption 
can take 10,000 times longer than a symmetric encryption because  “the underlying 
modular  exponentiation  depends  on  multiplication  and  division,  …  is  reserved  for 
specialised,  infrequent  uses,  where  slow  operation  is  not  a  continuing  problem” 
[117]These two systems are compared in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Comparing Secret Key and Public Key Encryption, reprint from [117] 
  Secret Key (Symmetric)  Public Key (Asymmetric) 
Number of keys  1  2 
Protection of 
key 
Must be kept secret  One key must be kept secret; the 
other can be freely exposed 
Best uses  Cryptographic workhorse; 
secrecy and integrity of data – 
single characters to blocks of 
data, messages, files 
Key exchange, authentication 
Key distribution   Must be out-of-band  Public key can be used to 
distribute other keys 
Speed  Fast  Slow; typically, 10,000 times 
slower than secret key  
3.4.5 Definition of Digital Signature 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger described digital signature as “a protocol that produces the 
same effect as a real signature: it is a mark that only the sender can make, but other 
people  can  easily  recognize  as  belonging  to  the  sender”;  they  defined  it  as  “a 
mathematical  scheme  for  demonstrating  the  authenticity  of  a  digital  message  or 
document”; “it is a sequence of bits applied with public key cryptography, so that many eCert 
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people using a public key can verify the authenticity of bits, but only one person using 
the corresponding private key could have created them” [117] 
3.4.6 The Trust in Digital Signature 
The word “trust” has been used in security. Pfleeger and Pfleeger stated [117] 
that  “security  professionals  prefer  to  speak  of  trusted  instead  of  secure  operating 
system”. They also pointed out that “trust is perceived by the system’s receiver or user, 
not by its developer, designer, or manufacturers”, and “there can be degrees of trust”. 
They  describe  a  trusted  system  as  “a  system  that  employs  sufficient  hardware  and 
software integrity measures to allow its use for processing sensitive information”. 
For a successful online communication or transmission, the parties involved need 
to “establish trust without having met” through a “common respected individual” [117]. 
To increase security and establish the trust, digital signature makes use of Hashing and 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
3.4.7 Hash in Digital Signature 
Hashing  is  one  of  the  encryption  applications.  The  most  widely  used  hash 
functions include MD4, MD5, and SHA/SHS. In cryptography, a hash is also called 
“checksum or message digest”. It is a one-way function for which the encryption is 
easy to compute, but the inverse decryption is much more difficult. 
A one-way hash function can be used to “seal” a file, so that “any change to even 
a single bit will alter the checksum result”. This is “similar to the use of wax seals on 
leathers in medieval days” [117]. When a hash is used in the digital signing process, a 
message is not signed directly, but rather first hashed to produce a constant size digest, 
and then the digest is signed instead of the message. When the checksum value is 
stored with the file, and if the computed checksum value matches the stored value on 
access,  it  is  “likely  that  the  file  has  not  been  changed”  [117].  This  hash-then-sign 
method increases system security, and can guard against attacks such as the chosen-
message attack [91].   eCert 
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3.4.8 Public Key Infrastructure 
Toorani defined public-key infrastructure (PKI) as “a set of hardware, software, 
people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and 
revoke  digital  certificates”  [158].  Pfleeger  and  Pfleeger  defined  PKI  as  “a  process 
created  to  enable  users  to  implement  public  key  cryptography,  usually  in  a  large 
setting”. He also noted that PKI offers users a set of identification and access control 
services, including: creating certificates associating user’s identity and the public key; 
signing  certificates;  confirm/deny  if  a  certificate  is  valid;  invalidate  certificates  if 
withdrawn or if signing key has been exposed [117] 
PKI consists of the following main components [8, 99, 158, 164, 176]: 
  Registration Authority (RA): an agency who verifies public keys and the 
identities  of  their  holders  before  binding,  ensuring  the  keys  meet  the 
international standard 
  Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to the identities of their 
holders, responsible for issuing and revoking of Public key certificates 
  Validation Authority (VA): an agency that provides information on behalf 
of the CA 
  Public key certificate: a document that is signed by a certificate authority 
(CA),  certifying  the  accuracy  of  the  binding  of  a  public  key  and  its 
owner’s identity (also reviewed in the Certificate section) 
  Certificate  Repository  (CR):  stores  Public  key  certificates  and 
Certification Revocation Lists (CRLs) 
  Central Directory: a secure location for store and index keys 
The principle of PKI outlined in literature [158, 160, 164, 166] is: 
1.  A user applies for a certificate with his public key at RA; 
2.  RA verifies and confirms the user’s identity to the CA; 
3.  CA signs the public key certificate with CA’s private key and issues the 
certificate to the user; 
4.  CA also sends information about issued certificates to VA; eCert 
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5.  The user can now sign eDocuments with his private key and attach the 
Public Key Certificate to the eDocument; 
6.  The integrity of the eDocument can then be verified on access and the 
user’s identity can be checked by the VA on behalf of the CA. 
PKI provides a hierarchy trust structure [117]: through PKI, a chain of CAs can 
be traced to find a trusted note from the signer’s public key certificate, such that not 
only can the signer be tracked down, but also the CA, and the CA’s CAs, all the way to 
the  root  CA.  Yeun  [176]  comments  on  PKI  in  his  paper  as  “trusted  services  that 
enables the secure transfer of information and supports a wide variety of E-Commerce 
applications”.  He  also  pointed  out  that  a  properly  implemented  PKI  can  provide 
“Confidentiality:  communications  between  two  parties  remain  secret;  Integrity:  no 
unauthorized  modification  of  information  between  two  parties;  Authentication:  the 
process  of  reliably  determining  the  identity  of  a  communication  party;  and  Non-
repudiation: impossible for communicating parties to falsely deny.” [176] 
3.4.9 Digital Signature Theory 
The  core  of  the  PKI  is  the  digital  signature,  which  employs  asymmetric 
cryptography  and  “consists  of  three  algorithms:  key  generation  algorithm,  signing 
algorithm, and signature verifying algorithm”. Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman, the RSA 
inventors,  describe  the  signing  algorithm  of  a  digital  signature  as  “A  message  is 
encrypted by representing it as a number M, raising M to a publicly specified power e, 
and  then  taking  the remainder  when  the  result  is  divided  by  the  publicly  specified 
product, n, of two large secret prime numbers p and q” and the verification algorithm 
as “secret power d is used, where e d ≡1 (mod (p - 1) _ (q - 1)).” They also stated that 
“the security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published 
divisor, n” [128]. 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger pointed out that a digital signature must meet two primary 
conditions: “unforgettable” and “authentic,” such that only person P can sign message 
M, and produce a signature of S(P,M). It is “impossible for anyone else to produce the 
(M,  S(P,M)),”  and  such  a  signature  can  be  checked  on  receive  [117].  They  also 
mentioned  that  a  digital  signature  has  two  properties:  “not  alterable”  and  “not eCert 
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reusable”, such that the message M will not be reused or modified without notice on 
receive  [117].  A  valid  digital  signature  provides  authentication,  integrity,  and  non-
repudiation, such that it gives the receiver reason to believe that the message was sent 
by the signer, it has not been modified without authorization, and at the same time, the 
signer can not deny he/she signed the message. 
In practice, an eDocument will first be hashed; the hashed value (message digest) 
will then be encrypted using the signing algorithm with the issuer’s private key; the 
result of the encrypted hash is the new called the digital signature of the message, 
which can be attached in the eDocument along with the Public key certificate before 
distribution.  On  receipt,  the  eDocument  will  first  be  hashed  again;  and  the  digital 
signature (the encrypted hash) will be decrypted using the verification algorithm with 
the user’s public key; if these two hash values matched, then the received message is 
considered  as  valid,  it  has  not  been  modified  since  it  is  signed  and  it  is  from  the 
claimed public key’s owner. 
Another  verification  process  is  checking  the  revocation  status/validity  of  the 
public key certificate. This can be done by checking the CA’s certificate revocation list 
(CRL). X509 is a standard for a PKI, specifies the standard formats for public key 
certificates and CRL. 
3.4.10 Security Issues in Digital Signature 
Security assurance of digital signature has been published in the literature [82, 91, 
117], that includes these characteristics. 
1.  Quality algorithms: Some simple public-key algorithms with small chosen 
prime numbers are known to be insecure, and are easily attacked  
2.  Quality  implementations:  a  good  algorithm  with  no  implementation 
mistakes form the base of the security design 
3.  Secret private key: The private key must remain private at all times  
4.  Ensure trust: The public key certificate must be verifiable and the CAs 
can be traced  
5.  Correct procedure: Users must carry out the process properly. eCert 
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Many attacks  target  the  digital  signature, such  as  key-only  existential  forgery 
attack [95] and chosen-message attack [91]. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest studied 
some  of  these  attacks  and  published  the  attack  results  in  the  SIAM  Journal  on 
Computing [65].   
The review of digital signature has been focused on the security holes that may 
have  a  special  impact  on  eCertificates.  As  a  result,  two  main  issues  raised  in  the 
literature have been identified; however, one of the main eCertificate security concerns: 
the content status validation of a digitally signed eDocument, has not been mentioned 
in literature. These three issues are detailed below. 
3.4.10.1 Issue 1 - public key certificate status validation 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is a list of the issued public key certificates 
that need to be revoked. The reasons for the revocation can vary, but according to the 
revocation reason code specified in RFC 5280 [105], it is categorized as: “unspecified; 
keyCompromise;  cACompromise;  affiliationChanged;  superseded; 
cessationOfOperation;  certificateHold;  removeFromCRL;  privilegeWithdrawn;  and 
aACompromise.” 
When  accessing  a  digitally  signed  eDocument,  the  system  will  automatically 
verify the integrity of the document by comparing the eDocument’s hash value against 
the decrypted signature hash value. The reviewer will be informed if the signature is 
invalid (the two hash values do not match) [82, 91]. However, not all systems will 
automatically check the status of the signature’s signing key (the public key certificate) 
against the CRL. Some of them require the reviewer to manually open up the public 
key certificate to check the status when concerned, while some of them require the 
receiver to configure the system to enable the function. 
In practice, a message may be displayed with a valid signature: “This document 
and all items contained in the document file are signed. All signatures are valid. Click 
here to view the signer’s identity.” Pronichkin commented that “CRL checking takes 
place  on  a  per  application  basis,  …  Some  applications  make  verification  failures 
visible to the user while other applications stay silent and suppress such messages” eCert 
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[119]. This is a known security hole; it can lead to documents signed by a revoked key 
being accepted, if this part of the verification process has been skipped. 
3.4.10.2 Issue 2 – eDocument content validation 
The simplest form of signing is called Comprehensive Signing,  where  one or 
multiple  signatures  is  used  to  sign  all  the  content  in  a  single  document  with  no 
reference  to  external  content.  In  addition,  the  eDocument  contents  have  also  been 
categorized into four additional groups according to their different signing situations. 
These four groups are: Unsigned content, Signed content groups, Externally referenced 
content, and Dynamic content [41]. Signing for contents that fall into any of these four 
categories  will  invalidate  the  trust  and  should  be  avoided.  “From  a  signature-trust 
standpoint, content that can be dynamically added, removed or altered is by its very 
nature unsignable.” When the situation is unavoidable, clear notifications should be 
provided [41]. 
  For a document with pages/parts left unsigned or added later as unsigned 
parts, a verification result message should be displayed clearly to inform 
users of the unsigned but associated content. 
  For a document with different signed content groups, a verification result 
message should be displayed clearly to inform users that signatures that 
relate to different content groups are independent. 
  For a document with externally referenced content, a verification result 
message should be displayed clearly to enable the user to understand the 
situations and identify the unsigned external materials. 
  For a document with dynamic content, such as inserted variable texts or 
results  of  running  macros,  a  verification  result  message  should  be 
displayed  clearly  and  accurately  to  enable  the  user  to  understand  the 
situations and identify the unsigned dynamic materials. 
Signing  contents  can  also  present  in  various  content  types,  such  as  text 
documents, media files, and programme code. To accompany the various content types 
and signing categories, a digital signature with XML syntax has been defined,  which 
can be used for signing data resources of any type and is most suitable for signing eCert 
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XML  documents  [103,  167].  Three  signing  methods  have  been  defined:  detached 
signature can be used for signing externally referenced resources; enveloped signature 
can be used for signing part of the document; enveloping signature can be used to sign 
a whole document and wrap the signed content within itself. This XML signature has 
the advantage over other forms of digital signatures, such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
[180] as it operates on XML Info set rather than binary data. This allows various ways 
of binding the signature and the signed content [103, 141]. 
However, although the XML signature provides helpful signing methods, it still 
does not solve the security issue when unsigned content is involved. This needs to be 
addressed when designing the eCertificate system. 
3.4.10.3 Issue 3 – eDocument status validation 
After a long search in  the literature, information was found about revoking a 
digitally signed eDocument and was all about the signing key being compromised. No 
information was found about revoking a signed document due to a changed situation so 
that the signed content is no longer true. This is similar to the unsignable dynamic 
content that also involves some changes after signing, but the difference in this is the 
document can just be a simple static file and perfectly signable. Taking the eCertificate 
as an example, it could be a simple text file when it is signed, but what happens if fake 
evidence, or copied work, or cheating, has been found after the certificate has been 
miss-issued?, How can the eCertificate be revoked due to this changed situation but 
where  the  key  has  not  been  compromised?  For  the  eCertificate,  the  public  key 
certificate  must  be  checked  against  the  certificate  revocation  list  (CRL)  and  also 
whether the content of the eCertificate, the qualification award certificate, has been 
withdrawn. Thus the issues faced are of having two types of certificates to be verified: 
one well-documented and supported, and the other with no information at all. It might 
be called the (eCertificate)
2 issue! 
3.4.11 Discussion 
Encryption,  as  the  security  method,  has  been  reviewed.  Both  Symmetric  and 
Asymmetric  encryption  methods  have  their  pros  and  cons.  A  combination  of  the eCert 
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asymmetric  encryption  application  (digital  signature)  and  the  symmetric  encryption 
application  (hash  function)  has  turned  out  to  be  the  favourite  for  securing  an 
eCertificate. With the support of PKI, these could well provide the eCertificate system 
with confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. 
However, three issues relevant to eCertificate have been identified: public key 
certificate  status  validation,  eDocument  content  validation,  and  eDocument  status 
validation. Unlike the first two known issues, the third, eDocument status validation, is 
unique for the case of an eCertificate, although it is not mentioned in the literature.  All 
three issues need to be addressed when designing the eCertificate system in order to 
provide the confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation throughout the eCertificate 
lifecycle (issue, distribute, and review). 
3.5 Privacy and ownership 
With  technology  developing  rapidly,  and  information  gathering  and  sharing 
become much easier, the privacy and ownership issues of the eCertificate have also 
increased.   
3.5.1 Privacy Rights 
Privacy, is generally understood and has remain unnoticed or unidentified by the 
public, as “an Aspect of Human Dignity” [19], and has been studied for decades. Cohen 
described privacy is “anything but old-fashioned, … an indispensable structural feature 
of liberal democratic political systems … is foundational to the capacity for critical 
self-reflection  and  informed  citizenship,  …  is  also  foundational  to  the  capacity  for 
innovation” [38] 
Cavoukian thinks that identity and privacy are “closely related”, when a person’s 
identity is unknown, he/she “tend to have more privacy”. He has also used paying for a 
coffee as an example. If you pay cash, your identity is of an “anonymous consumer”; if 
you pay “with an pre-paid coffee card”, your identity becomes “a loyal patron”; but 
when information such as your name, address, and the coffee purchases history are eCert 
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linked to the pre-paid card, your identity becomes “identifiable individual”. Cavoukian 
also  stated  that  “information  that  can  be  linked  to  an  identifiable  individual  is 
considered to be personal information”.[26] 
The definitions of privacy are different in different countries, it is “a sensitive 
prone  to  different  interpretations  which  are  largely  politically  and  culturally 
determined” [96]. Dragana and Victor have also stated that privacy protection in the 
USA is “primarily motivated by the protection of liberty,” and in the EU is “mainly the 
protection of one’s dignity,” while those in Canada “occupy the middle ground.” 
Many countries have their own laws to protect privacy in different domains. For 
example, the USA  has  the Family Education Right  and Privacy  Act  (FERPA) that 
requires education institutions to provide access to student record-related information 
to students and parents, including an access history of where, when, and by whom the 
record  was  accessed  [110].  Canada  has  the  Personal  Information  Protection  and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) that defines in detail what personal information is 
[12]; in Europe, the EU Data Protection Directive 1995 has set “the minimum standards 
for national privacy laws” and “defines personal data as any information related to an 
identified or identifiable person”, either directly or indirectly [50]. However, there are 
many perfectly legal daily transfers in the USA and many other countries are in fact 
illegal under the EU regulations. In UK, the UK Data Protection Act 1998 has eight 
principles of data protection, and requires that all personal data processes must comply 
these principles [162] 
In 1890, Warren & Brandeis pointed out that privacy is the “right to be let alone” 
[168]. Lessig believes that “individuals should be able to control information about 
themselves” and “privacy breaches online” could be “regulated through code and law” 
[87]. Alan believes that privacy rights can protect democratic processes but may limit 
government surveillance [171], while Etzioni believes that “privacy is merely one good 
among many others” and “privacy laws only increase government surveillance” [48, 
49]. Regan believes that “individual concepts of privacy have failed philosophically 
and  in  policy”,  and  she  aims  to  strengthen  privacy  claims  in  policy-making  [126]. 
Shade argues that “the human right to privacy is necessary for meaningful democratic 
participation, and ensures human dignity and autonomy” [142]. eCert 
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Privacy laws exist that concern the protection and preservation of privacy rights 
of individuals. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights states that: “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers” [163]. 
3.5.2 Privacy issues in Technology 
As technology is being developed rapidly, the way in which privacy is protected 
and violated is also changing. The increased ability to share and gather information, 
such as peer-to-peer networking and data mining, also challenge our computer systems 
as they lead to new ways that privacy can be breached, and users have little or no 
control of the information about themselves that others may have, hold or access. 
Use  of  the  Internet  led  to  data  that  could  be  stored  permanently  without  our 
notice. Jeffrey stated that the web means the end of forgetting “where every online 
photo,  status  update,  Twitter  post  and  blog  entry  by  and  about  us  can  be  stored 
forever”  [130].  Studies  indicated  that  “75  percent  of  U.S.  recruiters  rejected 
candidates”  based  on  their  “internet  profile”,  such  as  information  gathered  through 
search engines, personal web sites and blogs, Twitter, and Facebook [130]. Andrew, the 
Co-founder  of  Intel  Corporation  commented  that  “Privacy  is  one  of  the  biggest 
problems in this new electronic age. At the heart of the Internet culture is a force that 
wants to find out everything about you. And once it has found out everything about you 
and  two  hundred  million  others,  that’s  a  very  valuable  asset,  and  people  will  be 
tempted to trade and do commerce with that asset. This wasn’t the information that 
people were thinking of when they called this the information age” [70]. 
Furthermore,  the  web  has  become  a  social  tool.  While  personalization 
technologies offer the power to enhance user online experience, many application are 
using  networked  user  information  to  improve  their  user  profile,  which  “has  the 
potential to amplify and complicate the Internet’s inherent privacy risk and concerns” 
[157]. eCert 
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Dragana and Victor state that “Privacy issues in education systems is important to 
investigate and complex to achieve, … as it become easier to collect and store personal 
records, we believe that privacy issues need to be addressed holistically”. They have 
also pointed out that “regardless of the way in which the information is collected, it 
most  likely  gets  stored  electronically  in  the  form  of  database  records.  Security 
protection and proper maintenance, combined with access and retrieval protocols and 
policies, are expected to be put in place to maintain compliance with relevant privacy 
legislation and policies”. [96] 
3.5.3 Ownership Rights 
The term ownership is very broad and complex, it could be private, collective, 
cooperative, or common, could refer to objects, land, or intellectual property, and it can 
be gained or lost in many ways, such as buying and selling, exchange, or as a gift. 
In  The  cost  and  benefits  of  ownership  [69],  Grossman  and  Hart  defined  two 
rights: specific rights and residual rights. They stated that ownership is the purchase of 
the residual rights, such that “When residual rights are purchased by one party, they 
are lost by a second party, and this inevitably creates distortions. Firm 1 purchases 
firm 2 when firm 1’s control increases the productivity of its management more than 
the  loss  of  control  decreases  the  productivity  of  firm  2’s  management”.  They  also 
claimed that they  “do not  distinguish  between ownership and control  and virtually 
define ownership as the power to exercise control”. 
3.5.4 Ownership Issues in Technology 
Information ownership refers to “both the possession of and responsibility for 
information, … implies power as well as control”, these include “the ability to access, 
create, modify, package, derive benefit from, sell or remove data”, and the right to 
“assign these access privileges to others” [90]. It is “easily and frequently confused due 
to the lack of standardized definitions”, and is “frequently assigned in organizations 
without regard to who created the information or where it originated” [150].  eCert 
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In  the  world  of  computing,  discussions  and  arguments  regarding  intellectual 
property aboud. For many years, this topic has also varied widely across countries and 
across  cultures.  Commonly,  the  person  “who  creates,  or  initiates  the  creation  or 
storage of the information” is considered as the initial owner, and has the responsibility 
of  safeguards  while  ensuring  that  the  information  “continues  to  be  classified 
appropriately” [140]. Adam stated that “one of the sacred laws of justice was to guard 
a  person’s  property  and  possessions”  [146].  However,  as  Tsahuridu  said,  “parting 
ways and deciding who keeps the material created during the relationship can be a 
tricky business” [161]. Aristotle pointed out two main issues: “how to allocate property 
between what is private and common and how to allocate the private property within 
society” [97]. 
Stevens  believes  that  “as  long  as  the  ownership  of  the  information  asset  is 
established, the owner has responsibility and authority to perform ownership duties, 
and accountability is enforced” [150]. 
In military cyber information flows, “the relationship between the information 
producer,  information  owner,  and  information  consumer  do  not  adhere  to  the 
traditional definition”, but their “clearly defined roles of consumption and ownership 
become  relative  to  need  and  to  the  contextual  value  within  an  organization”  [68]. 
Webb believes that the ownership of media may “even extend to the documents or 
media in which the secrets are disclosed such that the owner controls not only the 
underlying intellectual property rights but also the physical embodiment of such rights 
whether in the form of a document or a tape or disk. This allows the owner to call in 
such  documents  or  other  media  when  the  relationship  which  was  the  occasion  for 
disclosure terminates” [169] 
3.5.5 Calls for a User-Centric Data Model 
With the use of Cavoukian’s technical terms of “user-centric”, “enterprise”, and 
“federated”  [26],  Dragana  and  Victor  categorise  the  current  models  for  organizing 
personal information as Clustered, Centralised, and Mixed. They define Clustered as a 
user-centric model, where “there is no central repository of personal data and every 
person has some control over his/her personal data in terms of accuracy and further eCert 
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dissemination”;  Centralised  is  an  enterprise  model,  where  “there  is  a  centralised 
repository  of  personal  data  with  role-based  control  over  accessibility  to  data”;  and 
Mixed is a federated model, which lies between the other two [96]. 
Graham, presented his opinion at a conference that our data should be accessible 
to us “through any channel, on any device, at any time”; we should have the right “to 
store, update and manage, … to have authenticated, verified and certified, … to share, 
sell and track, … under our control, with our consent, for our benefit”, and on the terms 
of “Secure, Convenient, and Valuable” [133]. 
Although lots of systems that we currently use are presented as enterprise models, 
calls for a user-centric model have rapidly increased in the past few years as it “better 
facilitates privacy protection” [96]. Many systems have or are planning to re-examine 
their design to meet the increasing demand of “privacy and personal data protection”, 
while  enabling  “individuals  owning  and  controlling  their  personal  data  and 
information” [96] 
3.5.6 Discussion 
According to the definition that ownership can be gained through gift, students 
can gain ownership of their eCertificate when being awarded, no matter how many 
other parties also have ownership during the creation process. 
As technology continues to develop, information gathering and sharing are much 
easier than ever before. As a result, privacy and ownership issues have also increased 
rapidly. 
In  literature,  discussions  around  privacy  and  ownership  are  mainly  about  the 
stored data, but not much about the distributed data, especially how to protect privacy 
and  ownership  of  the  distributed  data  from  unauthorized  further  forwarding  and 
accessing. This could be the main task for the case of eCertificate as the distributed 
eCertificates are very likely to be passed or collected by unauthorized parties, such as 
recruitment agencies, without owners’ consent. eCert 
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There have been many  calls  for  a user-centric  data model  found in  literature 
which  aims  to  give  the  information  owner  full  control  of  their  data,  that  includes 
storage,  updating,  sharing,  tracking,  and  who  can  access  and  for  how  long.  These 
qualities should also be integral when designing the eCertificate, in order to develop a 
user-centric eCertificate system. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
eCertificates represent a typical case of eDocument that contains dynamic content 
and needs to be transferred to multiple parties. The literature was reviewed about what 
an eCertificate should consist of and how to secure such a distributed eDocument. The 
result indicated that: 
  Certificates require support for verification, revocation and time limit re-
certification  processes.  The  eCertificate,  as  an  electronic  qualification 
award certificate, is still a new field in literature: beyond the paper-based 
certificate elements, there is no clear indication of what an eCertificate 
should include or what format it should be. However, the SPOCS project 
has proposed an eDocument structure, and its OCD concept could be used 
for eCertificate file structure design. 
  ePortfolios, as the main usage of eCertificate, lack security control. They 
require verifiable data with supported evidence; and eCertificate, when 
being used within other systems, such as ePortfolios, need to be verifiable, 
compactable and recognisable. Some of the barriers that ePortfolios face, 
such as users with low IT skills, will also apply to eCertificate. 
  Security  involves  many  areas.  Merely  securing  an  issued  eCertificate 
would be insufficient to prevent it being hacked, faked, or modified in 
many areas: such as the database, the application, the software, or the 
network.  The  whole  lifecycle  of  the  eCertificate  system  needs  to  be 
secured, from its creation, distribution, to verification processes, from its 
front-end application, distribution paths, to the back-end database and the 
human controls. The right balance between confidentiality, integrity and eCert 
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availability,  needs  to  be  determined  to  ensure  the  eCertificate  is  user 
friendly while maintaining a high level of security. 
  Both Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption methods have their pros and 
cons.  A  combination  of  digital  signature  and  hash  function  appear  to 
provide an optional means of securing an eCertificate; with the support of 
PKI, these could well provide the eCertificate system with confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation. 
  Many  issues  exist  in  the  field  of  encryption  and  the  digital  signing 
application. Among them, the public key certificate status validation issue 
and  the  eDocument  content  validation  issue,  will  directly  affect  the 
security of eCertificate system. A new issue, eDocument status validation, 
which is key to the eCertificate case, has not been mentioned in literature. 
All three issues needed to be addressed in the eCertificate design in order 
to provide a secure eCertificate system. 
  Acts and policies exist for different domains and cultures to address the 
information privacy and ownership issues. However, the world of security 
in  computing  is  changing,  such  that  the  ways  in  which  privacy  and 
ownership are protected and violated are also changing: from the systems 
orientated “Fortress Approach” to the needs of securing our privacy and 
ownership  in  peer-to-peer  networking,  social  networking  and  link  data 
environment. Currently, users still have little or no control of their data, or 
how  people  may  have,  hold  or  access  to  their  data.  As  a  result,  the 
demand for a user-centric system is increasing rapidly, with a call to give 
users back control of their own data.  
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Chapter 4   Domain Research 
Before considering a new eCertificate system, it is important to find out, besides 
the literature, what systems and information are already available, what can be adapted, 
and what limitations exist that need to be overcome. These, together with the literature 
review, will provide an informed background of what is required in the investigation of 
the new eCertificate system. 
Domain research was carried out, which has been focused on related previous 
works, existing systems, and domain experts’ opinions. 
This  chapter  summarises  the  related  work  in  the  eCertificate  domain.  It  is 
expressed in the researcher’s own words. It has been published in conference papers 
[34, 35] and in the eCert project website[28]. 
4.1 Previous Work: The eCert-GDP2008 Project 
A project entitled “eCert-GDP2008” [132] was run in the school of Electronics 
and Computer Science, at the University of Southampton, to explore the issues of on-
line authentication of awards, and produced an award verification demonstrator. 
4.1.1 The Demonstrator and the Development Group 
The eCert-GDP2008 project explored the issues of three-party authentication and 
demonstrated how to best approach the process of validating students’ claimed awards 
in such an environment. eCert 
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The  demonstrator  was  developed  by  a  group  of  four  MSc  Computer  Science 
students. This was the end product of the group development project (GDP) within 
their degree study. EdExcel, a UK national certifying authority, was also involved in 
working with the project team to explore and create a potential model and proof-of-
concept system. 
4.1.2 The Design 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Original design for eCert-GDP2008 project, published in[34] 
 
The  eCert-GDP2008  project  raised  interesting  points.  In  particular,  many 
conventional security scenarios assume two stakeholder transactions, with any third 
party involved being an attacker. In e-certification, three parties are involved in the 
transaction; any external attacker becomes a fourth party. The system not only dealt 
with  access  to  resources  with  the  attendant  issues  of  Authorization,  but  also  with 
verification of the information provided. Figure 4-1 shows its original design, Figure 4-
2 indicates the important interactions within the system. 
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Figure 4-2 The interactions within the system, published in [34, 35] 
 
4.1.3 The Security Model 
The group made some security policy decisions. These not only concern who can 
see what and when, but also the value of the data. For example, one might decide that 
information about qualifications is less valuable than banking details, so the level of 
security could be lower if it aids usability of the system. In contrast, one might decide 
that the level of security should be higher to prevent identity theft, for example. 
The security policy decisions adopted were: 
  The  data  is  to  be  regarded  as  important  and  therefore  should  be  properly 
secured 
  There should be minimal transfer of data 
  It  should  not  be  possible  to  browse  the  data;  all  queries  should  be  of  the 
format, <claimed award> and the response, <true/false> eCert 
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  The award holder (student) should determine who may see their award details 
These decisions introduced novel design criteria. The basic concept was that there 
would be a Certification Server – the Certifying Authority in the original design. This 
provides  a  service  to  the  ePortfolio  Holder  (student)  who  can  build  up  a  set  of 
ePortfolio  certificates,  each  one  tailored  for  a  specific  ePortfolio  Reviewer  (e.g. 
employer).  Because  of  design  policy  3  above,  it  is  not  possible  for  the  student  to 
browse their awards and select from a list. Instead they have to be entered individually. 
Although this could be annoying for the student, it prevents attackers from intercepting 
the communication and obtaining all the student’s qualifications in one go. Similarly, it 
prevents the employer from taking the student’s details and making a general enquiry to 
see what information about awards has been withheld. 
As the student builds up their award profile, the Certification Server contacts the 
Awarding body (e.g. EdExcel in our case, but as many awarding bodies as possible 
ought to be part of a full scheme). This is done on an “is this true” basis, with a true or 
false answer being returned as in design policy 3 above. The student’s profile then 
builds up with a series of certified claims, and hopefully none denied! It is also likely 
that there may be some unverifiable claims (e.g. an award from a body that is not part 
of the scheme). In practice, it was found that a fourth possibility was “pending” – i.e. it 
should be possible to verify the claim, but for some reason the Certifying Body has not 
yet  responded,  possibly  as  a  result  of  their  server  being  offline.  The  final  step  in 
building up their profile is for the student to select which awards they want to present 
to a given employer, which is done via a tick box grid. 
Having built up an award profile for a particular employer, the student is now 
given a code by the Certification Server. This code is then sent to the employer, who 
can use this to log in to the Certification Server to see the student’s award profile. The 
web page that they see gives a “stamp” indicating the status of the claim. 
4.1.4 Advantages 
All  communications  are  encrypted  and  digitally  signed  so  the  source  can  be 
verified. This entails the use of both public and private key encryption. eCert 
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The benefit of this approach is that all original data remains with the Certifying 
Authorities.  The  Certifying  Sever  simply  communicates  with  these  authorities  to 
confirm or deny claims, and no data is passed on from this point – all communications 
involve the Server. 
4.1.5 Limitations 
The purpose of this project was to investigate the issues involved in setting up an 
e-Certification system, particularly from the security point of view. In order to make it 
realisable within a realistic timeframe, the scope was limited, and focused particularly 
on the delivery end, linking to the ePortfolio holder and the ePortfolio reviewer. 
The project explored security issues, particularly in the client-facing side of the 
process. The issues of scalability and the need to communicate with multiple awarding 
body servers were not considered. 
4.2 Existing Systems 
Some existing systems are relevant to the validation of qualification records or 
certificates. Typical examples have been selected and are examined here. 
4.2.1 The Europass 
The  European  Community  provides  Europass  Certificate  Supplements  and 
Diploma Supplements [51], which are facsimiles of award certificates and information 
about the qualifications. 
All  information  below  about  Europass  has  been  sourced  from  the  Europass 
website
8 
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4.2.1.1  The service and its organization 
Europass was established in 2004, with the aim of “facilitating the mobility of 
European learners and workers by making their skills and qualifications more easily 
understood in Europe” [51]. Besides the online CV, Europass offers four document 
services:  “Europass  Language  Passport;  Europass  Mobility;  Europass  Diploma 
Supplement; and Europass Certificate Supplement”. 
4.2.1.2  The Europass Certificate Supplement 
A Europass Certificate Supplement is “made available to individuals who hold a 
further  education  and  training  award  certificate  by  the  body  that  issued  the  award 
certificate”.  It  aims  to  make  the  award  certificate  “more  easily  understood  by 
employers  or  institutions  outside  the  issuing  country”.  It  provides  additional 
information to the award certificate. This includes [51]: 
  “the awarding status of the body that issued the award 
  the skills and competences acquired by ALL holders of the award 
  the level of the award in the national awarding system 
  the typical entry requirements to programmes that lead to the award 
  the  typical  employment  or  learning  opportunities  that  are  accessible  to 
holders of the award” 
4.2.1.3  The Europass Diploma Supplement 
A  Europass  Diploma  Supplement  is  “issued  to  graduates  of  higher  education 
institutions along with their degree or diploma. It helps to ensure that higher education 
qualifications are more easily understood, especially outside the country where they 
were awarded”. [51] 
The Europass Diploma Supplement was developed by the European Commission, 
Council of Europe and UNESCO/CEPES. It aims to provide “sufficient independent 
data to improve the international ‘transparency’ and fair academic and professional eCert 
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recognition of qualifications (diplomas, degrees, certificates, etc.)” It is designed to 
“provide a description of the nature, level, context, content and status of the studies 
that were pursued and successfully completed by the individual named on the original 
qualification”
 9 to which the supplement is appended. Figure 4-3 shows a screenshot of 
part of a Europass Diploma Supplement example. [51] 
The Diploma Supplement “is issued in a widely-spoken European language and 
free of charge to every student upon graduation” [51]. 
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Figure 4-3 A Europass Diploma Supplement example, reprinted from [53] 
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4.2.1.4  Advantages 
The additional information provided with the award certificate, benefits both the 
award  certificate  holders  and  the  reviewers:  “award  holders  will  be  able  to 
communicate their qualifications and competences in an effective way; employers will 
find the qualifications and competences of job-seekers easier to understand; education 
and training providers and guidance counsellors will find it easier to provide accurate 
advice to award holders regarding suitable learning opportunities”  [51]. 
4.2.1.5  Limitations 
The Europass clearly states that, “The Europass Certificate Supplement is not: a 
substitute  for  the  original  certificate;”  or  “an  automatic  system  that  guarantees 
recognition” [52]. But this is not good enough for security in the real world. Also, this 
does not solve the problems that are faced with paper-based certificates as it needs to be 
accompanied by the original certificate. Furthermore, the document is not suitable as a 
standalone  proof  of  qualification  in  an  ePortfolio  as  its  detailed  records,  such  as 
individual module marks, which may work against privacy issues. 
4.2.2 The HEQC 
In  China,  an  online  information  verification  service  for  higher  education 
qualification certificates (HEQC) has been running since 2001. The service is carried 
out  by  the  China  Higher-Education  Student  Information  and  Career  Centre 
(CHESICC). It is based on information collected since 1991. 
All information collected here is from the CHESICC website
10. 
4.2.2.1 The service and its organization 
CHESICC  is  “a  specialized  body  authorized  by  the  Chinese  Ministry  of 
Education (CME) for verifying any certificates or diplomas awarded in China” [37]. Its 
                                                 
10 HEQC: an online information verification services for higher education qualification certificates. 
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website is the sole website designated by the CME for HEQC inquiries. It has the only 
database for information of the HEQC. 
The  service  provides  online  certificate  information,  verification  for  those 
certificates that were gained in higher education since 2001, and an offline certificate 
verification service for any year’s certificates. The certificates that have been verified 
offline will then be also available for online verification. 
The service is designed for individuals as well as organizations although a charge 
is made. 
4.2.2.2  The method 
The  government  announced  that  every  student  starting  their  HE  course  since 
2001 must have an electronic student status registration. 
The  students  who  have  a  electronic  status  registration  record  will  be  able  to 
register their certificate information and build it up in their years of study. 
Both the student status and the certificate information are verified step by step 
under the management of government body. Figure 4-4 shows the work flow of the 
electronic registration system in China. 
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Figure 4-4 electronic registration system work flow, reprinted from [37] 
The certificates that were awarded before 2001 will require offline certificate 
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4.2.2.3  Advantages 
The system is on a large scale in both time and coverage, and its government 
authorized body provides the trust. 
4.2.2.4  Limitations 
The whole process sounds like creating an ePortfolio (with the student status as 
the ePortfolio account and the certificate information as its contents), but it is  at a 
government level, not a personal level, so that the student (the account holder) has no 
control and use of it. 
The service aims for verification only, not the use of eCertificate that is the focus 
of this research. 
4.2.3  Digitary 
Digitary,  which  stands  for  “Digital  Notary”,  was  established  by  Framework 
Solutions in 1999. It worked with the Higher Education sector to issue, distribute and 
authenticate  official  electronic  graduation  documents  over  the  Internet.  It  was  first 
implemented in 2005 [43]. 
All information collected here is from the Digitary website
11. 
4.2.3.1  The service and its organization 
Digitary describes itself as “a high-security software system developed with the 
Higher Education sector for the online issuing and authentication of tamper-evident 
electronic official  graduation  documents” [43]. It  also  states  that  documents  issued 
through the system are electronically signed by officials of issuing institutions and are 
therefore legally valid. 
A charge is levied for the service. Educational institutions who want to use the 
service need to  install the system  on their site, and students  need to  login  to  their 
                                                 
11 http://www.digitary.net/ eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 83 
institution’s  system  to  access  their  documents.  Employers  who  want  to  verify 
qualifications that were sent by the students or graduates, are required to carry out 
registration on Digitary at the issuing institutions, in order to authenticate and view the 
documents. 
Digitary  is  “a  trading  name  of  Framework  Computer  Consultants  Limited, 
registered in the Republic of Ireland” [43]. 
4.2.3.2  The method 
Graduates and students “who have been issued with Digitary documents by their 
institutions  can  allocate  rights  for  who  can  access  them  by  emailing  a  Document 
Access Ticket to them. People who have been given the right to access can authenticate 
and view documents”. 
If some students decide to restrict access, “people to whom they send Document 
Access Tickets will need to complete an online account registration process, including 
proof of ownership of their email address”. 
Audit trails enable users to see all activities against their accounts, such as “when 
documents were issued, and when and from where they were authenticated”. 
When  an  employer  or  third  party  verifies  a  Digitary  document  through  the 
system, it performs a number of security checks on the document: 
  they have been granted access to the document by the owner 
  the document has not been revoked for any reason 
  the document was issued by authorised officials of the institution in question 
  the document has not been tampered with in any way 
4.2.3.3  Limitations 
Employers  need  to  register  with  every  institution’s  system  where  the 
qualifications were originally issued, to be able to verify the documents. eCert 
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4.3 Domain Experts Advice 
Nottingham University is one of the leading research groups in ePortfolio studies. 
Contacts with their researchers, e.g. Kirstie Coolin and Clive Church, were carried out 
during the eCert-GDP2008 project, an e-certification project for qualification records. 
Feedback on ePortfolio operations were supplied as secondary data to this project. 
Contact with these experts has again been carried out at an early stage of this 
research to collect professional opinions on the new eCertificate system. As the topic 
was new to both parties, no specific requirements were noted at that time. However, 
concerns were raised, such as potential file size of the certificates which must be sent 
out by email; and the nature and role of such a system. The UK Government has a 
history of losing entire databases of sensitive personal information! Advice was that for 
the new eCertificate system to be a success, these concerns need to be addressed in the 
design stage. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
Systems  exist  that  provide  the  services  for  signing  and/or  verifying  online 
qualification records or eDocuments. However, they are built with specific purposes, 
and therefore do not satisfy the eCertificates’ requirements. 
The eCert-GDP2008 project explored the issues of three-party authentication and 
produced an award verification demonstrator. But it only verifies input qualification 
records against linked institution databases, which will be limited. Using this method 
also increases the risk of database attacks on those institutions. It does not involve 
eCertificates, so the paper-based certificate problem remains unsolved. 
The  European  Community  provides  a  Europass  Certificate  Supplement  and  a 
Diploma Supplement. These provide facsimiles of award certificates and information 
about  the  qualification.  However,  the  system  clearly  states  that,  “The  Europass 
Certificate Supplement is not a substitute for the original certificate” or “An automatic 
system that guarantees recognition.” But this is not good enough for security in the real eCert 
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world. Also, this does not solve the problems faced with the paper-based certificates as 
it must be accompanied by the original certificate. Furthermore, the document is not 
suitable as a standalone proof of qualification in an ePortfolio as its detailed records, 
such as individual module marks, may work against privacy issues. 
The  Chinese  Certificate  Information  Verification  service  is  an  eCertification 
service for qualification records, similar to eCert-GDP2008, but with different inputs 
and outputs. The service takes unique student numbers and unique certificate numbers 
as input, and outputs the specified qualification detail along with the student’s personal 
details, including a photo. It provides more reliability to the viewers as it also verifies 
the  identity  of  the  person.  But  this  method  does  not  suit  every  country,  e.g.  it 
contravenes the  Data Protection Act in UK. Again, this service does not deal with 
eCertificates. 
The Digitary system issues, distributes and authenticates eCertificates over the 
Internet with the system installed at individual institutions. Students need to login to 
their  institution’s  system  to  access  and  manage  their  e-Certificates,  such  as  setting 
access for individual reviewers. Reviewers can then access the e-Certificates through 
the received URLs using access tokens; this may involve registration depending on the 
access level that was set. This is the closest system to this research for an eCertificate, 
except  that  the  system  only  works  for  individual  institutions.  This  is  good  for  the 
eCertificate  issuing  process,  but  is  not  suitable  for  reviewers,  who  need  to  verify 
information received from a wide range of institutions. It also has storage issues as it 
requires the system to maintain all students’ eCertificates, their different versions, and 
the corresponding access tokens. More importantly, lifetime validation of the issued 
eCertificate is a problem, if anything happens to the institution (e.g. it closes down) or 
its database (e.g. being hacked). 
The eCertificate related systems that mentioned above is compared in Table 4-1.  
The issue of how to provide trust for a system that deals with sensitive data is a very 
important point raised by the domain experts. This will be the main task that needs to 
be addressed. eCert 
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Chapter 5   eCertificate Case 
Study 
Following  the  SORM  methodology,  the  domain  definition  was  explored  in 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Chapter 4 Domain Research. An eCertificate case 
study was then carried out for the next layer: use cases. This chapter describes the 
formal use cases and the processes that lie between the related layers: the common 
usage patterns and gap analysis. These involve summarising the key activities from the 
domain, identifying the eCertificate stakeholders, developing the use cases where these 
stakeholders act, whilst considering techniques that address similar issues through a 
gap analysis. 
This  chapter  is  entirely  the  researcher’s  own  work.  It  has  been  published  in 
conference papers [29-33, 36] and in the eCert project website [28]. 
5.1 Common Usage Patterns 
From the literature review and domain research that were described in Chapters 3 
and  4,  key  activities  for  the  eCertificate  domain  were  identified.  As  a  result,  the 
common  usage  patterns  were  generated  as  requirements  for  the  new  eCertificate 
system, and these are summarized in Table 5-1. 
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SR-01  can be used stand alone or served within an ePortfolio 
SR-02  security control throughout the whole eCertificate lifecycle: from 
generation, issue, distribution, to verification; involves hardware, software, 
database, information, and human control 
SR-03  can be verified in a legal context, supports withdrawal of an eCertificate 
and the content status validation as well as the signing key status 
validation 
SR-04  ensure that the owner has control over the usage of their eCertificates 
SR-05  effective usage: easy to use, supports lifetime validation, and can be 
widely verified and recognized throughout the UK 
 
5.2 Stakeholder Analysis 
In ePortfolio systems, an ePortfolio is considered to have two stakeholders: the 
ePortfolio  creator  as  the  owner,  and  receiver  as  the  reviewer.  In  eWork,  the 
qualification data is considered to have three stakeholders: record creator as the issuer, 
government bodies as the holder/owner, the student and any third parties who need 
access as the reviewer [92, 93]. 
In this study, the eCertificate owner is considered to be the student graduate, just 
like the ownership that they have of their paper-based certificates. According to studies 
of related systems, the eCertificate system is considered to have three stakeholders: the 
originating institution as the issuer, the student as the owner, and the receiver as the 
reviewer.  Any  government  bodies  that  co-own  the  qualification  records  are  not 
considered as eCertificate owners. Likewise they do not own the students’ paper-based eCert 
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certificates. However, the proposed eCertificate could record, hold, and provide access 
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Figure 5-1 eCertificate Stakeholders and Activities 
 
These three stakeholders perform three processes: issue, distribute, and verify, as 
showed in Figure 5-1, and are described below. 
An eCertificate issuer is a body that creates and issues the certificate, such as a 
college or a university. They may 
  issue a huge range and number of certificates 
  have  to  restrict  database  access  for  any  incoming  verification  requests  to 
minimize database attacks. 
An eCertificate owner is the certificate holder who has successfully passed the 
qualification certification process and gained the award, such as a student or a graduate. 
They may 
  hold low, high, and/or special level of qualifications 
  have  qualifications  achieved  in  different  areas  of  the  UK  (world-wide 
certificates are considered as out of the scope for this study) eCert 
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  have differing levels of IT skills 
  or may not have an ePortfolio account 
An eCertificate reviewer is a body or a person who receives the certificate in 
support of an application. This may be an academic institution or an employer. They 
  could be an individual or a big organization 
  may  receive  e-qualification  certificates  as  part  of  applications  or  within 
ePortfolios 
  may have few IT skills or may have a team of IT literate staff with high tech IT 
equipment 
  may need to check a few qualifications occasionally or may need to check a 
huge number of qualifications efficiently 
  may need to review varied levels of qualifications that were issued across the 
UK. 
5.3 Use Case 
Based on the certificate process study from the literature review, with the selected 
three eCertificate stakeholders in mind, and the user case collation [76] from the eWork 
project,  the  related  personas  and  scenarios  have  been  arranged  to  help  with 
understanding the situation, as depicted in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-2 Stakeholders 
Stake 
holders 
































User Ann, aged 16, a secondary school student, has achieved 
GCSE in Maths; she hasn’t set up an ePortfolio account, and 
her IT skill level is low. 
Combination 
of low and 
high level 
qualifications 
User Ben, aged 43, a computing lecturer of a university, has 
achieved PhD Computer Science & MSc Complexity 




– e.g. life 
critical  
User Chris, aged 38, a hospital surgeon, has achieved 
qualifications MD Medicine & FRCS (Surgery); he hasn’t 




areas of the 
UK 
User Dave, aged 23, studied A level in the south of the UK, 
and the first degree in the north of the UK, has achieved A 
level in English & BA in English; he has got an ePortfolio 

























User Eric, an director of a small company, needs to employ a 
couple of staff from time to time, has received information 
of potential employees on both paper-based CVs and 
ePortfolios; he has internet access, basic IT skills only, and 




User F, a department of a university in the UK, takes in 
hundreds of new students every year, has received a huge 
number of applications on paper-based CVs, UCAS forms 
and ePortfolios. Some qualifications were achieved overseas. 
User F has high tech IT equipments, a team of IT literate 
staff, and needs to check a huge number of qualifications 
efficiently, all levels of qualifications, across the UK and 

























User J, an exam board, offers many certification courses, 
issues a huge range and number of certificates all year 
round. User J maintains a database for all these records 
itself. It is happy to carry out any verification processes for 
either individuals or big companies, but its data protection is 
considered as very high, and it is doing its best to prevent 
information leaking in any way. 
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Table 5-3 Use case, published in [11, 29-32] 








An exam board checks that the students have successfully passed the 
particular exams, and are who they claim to be, and then creates the 
eCertificates accordingly. 
-- This involves identification and verification against the exam board’s 
database. The creation process needs to have standard control for both low 
and high level qualification certificates in order to suit educational 










An exam board found out that an eCertificate was mis-issued, and must be 
withdrawn. 






  The exam board issues the eCertificates for students. 
-- This needs security methods to a) indicate that the eCertificates are 
issued by the exam board, in order to prove their genuineness, and prevent 
















  The students receive their eCertificates, and view the contents. 
-- This needs security methods to ensure that no one other than the students 







  A student specifies certain eCertificates to be visible to particular 
employers. 
-- The student needs to be able to control which eCertificates are visible by 
which employers and for how long they would be valid. The system design 











  A student sends the selected eCertificates to potential employers. 
-- The student should be able to send the eCertificates alone or within an 
ePortfolio. For students sending the eCertificates through ePortfolio 
accounts, only the selected eCertificates in the account should be visible to 







  An employer views the received eCertificates. 
-- This needs security methods to a) ensure only the specified employer 
can view the eCertificates, and no-one else; b) protect from modifying and 







  The employer verifies the received eCertificates. 
-- The system needs to be able to verify all level qualifications that are 
issued using the same standard from any education institutions nationwide, 
and check that the eCertificate and the key are still valid. eCert 
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5.4 Use Case Analysis 
The scenarios are shown diagrammatically as use cases in Figure 5-2 published in 
[29-32]. Through the scenarios and use case study, we may note that the eCertificate 
system involves assertion, trust, privacy, distribution, property rights, and the lifetime 
issues.  As  the  eCertificate  and  the  qualification  claims  in  ePortfolios  face  similar 
situations,  some  of  the  issues  have  already  been  identified  by  Blowers  [20]  in  his 























receive / being awarded
verify
verify the issuer
verify the awarded qualification
 
Figure 5-2 eCertificate use case diagram  
 
eCertificate  assertion:  the  system  need  to  be  self  certificating  to  prove  it  is 
genuine, and also allow reviewers to further confirm it. As well as generating these 
assertions, it should be possible to withdraw them. Parallels can be drawn with Public 
Key Infrastructure certificate systems, which provide the required method while also 
maintaining a revocation list of keys which are invalid as they have been compromised 
[154]. 
eCertificate privacy: ePortfolio reference models include the functionality for 
owners  to  be  able  to  create  different  “views”  where  “information  relevant  to  a eCert 
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particular purpose” is selected by the owner for a particular audience [66]. This means 
the owner can tailor their portfolio to best support their application. This also applies to 
eCertificates, as no matter whether they are used standalone or within an ePortfolio, 
one aim is to give students control over who can see their eCertificates and for how 
long. This can prevent untrustworthy reviewers republishing the eCertificate without 
the owner’s permission; for example, to an ePortfolio bank which recruitment agencies 
might access. This is a similar paradigm to Web 2.0 social networking sites where a 
user  can  “categorize  their  network  (of  friends)  into  different  access  groups  with 
different access privileges” [121]. 
Information property rights: the learners have not only needs, but also rights. 
They have the ownership right of their qualification attainments, in the same way as 
paper-based certificates. These are personal data, and the owners have the right to store, 
manage, share and track, “under their control, with their consent, and for their benefit” 
[133]. 
Stakeholder trust: A fundamental requirement from the use cases is the need to 
establish trust amongst all three stakeholders, such that one stakeholder can place faith 
that the identity of another is true, and their eCertificates have not been tampered with. 
The issuer needs to maintain a reputation for credible awards; they do not want to be 
known as an awarding body that is linked with suspect eCertificates, for example, so it 
is important that their eCertificates can be proven not to have been tampered with. The 
owner (student) also wants to know that they can trust the credibility of the award they 
have obtained; but they also need to trust the reviewer not to misuse the information on 
the  certificate,  for  example  by  harvesting  the  information  and  selling  it  on  to 
recruitment agencies. The reviewer needs to be able to trust the issuer, not only to 
maintain standards, but also to have protected against fraud (e.g. if a corrupt employee 
were to accept a bribe to produce a fake eCertificate); and similarly, to trust the owner 
not to have tampered with the eCertificate. Once more parallels can be drawn with PKI 
systems where trust networks have to be engineered in order for any other user to see 
value in the key certificates generated. This is typically achieved either with a hierarchy 
of globally “trusted nodes called Certificate Authorities” (CA) or by methods such as 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) where chains of trust are formed between users who already 
know each other [116]. eCert 
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Distributed  stakeholders:  To  “stimulate  large-scale  uptake”  of  users  [125], 
eCertificate tools need to define an “architecture of participation”. The eCertificate 
system will not work unless there is a significant body of universities and employers 
who will accept them. This concept is defined within the Web 2.0 community as the 
network effects that are achieved when “Users Add Value” and encourage further users 
to participate [111]. 
eCertificate lifetime validation: In standard approaches to computer security, 
authentication and validation are typically considered as instantaneous activities – the 
system authenticates a user and validates their request or data immediately. Longer 
periods  of  time  are  necessary  in  transaction  processing,  but  authentication  and 
validation are still only relevant for the duration of the transaction. Indeed, long periods 
of authentication are undesirable, so it is common for “sessions” to be “logged off” or 
terminated if they exceed a predetermined length of time. If we consider the three 
parties  authentication  problem  outlined  above,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  effective 
“transaction” period lasts for the entire lifetime of the eCertificate owner. Considering 
the parallel of paper certificates, many of us can probably think of people who have 
continued studying well past the age of retirement. Yet they may still be presenting 
awards they acquired as children, decades previously. The important factor in this is the 
lifetime  of  the  eCertificate  owner.  During  their  lifetime,  it  is  almost  certain  that 
awarding bodies will have come and gone, so an eCertificate system needs to be able to 
validate an award long after the issuer has ceased to exist. Similarly, reviewers will 
come and go, although this is less of a problem in practice. The implication of this is 
that an eCertificate system needs to be independent of both issuer and reviewer and to 
be  able  to  provide  a  mechanism  for  the  eCertificate  owner  to  continue  to  provide 
evidence of their attainment long after the issuer has disappeared. 
5.5 Gap Analysis 
With the use cases defined, a gap analysis was performed to discover whether it 
is required, and if yes, what services can be reused and what technical gaps need to be 
addressed. eCert 
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5.5.1 Is it required? 
The literature review indicated that eCertificate is a new field in research. The 
problems faced need a solution. As technology develops rapidly, eCertificate could be a 
solution for many situations, such as ePortfolio. In order for a third party to verify 
qualifications that are claimed in an ePortfolio, it is necessary for ePortfolio systems to 
implement an on-line equivalent of paper-based certificates. However, and to date, no 
literature  was  found  in  eCertificate  for  qualifications.  This  indicates  that  no 
implementations have explored the underpinning technology or mechanisms required in 
this area. The eCertificate of qualifications is a new field of research, and this is true 
across the world. 
Even if there  are  no studies  in  this  area, the point has  been spotted,  and the 
European  Communities  [51]  “Europass”  provides  Certificate  Supplements  and 
Diploma  Supplements,  and  there  are  eCertificate  systems  produced  by  commercial 
companies. These provide facsimiles of award certificates and information about the 
qualifications, but the system clearly states that “The Europass Certificate Supplement 
is  not  a  substitute  for  the  original  certificate;”  nor  “an  automatic  system  that 
guarantees  recognition.”  However,  with  their  various  design  purposes,  they  do  not 
satisfy our requirements sufficiently. Therefore, a framework for a secure eCertificate 
system is definitely required. 
5.5.2 Feasibility 
There  are  technologies  available  for  constructing  an  eCertificate  framework: 
digital signing, encryptions have been used in document security and transitions; online 
identification and validation has been  addressed and implemented securely in other 
contexts such as e-Commerce and on-line auctions. The challenge now is to identify 
and design what is required; and adapt the available technologies to the eCertificate 
system and make it really secure. eCert 
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5.5.3 Gaps in Related Technology 
A gap analysis against current techniques and services was carried out to discover 
what could be reused and which technical gaps need to be addressed. 
The  process  of  confirming  the  veracity  of  an  academic  award  using  paper 
certificates is well established, and the potential for exploitation is also well understood 
[61][63][98]. In the on-line world, the concepts of digital signing, locked PDF, and 
watermarking are also well understood, with technologies available to support such 
processes [58]. The literature review for encryption and digital signature application in 
section 3.4, showed that digital signing turned out to be the most suitable technique for 
an  electronic  version  of  qualification  certificates  (eCertificates),  among  these 
eDocument security techniques; it is a mathematical scheme for authentication of a 
digital message or document. It not only detects unauthorized modification, but also 
proves the issuer, and therefore provides trust that the eDocument is genuine. However, 
the literature review also indicated that some limitations exist, such as service support, 
key management, and lifelong validation. These crucial limitations affect its security 
efficiency when applied to an eCertificate system, especially for an eCertificate that 
may contain non-static contents, and needs to be transferred to three or more parties. 
Access  support  &  owner  control:  As  computing  technology  developed,  the 
concerns of data privacy and eDocument ownership rights intensified. It has been noted 
that an eDocument owner has the right to store, manage, share and track their personal 
data,  “under  their  control,  with  their  consent,  and  for  their  benefit”  [133]  (see  3.5 
Privacy  and  Ownership).  Unlike  paper-based  documents  that  can  be  presented 
anywhere, digitally signed eDocuments are currently based on organizations for their 
service support, so that the reviewer can only verify them through the organization-
provided  service  (see  3.4.8  PKI  and  3.4.9  Digital  Signature  Theory).  Many 
organizations also provide access control functions for the stored eDocuments through 
a system to satisfy the ownership right, such as Digitary (see 4.2.3 Digitary). However, 
this method depends heavily on the issuing body; in the case of the eCertificate, it is 
inconvenient  for  a  reviewer,  who  has  eCertificates  issued  from  many  different 
organizations, to verify the eDocuments through many different systems. Moreover, 
anything  happening  to  the  issuing  organization,  e.g.  going  out  of  business,  or  the eCert 
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database being damaged, will result in the eDocument becoming invalid. This lifelong 
validation issue is crucial to an eCertificate as a genuine eCertificate must remain valid 
even if the issuing body no longer exists. 
eDocument  content  validation:  eDocument  content  for  digital  signing  can 
present in various forms, such as Unsigned content, Signed content groups, Externally 
referenced content, and Dynamic content. It also portrays various content types, such as 
text documents, media files, and programme code. To accompany the various content 
types and forms, digital signature with XML syntax was defined. It has three signing 
methods:  detached  signature,  enveloped  signature  and  enveloping  signature,  each 
designed to handle the various content forms (see 3.4.10.2 Issue 2 – eDocument content 
validation).  However,  the  content  of  an  eCertificate  will  not  solely  comprise  one 
content type or form, but a combination of them. For example, the evidence file could 
be the Externally referenced content, the transits file and the qualification file could 
become the Signed content groups, and the qualification award itself is the Dynamic 
content as it may be withdrawn at a later stage. What is more, there is no specification 
of  how  an  eCertificate  file  should  be  structured  and  how  it  should  be  verified. 
Therefore, how to combine the different XML signing methods together to sign the 
various content types and forms to ensure the security and trust  becomes the main 
technical gap that needs to be overcome. 
eDocument content status validation: digital signature is most suited to sign 
static eDocuments, but not for eDocuments with changing status, as it only validates 
the  eDocuments’  content  modification  and  the  status  of  the  signers’  public  key 
certificates (PKC), without validating the status of the document’s actual content (see 
3.4.10.2 Issue 3 – eDocument status validation). This is crucial to an eCertificate as this 
signed eDocument itself is also a certificate, which may have a valid period (e.g. first 
aid certificate), and may be revoked in a later stage (e.g. if it is discovered, after the 
certificate has been issued, that the student cheated in the exam or plagiarized). The 
problem we are dealing with is a certificate squared issue (referred to as (certificate)
2 
issue), which involves the issuer’s PKC and the qualification certificate as a whole. 
Auto  request  of  signing  key  status  validation:  Current  Public  Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) does not start the validation of the public key certificates’ status eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 99 
automatically. It will only undertake this process if required (see 3.4.10.1 Issue 1 – 
public key certificate status validation). In the case of an eCertificate, this is a critical 
security  hole  as  it  may  result  in  a  forgery  being  accepted  if  the  key  has  been 
compromised. 
The issues of content validation and auto request of validation are explained in 
Figure 5-3, after [31, 32]. eCert 
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Figure 5-3 Digital signing issues 
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5.5.4 Technical Requirements 
Referring to the system requirements summarised from the domain definition and 
common usage pattern, the corresponding technical requirements from the use case 
study and gap analysis are listed in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4 Technical requirements (TR) 
SR ID  TR ID  Summary 
SR-01  TR-01  system adaptability and compatibility so that the system 
can be embedded as a plug-in within other systems, e.g. 
eFolio 
SR-02  TR-02  Security control: include hardware, database, and network 
TR-03  system access control for students, reviewers, and any third 
parties 
TR-04  eCertificate access control for students, reviewers, and any 
third parties 
SR-03  TR-05  support content modification validation 
TR-06  support withdraw of an eCertificate 
TR-07  support revocation of signing key 
TR-08  can verify and prove issuer 
SR-04  TR-09  the student owner of the eCertificate can have control over 
who can see it and for how long, without the need of re-
signing by the issuer 
SR-05  TR-10  Stimulate large-scale uptake, enabling eCertificate to be 
widely verified and recognized throughout the UK 
TR-11  support lifetime validation, can be independent from the 
issuing body 
TR-12  easy to use, suits low IT skill users, both students and 
reviewers 
TR-13  Minimize system storage 
TR-14  Establish stakeholder trust between all involved parties eCert 
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5.5.5 Chapter Summary 
The eCertificate case study has identified the three stakeholders involved, and 
explored  the  issues  through  use  cases  analysis.  A  gap  analysis  against  current 
techniques  and  services  for  such  issues  was  carried  out  to  discover  what  could  be 
reused and what was still required. The technical requirements from the use case study 
and gap analysis were tabulated in line with the system requirements. These will then 
need to be addressed and reflected in the design of the new system. eCert 
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Chapter 6   The Proposed 
eCertificate System 
The  last  2  layers  of  the  SORM  methodology  are  service  profile  and 
implementation. This chapter describes these two layers through the following steps: 
first generation of the services profile to bridge the gap, then the decisions made for the 
technical  approaches,  then  the  system  design,  and  finally  summary  of  the  system 
implementation. 
The eCertificate system development was carried out under the eCert project. The 
researcher was fully responsible for the whole system analysis and design while over-
viewing the system demonstrator production as the eCert project manager. All sections 
in  this  chapter  are  the  researcher’s  own  work,  expect  that  section  6.6  System 
Demonstrator  includes  contributions  by  other  eCert  project  team  members.  Two 
workshop proposals [11, 33] and a conference paper [32] were published during the 
development. This work has also been published as reports on the eCert project website 
[28]. 
6.1 Service Profile 
With the use cases defined and gap analysis produced, the next step in following 
the SORM methodology is to develop a complete service profile. Hence, techniques to 
tackle the issues were investigated. eCert 
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6.1.1 Existing Services 
Service  Orientated  Architecture  (SOA):  the  eFramework,  whose  aim  is  to 
build a common approach to Service Oriented Architectures for education, offer greater 
interoperability between systems and software across the eLearning community. By 
adopting the eFramework SOA, the distributed stakeholder use case can then be met 
since the SOA provides an architecture for participation. 
Digital  signing:  digital  signatures  are  used  in  eDocuments  to  provide 
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. By adopting the digital signing method, 
adding an issuer’s signature to an eCertificate can meet part of the eCertificate assertion 
use case as it can provide proof of the certificate’s source and evidence of modification, 
and it also meets part of the stakeholder trust use case as the CAs provide a chain of 
trusted nodes. 
Federated Identity: The formation of stakeholder trust has been addressed in 
previous  eFramework  projects,  including  ePortfolio  projects,  by  utilizing  the  open-
source federated identity system Shibboleth [72]. This is based on SAML (Security 
Assertion  Mark-up  Language)  published  by  OASIS,  and  provides  a  decentralized 
solution for institutions to share trusted user identities between each other, so that a 
home user identity is valid at any of the partner institutions within the federation [135]. 
This  could  provide the service for identity management of the eCertificate owners. 
However, such systems may need to be extended in order to associate the requirements 
of the eCertificate system. 
6.1.2 Services Required  
Stakeholder trust: Although the identities of the eCertificate owners could be 
addressed by adapting Shibboleth, and digital signing can provide the stakeholder trust 
as the CAs provide a chain of trusted nodes, we still require services to provide the trust 
between all stakeholders, especially when the eCertificate is transmitted further to three 
or  more  receivers,  where  extra  care  of  key  management  and  service  support  are 
involved. eCert 
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Unique ID system: In order to verify eCertificates nationwide, it is necessary for 
the eCertificates and their owners to have unique id numbers within the system. 
Access  control:  A  privacy  control  service  is  required  to  enable  eCertificate 
owners to set up controls for who can see what and for how long. 
Lifetime Validation: We also need a service to deal with the Lifetime Validation 
issue, so that the eCertificates can be validated even if the issuing institution does not 
exist years later. 
6.1.3 Bridging the Gap 
XML Signatures: By adopting the XML signature, which combines the detached 
and enveloped method, using the detached signature to sign any eCertificate related 
support  documents,  and  then  using  the  enveloped  signature  to  sign  the  whole 
eCertificate with the detached signature value embedded, will meet the assertion use 
case for any information involved in an eCertificate. 
XML  metadata: The ownership, usage, and privacy issues can be solved by 
generating the related information in XML metadata while employing the detached and 
enveloped signature methods to create an eCertificate, thereby allowing the owner to 
set access control to the document while retaining the integrity of the digital signature. 
A  timestamp  can  also  be  added  with  the  XML  Signatures  to  enhance  its 
integrity. 
Auto verification of CRLs: to solve the (certificate)
2 problem, the system needs 
to validate the certificates’ state against two types of certificate revocation list (CRL): 
whether the signer’s key has been compromised or the actual content certificate has 
been withdrawn. Therefore the system needs to maintain the document’s revocation list 
as  well  as  the signer’s  certificate revocation list  (CRL). The system can provide  a 
service to automatically verify the status against both of these lists, without the need to 
raise a request by the reviewers. eCert 
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Unique number systems: Systems such as the National Insurance Number, UK 
unique learner number, Chinese student registration number, and US citizen number, 
can be adapted to form the unique student ids and eCertificate ids. 
An  independent  system  that  provides  a  verification  service  for  eCertificates 
issued  throughout  the  UK  would  be  ideal  to  solve  the  lifetime  validation  issue. 
However, it needs to overcome the storage and security issues, as this may require a 
huge memory space if the system needs to store the eCertificates issued throughout the 
UK, and the database that stores all these details will be a target for hackers. 
6.1.4 Approaches for Meeting the Requirements 
Based  on  the  service  profiles,  the  ideas  to  bridge  the  gap,  and  the  technical 
requirements  (TR)  that  have  been  covered  previously  in  chapter  5,  the  Design 
Approaches (DA) to meet the requirements were compiled and summarised in Table 6-
1. The design approaches given here are mapped to system implementation in Table 6-
2 in section 6.5. 
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Table 6-1 Design approaches (DA) 
TR ID  DA ID  Summary 
TR-01  DA-01  Use XML to enable easy transaction between systems with 
different platforms 
TR-02  DA-02  The eCertificate generation and issuing process, the hardware, 
database, and network security, and human control for both staff 
and students, will be guarded by the issuing body  
TR-03  DA-03  Adapt Federated Identity system technique; access control to 
eCertificate system will be based on system roles 
TR-04  DA-04  Access control to eCertificate will be restricted to authorized users 
only 
TR-05  DA-05  Employ digital signing technique to support the content 
modification validation 
TR-06  DA-06  Design a new function for eCertificate content status validation, 
address the unique eCertificate squared problem, support 
withdrawal of an eCertificate 
TR-07  DA-07  Design a new function to support the auto verification of signing 
key CRL 
TR-08  DA-08  Design a new structure for eCertificate so that it can contain the 
various information files while can be legally accepted and verified 
  DA-09  Adapt the XML signature technique to support the verification of 
the various information types involved in an eCertificate 
  DA-10  Employ timestamp technique to enhance the signature integrity  
TR-09  DA-11  Employ XML metadata for eCertificate access control values 
  DA-12  Design a new signing method that allows the modification of 
eCertificate metadata while maintaining the integrity of the digital 
signature, so that the student owner can set access control to an 
eCertificate without the need for re-signing by the issuer 
TR-10  DA-13  Adapt SOA to provide the architecture for participation which will 
enable large-scale uptake  
  DA-14  Adapt a national unique number system to enable the eCertificate 
system to be rolled out throughout the UK 
TR-11  DA-15  An independent system to provide the required services  
TR-12  DA-16  Provide functions with user friendly interface to deal with 
complicated technical requirements, such as keys management 
TR-13  DA-17  Avoid storing sensitive data, minimize system storage to reduce the 
attraction of database attacks 
TR-14  DA-18  Employ PKI to establish stakeholder trust between all involved 
parties eCert 
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6.2 System Structure Development 
Although digital  signing is  widely  used for verifying  eDocuments,  it is more 
suitable for a “one stop” situation. When applying it to a “multiple stops” situation, a 
system designed is needed to handle the trust issue, such as the keys and their related 
security problems. 
Existing systems  deal  with the authentication of eDocuments,  such as  mobile 
eBoarding  cards,  secured  mailing  systems  and  commercial  eCertificate  systems. 
However, they were built for specific purposes, and only transmit data between two 
parties. They do not address the security requirements involved in data transmitting 
between multiple parties. 
6.2.1 Approach 1: Existing Transmission Process 
If a digitally signed document is used to replace the paper-based document within 
the existing issue, distribute, and verify process path, as show in Figure 6-1, it raises 
many issues. The two main ones are: 
  Service support to handle the digitally signed documents 
o  An efficient way to prove the issue of an eDocument is to have it digitally 
signed. However, this requires all the receivers (the eDocument owner and 
all inspectors) to have service support to handle the verification process. 
They  will  need  to  have  the  relevant  IT  skills  to  manage  the  operation, 
especially for the first time if system setup is required. 
o  As  different  institutions  will  use  different  methods  to  sign  their 
eDocuments, this may require all receivers to have services for each issuing 
institution. 
  Privacy and Confidentiality issues 
o  If an inspector has the service support (with the public key) for a selected 
issuer, this may mean that the inspector can view any eDocuments signed eCert 
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by this issuer; if these services are publicly available for inspectors (and 
anyone could be an inspector), this may mean that everyone can access any 
digitally signed documents, including stolen ones. There is no way for the 
users  to  have  control  over  their  usage.  This  is  strictly  against  the 










































Figure 6-1 Transmitting eDocument with existing process, published in[28] 
 
6.2.2 Approach 2: Institution Based Transmission 
There could be an institution based approach, as shown in Figure 6-2, taking the 
Digitary system as an example. 
a) eDocuments stored in the issuer’s system; 
b) The issuer also provides an online support service for eDocument management 
and verification; eCert 
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c) the owners can access the online management system to set access control for 
their own eDocument before sending out the link and access token to the specified 
inspector; 
d) the inspector can access the online verification system through the link and use 
the access token to view, verify, and download the eDocument. 
This approach addresses the privacy and confidentiality issues by setting access 
tokens. Therefore, the inspectors can only access those that they have the tokens for. 
However, some issues have arisen: 
  Privacy and Confidentiality issue 
o  The access token only controls the first time round. Once the inspector has 
accessed the online system and downloaded the eDocument, the owner will 
have lost control of it afterward. 
  System storage 
o  This  approach  requires  huge  storage  as  it  needs  to  store  all  the  issued 
eDocuments for a lifetime. 
  Lifetime validation 
o  This  approach  relies  heavily  on  the  institution  (the  issuer).  Lifetime 
validation is a problem if the institution no longer exists. 
  Security  
o  The  information  stored  is  considered  as  high  value  and  sensitive.  The 
support service provides an active channel to the backend database, which 
could increase the risk of attacks. 
  Usage 
o  It is inconvenient for the inspector when eDocuments are issued from many 
different institutions, as shown in Figure 6-3. 
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Figure 6-3 Usage issue of the institution approach, published in[28] 
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6.2.3 Approach 3: Central Service and Storage 
Taking the Chinese system as an example, a central service approach, as shown 
in Figure 6-4, could be provided. 
a) a central online system provides the management and verification service for 
all institutions that have joined; 
b)  all  institutions  issue  eDocuments  using  the  same  standard,  which  are  then 
uploaded to the central system; 
c) the owners can access the online management system to set access control of 
their own eDocument before sending out the link and access token to the specified 
inspector; 
d) the inspector can access the online verification system through the link and use 
the access token to view, verify, and download the eDocument. 
Compared  to  the  institution  approach,  this  approach  addresses  the  lifetime 
validation issue, and also solves the inconvenience problem as the inspectors only need 
to access one reference point for all the eDocuments. However, it requires an even 
bigger store, and increases the risk of database attacks as it now has a much bigger 
database. 
  System storage 
o  This approach requires huge storage as it needs to store all the eDocuments 
issued for a lifetime. 
  Security  
o  This  approach  stores  all  issued  eDocuments  from  institutions  that  have 
joined into one backend database; the risk of being attacked is considered 
very high. 
  Trust 
o  Who will host such a system? It must be trusted by all institutions as it 
holds the information for all of them. The English government has a history 
of losing sensitive information, and in some cases, the whole database. eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 






































































Figure 6-4 Transmitting with a central storage approach, published in[28] 
 
6.2.4 Approach 4: Central Service Only 
As the central storage in approach 3 above causes lots of problems, perhaps a 
central service approach without storing the eDocument in the system, as shown in 
Figure 6-5, would suffice. 
a) a central online system provides the management and verification service for 
all institutions that have joined; 
b) all institutions issue eDocuments using the same standard, which are then sent 
to the owners; 
c) the owners can access the online management system to set access control of 
their own eDocuments before sending out to the inspector; 
d) the inspector accesses the online verification system to verify the eDocument. eCert 
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Figure 6-5 Transmitting with a central service approach, published in[28] 
 
Compared  to  the  approach  of  central  service  with  stored  eDocuments,  this 
approach solves the three issues that the other one faced: a) it does not require storage 
for the eDocuments; b) the eDocuments are not stored in one system, thus dramatically 
reducing the likelihood of attacks; c) the eDocuments are not stored in one system, so 
there will be no risk of data being lost, therefore it will be much easier to find a body to 
run the service that everyone can agree on. However, this approach brings back the 
three way transmitting situation, and  again  face the keys management, privacy and 
confidentiality issues described earlier. 
  Privacy and Confidentiality issue: 
o  In this approach, an inspector can have service support for all issuers. If the 
inspector  has  the  public  key  for  one  eDocument,  he  can  access  all 
eDocuments  issued  by  that  issuer.  If  the  inspector  can  get  hold  of  one 
eDocument  from  each  issuer,  then  they  can  access  any  eDocuments, eCert 
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including stolen ones. This is strictly against the confidentiality and privacy 
requirement. 
 
6.2.5 The Chosen Approach 
As the approach of an online central service – without storing eDocuments – 
meets most of the major requirements, it has therefore been selected as a basis for the 
system structure design. 
Pros: 
  System storage: it does not store eDocuments on the central system, saving 
huge storage; 
  Security: as sensitive data is not stored in the system, many attacks can be 
avoided; 
  Trust: The central system is only there to provide a service, as the sensitive 
data is not stored in the system, there will be no risk of the data being lost. 
People in general, do not trust any government bodies holding their personal 
data, so this approach makes having such a central system a possibility. 
  Usage: convenient for the inspectors to access eDocuments from a wide range 
of issuers. 
  Lifetime  validation:  independent  central  system,  can  validate  eDocuments 
even when the issuer no longer exists. 
Cons: 
  Privacy and Confidentiality issue: an inspector can have the service support 
for all issuers. If the inspector has the public key for one eDocument, he can 
access all eDocuments issued by that issuer. If the inspector can obtain one 
eDocument from each issuer, then they can access any eDocuments. This is 
strictly against the confidentiality and privacy requirement. It is the main issue 
that still needs to be addressed. 
  Issues noted in the gap analysis still need to be addressed. eCert 
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6.2.6 The eCert System Structure Design 
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Figure 6-6 The new eDocument transmitting design, published in[28] 
   
a) a central online system provides the management and verification service for 
all institutions that have joined; 
b) all institutions issue eDocuments using the same standard, i.e. the document 
signed using the issuer’s private key, the metadata that contains the access token, and 
the whole XML document will be signed using the owner’s public key. The file is then 
sent to the owners; 
c) the owners can access the online management system to set new access control 
of their own eDocument before sending out to the inspector; 
d) the inspector accesses the online verification system to verify the eDocument. eCert 
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6.3 Decisions and Assumptions 
In order to secure the eCertificate system, a number of decisions and assumptions 
have been made. 
6.3.1 SOA 
The development of the system will adopt the SOA of the eFramework to meet 
the distributed stakeholder user case. SOA allows developers to build applications from 
sets of services with well-defined interfaces and is achieved without “tight coupling 
between transacting partners” [114]. When used with interoperable ePortfolio XML 
schemas, this makes it easy for any ePortfolio vendor to integrate eCertificate services 
into their application; hence enabling and encouraging user take up and participation 
between users using software from potentially different providers. 
6.3.2 UK Focus 
Different  countries  have  different  cultures,  a  different  understanding  of  what 
protections  should  be  provided  by  an  eCertificate  system,  and  have  different 
approaches to data protection with differing legal requirements. In order to deal with 
this, work on the current system design for an eCertificate system is focused on the UK 
situation, although the requirements for other approaches are being borne in mind. 
6.3.3 Unique Student ID and eCertificate ID 
For  the  eCertificate  system  to  be  rolled  out  nationwide,  a  unique  student  ID 
system  is  required. Such an  ID system  can be adapted from  either the UK unique 
learner  number,  or  the  learning  record  system,  or  the  Chinese  student  registration 
number system (see 6.1.2 Required Services and 6.1.3 Bridging the Gap). However, 
this unique student ID system will not be investigated further in the current work phase. 
It is assumed that such a system has been adopted, and every student will register a 
unique student ID when they start studying at sixth form or college (the level that they eCert 
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will start to receive all sorts of qualification certificates). The version of the ID system 
adopted should not affect the eCertificate system provided the identities are all unique. 
For the purpose of this study, a simple and self maintained numbering system was 
used, and every eCertificate issued would also have unique eCertificate ID associated 
with the student ID. The version of the ID system should not affect the eCertificate 
system as long as all IDs were unique within the system. The rules for the unique 
student ID and eCertificate ID are: 
  Every student will only have one unique lifelong student ID nationwide  
  Every eCertificate that the student achieves will contain this student ID along 
with the eCertificate ID as proof of ownership 
  Student : student ID  1 : 1 
  Student ID : eCert ID  1 : many 
6.3.4 Security Control by the Issuing Institution 
All institutions that would like to use the system to issue eCertificates will need 
to  be  certified  first,  ideally  by  a  professional  education  body,  e.g.  the  Ministry  of 
Education, so that no bogus institutions can be involved. 
All members that represent their institution, e.g. a registrar, will also need to be 
certified, and can be traced back to the institution. 
It is assumed that only authorized issuers from the registered education institution 
can access the issuing system and the student record database. Such staff control and 
database security will rely on the institutions’ security policy, and not be investigated 
further here even it is related. 
6.3.5 Ownership Control 
To ensure that the eCertificate owner has the right to control who can see what 
and for how long, the system will allow the owner to set controls on their eCertificates. 
This will include an option for the display content, display time limit, and who can 
have access to the controlled eCertificate. eCert 
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6.3.6 Solving the eCertificate Squared Problem 
The eCertificate squared problem described in the gap analysis will be dealt with 
by  maintaining  a  eCertificate  revocation  list  as  well  as  the  signer’s  public  key 
certificate revocation list (CRL). The system will verify both of these revocation lists 
every time an eCertificate is accessed. 
6.3.7 Students’ Unique Keys vs systems’ Default Key 
Encryption can be used for access control of the onward distributed eCertificates 
after they are issued, so that only the reviewers with the corresponding decrypt keys 
can have access. 
At first, it was decided that every student would receive a key pair when they 
register for a student ID, and all institutions will use the student’s public key to encrypt 
the eCertificates when issued, so that the privacy issue could be addressed, as only the 
student with the corresponding private key can access them. This is shown in Figure 6-
7. 
 



















(unique student id : 
password)
Generate key pair Receive key pair
 
Figure 6-7 Registration, published in[28] 
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However, it was finally decided to use a system default key rather than unique 
personalised student keys for encrypting the initial eCertificates. The reasons are: 
  Using a default key makes open access possible, as eCertificate owners may 
like their eCertificates to be open access in some situations, 
  Considering  that  keys  are  likely  be  forgotten  at  some  point,  creating 
eCertificates  using  students’  personal  keys  may  end  up  with  their  initial 
eCertificates becoming inaccessible. 
  The  eCertificate  owners  can  always  set  access  control  to  the  initial 
eCertificates through the management system when needed. 
To enable this, the initial issued eCertificates must only be accessible by their 
owners during the issuing process. Therefore, the design decision was that the initial 
eCertificates would be encrypted with a default key, and saved under the corresponding 
student’s account, so only the owner can have access. The eCertificate can be encrypted 
with  a  personalized  key  through  the  management  system  before  sending  to  the 
reviewer. 
6.3.8 Federation Management vs. eCert System Management 
To ensure that only the eCertificate owner can change the access value to their 
own eCertificates but no-one else, a system login for access control is required. 
There are two options: a) adopt a federation identity management system, with 
eCert  as  part  of  the  education  institution  federation,  passing  the  student  ID  and 
password to its identity management system for access control; or b) eCert maintains its 
own access control system with a student ID and system password. 
Many projects are currently running in the area of identity management under the 
Access and Identity Management Programme by JISC, such as login for life, Identity 
management  toolkit,  and  Service-Oriented  Federated  Authorization  (SOFA)
12.  As a 
result,  it  is  difficult  to  pick  a  suitable  one  before  these  projects  are  completed.  
However, login access control to the eCert system is not the main issue that the eCert 
                                                 
12 http://www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/programmes/aim.aspx eCert 
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project  needs  to  address.  Investigating  these  identity  management  solutions  would 
require considerable time, so it was decided that the eCert system would have an in-
built  access  control  system,  and  would  defer  investigation  of  a  suitable  federation 
identity management system to future work. 
6.3.9 Starting Point 
Every institution will have different attribute names in database tables, and may 
be using different methods to collect the required information when forming a paper-
based certificate. So that the eCert system can easily fit into any institution, the eCert 
system will let the institution form the base of the award qualification file using their 
existing methods, and take over from for the stage at which the paper-based certificate 
is ready for printing, and from that, set links to collect any required information. This 
should simplify the configuration of the system setup when it is installed. 
It is assumed that the database has the required information fields ready for the 
eCertificate issuing process. Any missing fields can be created and unmatched field 
names can be configured at the system set up stage: 
  student’s name 
  student ID – a unique learner ID nationwide 
  student record 
o  department 
o  course / qualification title 
o  academic year 
o  qualification status (pass/fail) 
  print-ready qualification award file, 
  qualification transcript file 
  assessment evidence file 
  qualification award information 
o  department / exam board 
o  qualification title 
o  level (first/2:1/2:2/third/A/A+/…?) 
o  date of award eCert 
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o  expiry date of award (when recertification is required) 
  on system configuration 
o  match the required field names 
  signer’s information 
o  signer’s ID 
o  signer’s name 
o  signer’s public key certificate 
6.4 Core Design 
The system design focused on four areas: the eCert file structure, the system 
structure, the signature method, and the authentication and verification processes. 
6.4.1 Systems and Relationships 
The  eCertificate  system  (eCert)  will  be  constructed  in  two  parts:  an  issuing 
system and an online central system. 
The online central system will also be constructed in two parts: a management 
subsystem (for students) and a verification subsystem (for reviewers). It will provide 
services for eCertificates issued from any involved institutions, and will be the single 
reference point nationwide. This will prevent confusion to reviewers of not knowing 
which  system  to  choose  or  which  can  be  trusted,  especially  when  they  have  large 
numbers  of  eCertificates  issued  from  different  institutions.  This  will  also  have  the 
advantage of having close monitoring and control against bogus systems. 
The  issuing  system  will  be  installed  at  individual  institutions.  The  institution 
creates and issues digitally-signed and access-controlled eCertificates to the specified 
students  through  the  local  issuing  system.  The  students  view  and  set  new  access 
controls on the received eCertificates through the central management system before 
sending them out to further reviewers. The reviewers use the central verification system 
to  view  and  verify  the  access-controlled  eCertificate.  This  is  shown  as  a  use  case 
diagram  in  Figure  6-8.  The  procedure  for  the  issue,  distribution,  and  verification eCert 
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processes  between  the  stakeholders  and  the  service  support  systems  is  shown  as  a 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6-8 eCert system design in use case diagram, published in[28] eCert 
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Figure 6-9 eCert system design in sequence diagram, published in[28] eCert 
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6.4.2 File Structure 
An  eCertificate  will  contain  three  files:  a  qualification  award  file,  providing 
qualification award details that a paper-based certificate would offer; a transcript file, 
providing the related course and institution information so that the qualification can be 
clearly understood; and any evidence files if applicable, providing the information that 
the assessment was based on. An evidence file can be in any format, and can be seen as 
proof of the skill as it is bound with the awarded qualification. An eCertificate file will 
be a compressed file of these three files with their access metadata, and the signers’ 
signature information. 
To ensure that the eCertificate owner has the right to control the usage of the 
document, the transcript file and the evidence files will be set as optional for display, 
while the qualification award file will be compulsory at all times. The system will 
enable the eCertificate owner to select the preferred section(s) and set an access time 
limit  for  individual  reviewers  to  best  fit  their  various  purposes.  The  metadata  will 
contain the section display values and access time limit, as well as the eCertificate ID, 
student ID, and certificate expiry date. The section display values for the transcript file 
and  the  evidence  file  will  be  set  to  true,  and  the  access  time  value  will  be  set  to 
unlimited  by  default  on  issue.  All  values  in  the  metadata  will  be  verified,  and  the 
eCertificate  will  be  regarded  as  invalid  if  it  fails  to  pass  any  of  the  verification 
processes. The controlled eCertificate will be encrypted individually, so that only the 
person with the given corresponding decryption key can access it. 
6.4.3 The eCert Signature 
Simple digital signatures are not secure enough for signing the eCert file due to 
their special file structure. 
With  the  traditional  method,  an  enveloped  signature  can  be  used  to  sign  the 
qualification award file, and the detached signature can be used to sign the attached 
transcript file and evidence file. However, by using this method, individual sections can 
be swapped with, for example, another piece of better work by a classmate, and signed 
by the same issuer. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6-10. eCert 
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Figure 6-10 Issues when applying traditional signature method directly 
 
Furthermore, digitally signed documents are not editable after they are issued, not 
even by their issuer or owner; any modification will be detected. This is not suitable for 
the eCertificate as the owner would like to set controls on their distributed documents. 
The system will employ a new signing method, the eCert signature, to ensure the 
integrity  of  the  digitally  signed  eCertificate,  so  that  the  eCertificate  can  have  the 
attached files securely bound together. Any unauthorized modification will be detected 
during the verification process, while it allows access control values to be changed and 
still claimed to be valid. This method will combine the detached signature and the eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 127 
enveloped signature, with the condition statements to meet the specified eCertificate 
situation, as shown in the code below. 
<metadata> 
  <access time limit>, 
  <transit_visible = 1>, 
  <evidence_visible = 1>, 
  ...... 
  ...... 
 
<qualification> 
  <student ID>, 
  < eCert ID >, 
  <eCert time limit>, 
  ...... 
 
  if <transcript_visible = 1> then validate the signature 
    <transitfile> 
      < transcript_signaturevalue> 
      <Reference URI=“…”> 
  if <evidence_visible = 1> then validate the signature 
    <evidencefile> 
      < evidence_ signaturevalue> 
      <Reference URI=“…”> 
 
  <qualification_signaturevalue> 
 
Using this method, any changes to the signed content, either the qualification 
section,  the  transcript  section,  or  the  evidence  section,  will  be  detected;  the  owner 
controlled access values can be changed in the metadata; the optional file will not be 
attached  within  an  eCert  file  if  it  is  set  to  0  (representing  non-display).  This  can 
minimise the transfer file size while the signed document remains valid as the system 
will only carry on to verify and display the optional section if the condition in the 
metadata is met, such as the display value set  to 1 (representing display). The file 
structure of an eCertificate is described diagrammatically in Figure 6-11. eCert 
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Figure 6-11 eCertificate file structure design 
 
6.4.4 System Authentication and Verification 
The management system is for students to view and / or set new access controls 
on  their  eCertificates.  To  ensure  only  the  owner  can  set  controls  on  their  own 
eCertificates  but  not  other  receivers,  the  management  system  will  require  a  login 
control.  This  will  consist  of  a  combination  match  of  the  student  ID  and  system 
password.  The  management  system  will  verify  the  login  student  ID  against  the 
uploaded eCertificates. eCert 
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The system will verify the embedded information in an eCert file every time it is 
accessed; failure of any single checking process will result in denial of access. These 
verification processes include: 
  Validate eCert access control time and date 
  Validate eCert validation date 
  Validate issuer’s PKC against CRL 
  Validate eCert status against eCert CRL 
  Verify eCert ownership: eCert ID = login ID 
  Verify content modification for the qualification section 
  Verify content modification for the transcript and/or evidence section(s), if the 
corresponding visible setting = 1 
The actual interface of a valid eCertificate will contain the three files as well as 
the verification result. The qualification award file will use a corresponding certificate 
image from the institution’s system as background to maintain the interface of a paper-
based  certificate.  It  will  contain  the  digital  signature(s)  of  the  signer(s).  When  the 
signature is clicked, the system will display a pop-up window with the information that 
the PKC can be traced all the way to the root CA. It is shown in Figure 6-12 . 
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Figure 6-12 The interface design of a verified eCertificate, published in [31] 
 
6.5 The Proposed System 
The implementation of the proposed eCert system is summarised in Table 6-2 and 
is described in detail in the following sections: from its creation, issue, distribution, 
management to authentication and verification.  
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Table 6-2 System implementation (SI) 
DA ID  SI ID  Summary 
DA-01  SI-01  The system was developed using XML to enable easy transition 
between systems with different platforms. 
DA-02  SI-02  The security control of hardware, database, and network for the 
eCertificate generation and issuing processes is handled by the 
issuing institution. 
DA-03  SI-03  As explained in the Federation Management vs. eCert System 
Management section, an in-built access control system was 
implemented instead of a federated identity system. 
SI-04  Based on their system role, only authorized staff can access the 
issuing system and only authorized students can access the 
management system, but everyone can access the verification 
system. 
DA-04  SI-05  Students can only set controls on their own eCertificates through 
the management system. 
SI-06  Only reviewers with the correct access key can access the 
corresponding eCertificate. 
DA-05  SI-07  Traditional digital signing technique is used as the foundation of 
the signing process to support the content modification validation. 
DA-06  SI-08  Taking the signing key CRL as an example, a new qualification 
CRL was created and its validation process was added to the 
traditional digital signing process to solve the eCertificate 
squared problem. 
DA-07  SI-09  A function was added to call for the verification of the signing 
key and display the result every time an eCertificate is accessed. 
DA-08  SI-10  A new file structure for eCertificate was defined, which contains 
all elements that a paper-based certificate has, as well as the new 
elements that meet the eCertificate and ePortfolio requirements, 
such as the evidence file.  
DA-09 
 
SI-11  The XML signature has been adopted with a new wrapping 
method for the various file types in the eCertificate to increase the 
signature security in the verification process. eCert 
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DA ID  SI ID  Summary 
  A timestamp has been added to the signature so that an 
eCertificate will be digitally signed, with certified signature time, 
and therefore tamper evidence and non-repudiation criteria are 
met. 
DA-10  SI-12  Owner controlled access token, display sections, and access time 
limit values have been placed in metadata. 
DA-11  SI-13  A new signing method, eCert signature, has been implemented, 
which allows eCertificate owners to modify the metadata of a 
signed eCertificate without invalidating the signature. 
DA-12  SI-14  The system was implemented with SOA. 
DA-13  SI-15  Standards and policies have been set up for all institutions which 
use the system. 
SI-16  As explained in the Unique Student ID and eCertificate ID 
section, a self-maintained numbering system was implemented. 
DA-14  SI-17  An online centre system has been implemented to provide 
eCertificate management and verification services. As the newly 
designed file structure and signing method enables the 
modification of access control values without re-signing, the 
system can be used independently from the issuers (with the last 
updated CRLs). 
DA-15  SI-18  Support functions have been implemented to handle the 
complicated requirements from the back end, such as signing and 
key management; therefore, front end web user friendly interface 
development can easily be set up by using the support functions. 
DA-16  SI-19  The system only provides the service, as no personal sensitive 
information is stored, only storing the CRLs for validation 
purposes. 
DA-17  SI-20  As the implementation is based on traditional digital signature, 
the PKI is maintained to provide trust between the stakeholders. 
DA-18  SI-21  The system was developed using XML to enable easy transition 
between systems with different platforms. 
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6.5.1 System Overview 
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Figure 6-13 System overview, published in [11, 28, 29, 31] 
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6.5.2 Creating an eCertificate – the Issuing System 
The process of creating eCert will be carried out through the issuing subsystem, 
which will be installed locally at the authenticated institution. 
Qualification award and 
access control metadata
1. signed using eCert signature with issuer’s 
private key + timestamp
eCert signature enabling
  the signer to specify the content the 
document owner is allowed to blind
  allow the document owner to produce an  
extracted subdocument, which can be 
verified by any third party, as signed by the 
original issuer
Digitally signed + certified signature time  
provides tamper evidence and non-repudiation
2. encrypted with system default public 
key
The access time control value can be set to 
no limit when create
eCert 
Institution – create eCert
  Collect required information from institution’s student record system 
Also:
  Update key revocation list 




  Qualification award 
data 
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the transcript file
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the evidence file
  Embedded issuer’s 
digital signature
3. issue to student’s institution account
 
Figure 6-14 Signing an eCert 
 
All certified institutions are required to use the same standards and methods, so 
that  the  issued  eCertificates  can  be  verified  by  the  central  system  nationwide.  All 
eCertificates will be in XML format, and provide information such as “valid time” and eCert 
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“issue time”  to  meet  the requirements  of re-certification, revocation, and deal  with 
future software update issues. Every eCertificate will have access control values e.g. 
who can see it and for how long. This is to keep control of the distributed eCertificates, 
protect  the  students’  privacy,  and  prevent  any  unauthorized  use  in  the  future.  All 
eCertificates will be digitally signed using the newly designed eCert signature. Here, 
techniques such as timestamp will be used. 
Overview of an eCertificate signing process is shown in Figure 6-14. The detailed 
process is described below. 
  Take selected issuing target (for who, or for which group) from input 
o  Option1: for issuing an eCertificate to a specified learner 
  student ID 
o  Option2: for issuing eCertificates to a specified group of learners 
  department (dropdown list) 
  course / qualification title (dropdown list) 
  academic year (dropdown list) 
  qualification status (dropdown list) 
  Retrieve the data from database 
o  Use the input, collect the required information of the learner(s) 
  student’s name 
  student ID 
  print-ready qualification award file 
  qualification transcript file 
  assessment evidence file 
  department / exam board 
  qualification title 
  level 
  date of award 
  expiry date of award (when re-certification is required) 
  corresponding background image and logo 
  email address eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 136 
o  Display  error  message  if  a  print-ready  qualification  award  file  for  the 
specified learner, or anyone in the specified group, is not found 
  Collect the signing information 
o  Provide a button for browsing and uploading the signer’s private key 
o  Collect and authenticate the signer’s ID and password to ensure they are 
correct and belong to an issuer, before allowing upload the signing key 
o  Use the ID to get the signer’s name and public key certificate from the 
database 
o  The system needs to be able to uptake more than one signer 
o  For security reason, the private key should be kept in a removable device 
when not in use 
  Create the eCertificate 
o  In  the  qualification  file,  set  display  control  for  the  transcript  file  and 
evidence file: if visible value = 1, and use detached signature to sign the 
files; 
o  Prepare  for  the  verification,  only  verify  the  signature  when  the  file  is 
selected and included 
o  Embed signer’s PK certificate within the qualification file 
o  Use enveloped signature to sign the qualification file 
o  Generate an unique eCertificate ID nationwide 
  E.g. Institution code + course code + year + student ID + certificate code 
o  Set the metadata for the signed qualification file (outside the signed section! 
So  change  of  access  value  will  not  break  the  integrity  of  the  digital 
signature) 
  student ID 
  eCertificate ID 
  eCertificate expiry date 
  eCertificate access time limit – get the specified time from database if it 
exists, set to no limit by default on issue 
  visible option value of the transcript file – set to 1 by default on issue, 
for use when changing access control 
  visible option value of the evidence file – set to 1 by default on issue eCert 
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o  Wrap  the  3  files,  the  transcript  file,  evidence  file,  and  the  signed 
qualification file with meta data into one folder 
  Compress all sections (the 3 digitally signed files, PKC, meta data), 
  Encrypt the file with a default private key 
Encryption will be used for access control of the distributed eCertificates, 
so  that  only  those  reviewers  with  the  corresponding  decrypt  keys  can  have 
access. 
Reasons for using a default key rather than unique personalised keys for 
the initial eCertificates are as follows: 
o  Using a default key makes open access  possible, as eCertificate owners 
may like their eCertificates to be open access in some situations. Owners 
can set access control to their eCertificates when needed. To enable this, it 
should be ensured that the initial issued eCertificates will only be accessible 
by their owners during the issuing process. 
o  Keys  are  likely  be  forgotten  at  some  point,  creating  eCertificates  using 
students’ personal keys may end up with their initial eCertificates becoming 
inaccessible. 
Therefore, it was decided that the initial eCertificates will be encrypted 
with a default key, and saved under the corresponding student’s account, so 
only  the  owner  can  have  access.  The  eCertificate  can  be  encrypted  with  a 
personalized  key  through  the  management  system  before  sending  to  the 
reviewer. 
  Name the encrypted file with a unique eCert ID generated by the system, and 
end  with  a  file  extension  of  “ecert”  plus  the  technical  version  code,  e.g. 
abc12345.ecert01. The technical version code will be used for selecting the 
correct services during the verification process,  in preparation for technical 
updates in the future. eCert 
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Figure 6-15 Overview of the eCertificate issuing process 
 
The system will issue the eCertificate to the corresponding student’s institutional 
account.  In  addition,  the  system  can  send  the  eCertificate  to  the  specified  student 
through its internal email system which supports secure mailing functions. This email 
can also be signed, so that the email will be verified when received, and the sender’s 
certificate can be traced. 
The overview of an eCertificate issuing process is shown in Figure 6-15. The 
detailed process is described below. 
  Issue eCertificate to learner 
o  option 1: 
  save  the  eCertificate  under  the  learner’s  institution  account  for  the 
student to download 
o  option 2: 
  get issuer’s mailing message from input 
  get the student’s corresponding email address from the database 
  email to the student through a secure mailing system eCert 
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6.5.4 Setting Control on an eCertificate – the Management 
System 
1. decrypt with system default private key
Time control value in metadata: 
  Check if it is within the access time and date
Issuer ID in metadata:
  Check if the signing key has a revocation record
eCert management subsystem
  Login to eCert management subsystem -- unique student ID : password
  Upload the eCert
Also:
  Update access key revocation list
3. display the eCert with verified message
4. owner control
Set new access control value
  New file name
  New access expiry date 
and time
  Select extract/blinding 
options
Encrypt controlled eCert
  System genera new key 
pair
  Encrypt the newly 
controlled eCert with the 
new private key
Return value
  Newly created owner 
controlled eCert
  Access information (new 
file name : new access key 
: new expire date)






  Qualification award 
data 
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the transcription 
file
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the evidence file
  Embedded issuer’s 
digital signature
2. verification and validation
Verify signature with issuer’s public key 
  Check content modification
  Check award revocation
  Check if it is within eCert expiry date
Ownership
  Check if the eCert student ID = login student ID
  Student can only access their own eCert within the 
management subsystem to prevent any unauthorized 
modification to the document
 
Figure 6-16 Set control on an eCert 
 
For students to set access control to their own eCertificate, they need to log into 
the  management  subsystem.  Here,  the  federated  identity  system  Shibboleth  will  be 
adapted for the login control. Once the eCertificate is uploaded and the access token 
entered, the system will automatically carry out the checking processes, which will 
include  a)  the  access  token  is  correct  and  within  the  access  time  limit,  b)  the 
eCertificate is within the valid time limit, so that no re-certification is required yet, c) 
the signing key has not been withdrawn (key revocation), d) the eCertificate has not 
been withdrawn, and e) whether the uploaded eCertificate belongs to the student. eCert 
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An overview of an eCertificate set control process is shown in Figure 6-16. The 
detailed process of the management system is described below. 
  User needs to login to the management system 
o  Login using the unique student ID and a registered password 
o  Use an independent login control for now, but will investigate a federation 
access management system in the future 
  Take the uploaded eCertificate and its access key from input 
  Carry  out  all  the  verification  processes  detailed  in  the  verification  system 
section 
  From the eCertificate metadata, get the eCert ID, verify the eCert ownership 
by  matching  the  login  student  ID  with  the  student  ID  in  the  eCertificate 
metadata 
  Students  can  only  set  access  control  to  their  own  eCertificates,  to  prevent 
unauthorized access to other people’s eCertificates 
  Take from user input new access time limit, selected visible sections, and a 
preferred new file name 
  Compress all visible sections 
  Generate a new key pair, encrypt the file with the private key 
  Name the encrypted compressed file with the user input file name with the 
current service version code for the file extension 
  Make the controlled file available for download, inform user of the access key 
(the public key) 
 eCert 
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6.5.5 Verifying an eCertificate – the Verification System 
eCert verification subsystem
  Upload the eCert and input the access key to the verification subsystem
1. decrypt with the input access key 
Access control
  Only the specified reviewer with the 
corresponding access key can decrypt 
the eCert
Time control value in metadata: 
  Check if it is within the access time and 
date
Issuer ID in metadata:
  Check if the signing key has a 
revocation record
3. display the eCert with verified message
Check the display control value, only display 
the unblinded content
2. verification and validation
Verify signature with issuer’s public key
  Check content modification
  Check award revocation
  Check if it is within eCert expire date






  Qualification award 
data 
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the transcription 
file
  Embedded 
signature value for 
the evidence file
  Embedded issuer’s 
digital signature
 
Figure 6-17 Verify the signatures 
 
For  anyone  to  view  and  verify  an  eCertificate,  the  only  requirement  will  be 
uploading  the  eCertificate  and  entering  the  access  token  onto  the  verification 
subsystem.  The  verified  eCertificate  will  be  displayed  automatically  if  it  has 
successfully passed all the validation checking processes. 
An overview of an eCertificate verification process is shown in Figure 6-17. The 
detailed process of the verification system is described below. 
  Take from input the uploaded eCertificate and its access key 
  Check  the  service  version  code  from  the  file  extension,  select  the  correct 
version for the service eCert 
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  Decrypt the file using the input access key, if no input, using default key 
  Validate the eCert time limit, access time limit, against the current day and 
time 
  Validate issuer’s PKC against CRL 
  Validate eCert status against eCert CRL 
  Verify content modification for the qualification section 
  Verify content modification for the transcript and/or evidence section(s), if the 
co-responding visible setting = 1 
  Display error message, and stop the rest of the process, once it fails any one of 
the processes above 
  Display  the  eCert  and  its  signature,  if  it  passed  all  the  processes  above  – 
display  the  transcript  and/or  evidence  file(s),  if  the  co-responding  visible 
setting = 1 
  Compare the eCertificate version code with the current service version code, 
display warning message and advice if the eCertificate has not been updated 
  Issuer’s PKC must be able to display the trace all the way to the root CA if 
required 
6.5.6 Other Required Operations 
A number of operations are required to support the design of securing the system, 
as described below: 
  Withdrawal 
○  Update the award CRL with the corresponding eCert ID when withdrawn 
  Revoke issuer’s key 
○  Update the signing key CRL when the key is revoked 
  Technical update 
○  Name the server with unique version code eCert 
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6.6 System Demonstrator 
A system demonstrator has been produced to test the design from the technical 
angle. With the specification and test plan set up, the project for the production of the 
demonstrator was joined by the eCert project assistant. 
The system is implemented in two parts: a back end code library and a front end 
service demonstrator. The service profile identified and the selected techniques from 
gap  analysis  and  gap  bridging  stages  are  used  for  the  code  library  for  a  reference 
implementation, ready to integrate within a Service Oriented Architecture. A service 
demonstrator is produced to represent the whole framework design supported by the 
library functions. 
6.6.1 The Back end – Code Library 
The core of eCert demonstrator implementation is a code library, providing basic 
support for the eCert issuing, management, and verification system development. The 
code library is built in Java, with the programming environment of J2SE 1.6. 
The eCert code library includes a number of features that meet the requirements 
of the eCert demonstrator development: 
  Support for digitally signing XML documents with the eCert signing method, 
compatible with ESTI European Digital Signature standard. 
  Support for digitally-signing and verifying files with given key stores. 
  Support for Key Pair generating (variant lengths), converting (from/to String) 
and file encryption/decryption with RSA/DSA algorithm. 
  Support  for domain file processing, including producing qualification files, 
adding  file  metadata,  setting  access  control,  multiple  digital  signing  of 
prepared files, file compression and decompression, and fully verifying signed 
qualification files. eCert 
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6.6.2 The Front End – online Demonstrator 
A  web  interface  service  demonstrator  has  been  produced  on  top  of  the  code 
library.  The  system  is  developed  in  MyEclipse  Enterprise  Workbench  8.5,  and 
implemented using JSP, JavaScript (jQuery), and MySQL for the database. 
The  website  provides  the  user  interface  for  the  issuing,  management,  and 
verification systems, with calls to the code library for functional support. All web pages 
share a common interface design for consistency with a different colour scheme to 
distinguish the three systems. Different pages are rendered by loading different sub-
pages in the menu and content areas using Ajax technologies. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
A system has been developed following the SORM methodology. Based on the 
research decisions and assumptions for the new eCertificate system, a secure and user-
centric  approach  has  been  presented  to  address  the  issues  identified,  such  as  the 
eCertificate squared problem and ownership rights. With a newly designed eCert file 
structure,  signing  method,  and  system  structure,  the  new  design  enables  authorized 
modifications to signed eCertificates while signature integration remains without the 
need for re-signing; it forms a framework for secured and owner controlled distributed 
data. 
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Chapter 7   Testing & Evaluation 
The eCertificate is a new field of research, so at this starting point, the evaluation 
of the proposed system was focused at the theoretical level, such as whether the related 
issues  have  been  understood  and  the  design  is  appropriate,  rather  than  on  the 
production level of how well the demonstration system performs. With this focus in 
mind, the Delphi methodology was employed, step-by-step alongside the development, 
to evaluate whether the proposed design meets all system requirements. 
To assist this evaluation and have a better understanding of issues that arise when 
theory  is  applied  in  practice,  two  system  testing  processes  were  carried  out  at  the 
technical level: (1) through the eCert demonstrator to test the system function against 
requirements ID SR-03 and SR-04, and evaluate whether these requirements can be 
achieved  technically;  (2)  through  an  experiment  subproject  to  integrate  eCert  in 
ePortfolios, test the system against the requirement ID SR-01, and evaluate whether the 
proposed eCert system can be adapted into the ePortfolio systems technically. 
The eCertificate system testing was carried out by the researcher and the eCert 
project  assistant.  The  test  results  recorded  in  Section  7.1.2  were  expressed  in  the 
researcher’s own words. The development of the eCert in ePortfolio system was carried 
out by the subproject team members.  This is expressed in the researcher’s own words 
in section 7.2.4 and 7.2.5. Apart from these, all other sections in this chapter are the 
researcher’s  own work. This work has  also been published as reports on  the eCert 
project website [28]. 
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7.1 eCert System Testing 
The aim of this testing is, through the eCert demonstrator, to evaluate whether the 
proposed eCert system meets the requirements ID SR-03 and SR-04. 
7.1.1 Test Preparation 
1. Create a Public key certificate for issuerA. 
2. IssuerA issues an eCert, named eCertA, to userA through the issue system. 
3. IssuerA issues an eCert, named eCertB, to userB through the issue system. 
4. Create a user account for userA in the management subsystem. 
7.1.2 The Test Plan and Test Result 
System testing for the produced demonstrator against system requirements  ID 
SR-03 and ID SR-04 were carried out. After some debug process, the final test results 
were emerged as expected. Details of the test plan and result are shown in Table 7-1 
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Access eCertA, change 
part of the displayed 
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eCertD 
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7.1.3 eCert System Design Feature Summary 
Compared with the current techniques and existing systems that mentioned in 
chapter 3 and 4, the eCert system offers significant advantages. 
  Ownership: the eCert system is designed with a user-centric approach, 
the eCertificate is in the owner’s hands, and the owner has full control of 
it. For example, the owner can set access control to an eCertificate, and it 
can be stored in the owner’s preferred repositories while still maintaining 
verification functions. 
  Technical:  the  system  contains  functions  to  handle  the  eCertificate 
squared and the auto validation problems; also allows settings for usage 
control while still verifiable against the initial issuer’s digital signature. 
  Usage: provides a single access point, convenient access for learners and 
reviewers with eCertificates that have been issued from a wide range of 
registered educational organizations. 
  Lifetime  validation:  an  eCertificate  can  be  verified  independently 
without  referring  to  the  issuing  institution,  since  the  central  system 
provides the required services for any issued eCertificates even when the 
issuing institution no longer exists. 
  System  storage:  the  system  does  not  store  any  eCertificate  copies  or 
sensitive data, while providing all the required services through a secured 
environment.  It  minimizes  the  required  storage.  This  becomes 
increasingly significant as the system grows in size, especially when its 
usage is nationwide, and the eCertificates need to last for lifetimes. 
  Security: as sensitive personal data is not stored in the system, and there 
is no traffic raised against any organisations’ database for the verification 
process, many of the potential attacks can be avoided. eCert 
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  Trust: the central system is only there to provide a service, as sensitive 
personal data is not stored, so there will be no risk of data being lost. 
Regarding  people  who  do  not  trust  government  bodies  to  hold  their 
personal data, this approach makes having such a central system possible. 
The drawback of the eCert system is that it has only be tested with stakeholders 
in design and development situations, but not yet with live groups of users. More issues 
could be raised from this unexplored area. In addition, the legal issue of digitally signed 
documents needs to be followed up, as this is what the eCert system based on. It is the 
key issue of whether the eCertificate system as designed can eventually replace the 
paper-based system. 
7.2 Integrating eCert into ePortfolios 
One of the goals of this eCertificate research is to investigate a solution for a 
secured eCertificate system that can overcome the paper-based certificate problems, 
and enable such eCertificates to be used standalone or serviced within other systems, 
most importantly the ePortfolio systems. The ePortfolios require verifiable qualification 
claims, and will be the main systems that the eCertificates are embedded in, therefore 
they  are  the  best  test-bed  for  the  eCert  system.  A  successful  result  of  integrating 
eCertificates into ePortfolios will not only verify the applicability of the eCertificate 
system, but will also provide a solution for the ePortfolio artefacts’ assertion issues. 
Therefore,  after  evaluating  the  eCertificate  system  through  the  Delphi  method,  the 
system was evaluated again, under a subproject named Integrating eCert in ePortfolios, 
to test its usage in the related applications, as explained in the following subsections. 
7.2.1 The Selected ePortfolio System 




                                                 
13 eFolio: University of Southampton ePortfolio system. Available from : http://www.efolio.soton.ac.uk/  
14 Mahara: an open source ePortfolio system. Available from: http://mahara.org/ eCert 
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eFolio was selected as it is an in-house ePortfolio system. It was newly developed 
at the University of Southampton, which allows full access to both the code and the 
development team. The eFolio system is written in PHP and JavaScript, and allows 
authorized students to create a number of portfolios with their academic achievements. 
It is also used by staff for setting assignments and displaying coursework results. The 
system links with many central services provided by the University of Southampton, 
including the Banner student information system
15. The eFolio system was at its live-
trial stage at the time of this research, and has not yet been released. 
On the other hand , Mahara is mature and open source software, which has 
advantages over eFolio in terms of system functions and development environment.  
The Mahara system is written in PHP, and uses the Model -view-controller (MVC) 
software architecture.  The system’s  structure  is  highly  modular;  it  contains  several 
libraries to support its functionalities, has the capability of handling most of the eCert 
requirements, and offers a pluggable environment for customisation. 
7.2.2 Systems Integration Analysis 
The  eCertificate  file  format:  The  structure  of  an  eCertificate  file  is  newly 
designed and developed, and contains three files: a qualification data file, a transcript 
file, and an evidence file. The main qualification file also holds the signatures for the 
related  transcript  and  evidence  files.  All  these  are  bound  together,  signed  and 
encrypted, and named with a new file extension of .eCert. For the integration of eCert 
into  an  ePortfolio,  the  .eCert  file  must  be  able  to  be  recognized  and  function  as 
designed. 
The  eCert  system:  The  eCert  system  includes  two  subsystems:  the  issuing 
subsystem for issuers to generate eCertificates; and the management and verification 
subsystem,  an  online  service  that  enables  users  to  upload  their  eCertificates.  This 
allows  owners  to  set  access  control  to  their  eCertificates  by  adjusting  particular 
variables,  while  reviewers  can  verify  their  received  eCertificates.  Assuming  the 
eCertificate owners present their eCertificates by making them available as part of the 
                                                 
15 Ellucian: Available from http://www.ecu.edu/banner/ eCert 
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ePortfolios, the ePortfolios have then become the user-friendly, web-based front-end, 
while the eCert Central System remains ultimately responsible for the management and 
verification process at the backend. For the integration of eCert into ePortfolio, the 
eCert functions have to be maintained, so that eCertificates presented in ePortfolios are 
access controlled and verifiable. 
7.2.3 The Challenge 
The overall goal of this subproject was to integrate the eCert system into existing 
ePortfolio  systems.  From  the  system  integration  analysis  above,  it  is  clear  that  the 
challenge is to ensure the newly proposed eCertificate file, which has a unique file 
structure with file extension .eCert and secured by access key and digital signature, can 
be recognized and verified by the selected ePortfolio systems, eFolio and Mahara. 
7.2.4 Decision on the Encryption Method 
With the ePortfolio systems selected and integration issues analysed, a project 
specification was set up (the eCert-GDP2010) and passed on to a group of four masters 
students to integrate the newly developed eCertificate system into eFolio and Mahara. 
After the group studied the eCertificate system and the two selected ePortfolio systems, 
they suggested a new encryption method for the eCertificate system. 
eCert  encryption  method:  as  proposed  by  the  researcher,  eCertificates  are 
encrypted  using  the  system  default  public  key,  and  stored  under  the  corresponding 
owner’s institution account. The owner can then access the eCert central management 
subsystem to set access control values, where it will be encrypted with a unique private 
key.  The  owner  can  then  make  the  access  key  (the  public  key)  and  the  controlled 
eCertificate available to the reviewer by different methods, e.g. making the eCertificate 
available online, and sending the access key through email. The reviewer will need to 
use the access key (in a similar way to using a password) to verify the eCertificate in 
the eCert central verification subsystem. This method ensures that only the reviewer 
who has the access key can verify and view the eCertificate content. However, it is 
inconvenient that the reviewer needs to store the access key as well as the eCertificate. 
This in turn also affects the ePortfolio system as every embedded eCertificate requires eCert 
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its  unique  access  key.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  none  of  the  existing  ePortfolio 
systems examined offers the functionality for uploading two associated files, which 
would have presented another barrier to implementation. 
The  new  encryption  method:  as  proposed  by  the  GDP2010  group,  in  the 
eCertificate issuing process, the localised issuing subsystem will make a request to the 
eCert Central System for a new key pair. The central system will generate the key pair, 
store both in its database, and send the public key back to the issuer. The issuer will 
then  embed  this  key  within  the  eCertificate  before  using  it  to  encrypt  the  entire 
package.  This  will  result  in  a  file  that  can  only  be  decrypted  using  the  associated 
private key, which is only ever known and kept by the central system. 
However, even though this new method avoids the use of an access key, it has 
lost the function of access control, so that everyone who gets hold of an eCertificate 
can verify and view its content, as the access key (the private key) is stored and can be 
retrieved in the eCert central system. These approaches  are compared in Table 7-2 
below. 
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Table 7-2 eCert initial encryption method vs. subproject team proposal 






















Encrypt with system default public 
key, and decrypt with the 
corresponding system default private 
key 
- access key stored in eCert central 
system, no key handling required from 
the student 
Encrypt with unique public key, and 
decrypt with the corresponding private 
key 
- all keys will be stored in the eCert 
central system, no key handled by the 
























Encrypted with unique private key, and 
decrypted with the corresponding 
public key 
- need to make the pubic key available 
for the receiver to access the 










On initial issue, the use of system 
default keys enable open access 
whenever required; 
no key handling suits low IT skill 
users; 
one key for one controlled eCertificate 
that the student can send to the desired 
receiver(s); this ensures only the 
reviewer with the corresponding 
decrypt key can access the eCertificate; 
loss of key is not a problem as the 
student can generate another one  
No key handling required from any 
users; this suits low IT skill users, and 
suits the ePortfolio integration as the 
ePortfolio currently has no support for 









The owner needs to manage the keys 
(keep a record of the matching keys 
with the corresponding controlled 
eCertificates) 
Requires function support for the 
uploading key when eCert integrated 
into ePortfolio 
Need to make sure that the student can 
only access their own initial 
eCertificates but no-one else’s 
This method requires the keys to be 
reported to the eCert central every time 
a controlled eCertificate is generated 
The central system needs to store the 
key pairs for the matching process 
when decrypting 
For a system that is designed to be 
rolled out nationwide, this requires 
huge storage, and also increases the 
chance of database attack 
If the database is in error or 
modified/hacked, this will result in 
invalid eCertificates 
Most importantly, loss of owner 
control on who can access their 
eCertificates, as no access key is 
required from the reviewers eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 155 
 
Using a default key makes open access possible, as eCertificate owners may like 
their eCertificates to be open access in some situations. Owners can set access control 
on their eCertificates when needed. To enable this, the initial issued eCertificates must 
only be accessible to their owners during the issuing process. 
Considering that keys are likely be forgotten at some point, creating eCertificates 
using  students’  personal  keys  may  end  up  with  their  initial  eCertificates  becoming 
inaccessible. 
Therefore, it was decided that the initial eCertificates would be encrypted with 
the  default  key,  and  saved  under  the  corresponding  student’s  account,  so  only  the 
owner can have access. The eCertificate can be encrypted with  a  personalized key 
through the management system before sending to the reviewer. 
The GDP2010 team has proposed a number of solutions to their new encryption 
method, such as a white-list policy, in which the eCert Central System will be able to 
determine  the  identity  of  a  genuine  employer,  or  ePortfolio  making  a  verification 
request (perhaps by its IP or domain name) and only responding to those entities. An 
alternative is to operate a blacklist policy, where malicious users are identified and 
blocked; however, this assumes they will re-offend and with this solution the system 
will still suffer violation before being able to determine who is and is not a malicious 
user. 
As the user access control is one of the main requirements of the eCertificate 
system, it must be met when it is applied to the ePortfolios. Therefore, it was decided 
that the new encryption method would be rejected, and the eCert encryption method 
would be maintained. A function to support the upload of two files (eCertificate and 
access key) in ePortfolio was implemented. eCert 
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7.2.5 Development 
Apart  from  the  decisions  I  made  as  the  project  manager  and  the  eCertificate 
system  designer,  the  development  work  summarized  in  this  section  is  the  group’s 
contribution.  
The eCertificate integration development covers two segments: a new layer of 
Java code as the API for the eCert code library, and the extensions for eFolio and 
Mahara to enable the upload of eCertificates and their corresponding access keys, and 
the verification process with the eCert central services. The group carried out the tests 
step-by-step throughout the project to ensure that the system worked as expected and 
meets the original specified requirements. 
Full details of this eCertificate integration project can be found from the eCert 
project website. 
7.2.6 Results 
From analysis and design to development and testing, the Integrating eCert in 
ePortfolio  sub-project  was  carried  out  through  the  development  lifecycle.  With 
successful implementation, both the eFolio and the Mahara can now be fully utilised by 
those  with  eCertificate  qualifications.  This  proved  that  the  newly  developed 
eCertificate can be used in ePortfolio systems at both the theoretical and the technical 
level. 
During the project, the eCert code library was employed. As a result, the eCert 
system has also been improved since errors were found and fixed. 
7.3 Development and Evaluation with Delphi 
Methodology 
The eCertificate study employed two research methodologies: SORM and Delphi. 
The  mini-Delphi  methodology  [131]  was  used  step-by-step  alongside  the  SORM eCert 
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methodology throughout the development stages, to guide and evaluate whether the 
design met all five requirements theoretically. 
For the mini-Delphi method, a group of domain experts in the UK were selected 
for security system design, ePortfolio study, and to represent the stakeholders. These 
included  employment  managers,  IT  security  experts,  exam  board  managers,  and 
ePortfolio researchers (details can be found in Appendix I). Two workshops were run 
during  two  stages  of  the  development  to  collect  professional  opinions  from  these 
experts. The first occurred at the system design stage, aiming to evaluate and adjust the 
design at the strategic level. After the first round of information collection, analysis, 
feedback,  and  system  adjustments,  a  second  workshop  was  run  on  the  system 
demonstrator completion stage,  when the system was shown to the domain experts 
again. The aim of this round was to evaluate and adjust the design not only at the 
theoretical level but also at the technical level. 
7.3.1 The First Round – the First eCert Workshop 
Following the eCertificate research, analysis, and initial design phases, the first 
workshop  was  held  to  review  the  design  before  moving  onto  the  demonstrator 
development stage. It was aimed at bringing leaders in the field together to consider 
and report on design issues for the secure eCertificate system, to check whether the 
eCertificate problems and issues had been adequately understood, and that the project 
was on the right track for the solution. 
7.3.1.1  The method 
The workshop was arranged in two parts. In the morning, the eCertificate topic 
was first introduced; then the determination of eCertificate issues and problems was 
opened up through presentation; this was followed by a group discussion to explore and 
define the problem areas. 
During the discussion, the Delphi technique was followed. The participants were 
given 4 questions, arranged in 2 groups. Group A discussed question in the order 1 to 4, 
while group B discussed the same questions from 4 to 1. The questions were: eCert 
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1.  Are there any missing issues? If yes, what are they? 
2.  Should there be any more requirements? If yes, what are they? 
3.  Anything that is over and above what is required? 
4.  Are there any errors and misunderstandings? 
At the end of the group discussion, the two groups joined to report their views 
and have further discussion across groups. 
In the afternoon, the proposed eCertificate system design was introduced through 
a  presentation,  entitled  “Towards  solving  the  problems:  the  eCert  plan”.  This  was 
followed by a Round Table discussion on the proposed design and its related issues. 
All conversations during group discussion and feedback were recorded with the 
permission  of  the  participants.  At  the  end  of  the  workshop,  all  participants  were 
informed of the plan for the following meeting. 
A copy of the first workshop PowerPoint presentation is available in Appendix G. 
Information of the workshop, including venue, date, participants, and format can be 
found in Appendix I. 
7.3.1.2  Feedback Summary 
In this round of Delphi, the first phase was to collect the required information 
from the expert panel to explore the subject issues. 
From the workshop, the eCertificate use case analysis and the proposed system 
were accepted without many issues being raised. Instead, there was a wide-ranging and 
interesting discussion of the higher level issues of rationale that covered several topics: 
  Security issues 
o  Is more than one approach needed? If Digitary has a working solution, 
why look for an alternative? This issue also relates to issues such as 
scalability, since Digitary currently only deals with HE awards. 
o  The statement was made to the effect that putting secured data in the 
hands of the user puts the central system at risk. It is not immediately eCert 
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obvious why this should be the case, so it raises a number of questions 
about what architecture is being assumed.  
o  Longevity.  The  point  was  made  that  a  certificate  issued  by  a  CA 
typically  has  a  life  of  a  year  or  so,  hence  one  might  jump  to  the 
conclusion that an eCert award certificate would not be secure after this 
period. Taking this thought further, one would therefore have to assume 
that a digitally-signed document would also only have a useful life of a 
year or so. 
o  Data persistence. The question was raised of what happens when the 
awarding body no longer exists? There was an assertion that awards are 
all recorded by the British Library. The question then arises of which 
awards, and of how robust the procedure is – the practice may be very 
different in some cases. 
o  The  question  of  prevention  of  data  theft  was  also  discussed.  It  was 
pointed out that it is not possible to prevent screen scraping (or other 
forms of data capture for that matter); however, it is possible to provide 
a system whereby scraped data cannot be verified. 
o  Implicit  in  the  discussion  was  the  fact  that  perception  of  security  is 
important if a practical system is to be adopted in due course. Providing 
a demonstrator may be helpful, but regardless of the reality, if there is an 
underlying  doubt  that  the  system  may  be  insecure,  adoption  of  the 
mechanism will not follow on. 
  Scalability and Granularity 
o  It is believed that Digitary currently deals exclusively with HE awards. 
That  leaves  open  the  question  of  potential  loading  and  performance 
issues if one wishes to deal with (a) 6th form awards, and (b) lower-
level (GCSE, NVQ, etc) awards. 
o  There  is  an  issue  of  granularity.  There  is  interest  in  exploring  the 
potential for validation of pieces of work (e.g. for NVQs) not just entire 
awards. 
o  It was also noted that there is a move to validating the assessor rather 
than the work per se.  eCert 
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  Ownership and Control of Data 
o  Does the student own their own award data, or does the awarding body? 
Might the employer/recruiter also claim ownership of the data relating to 
their student or employee? 
o  It was evident that ePortfolio systems are currently capable of giving the 
student full control over who sees what of their data and for how long. 
o  It might be assumed that Digitary also considers that it can give full 
control to the student over their data. 
  Other Issues 
o  A question was  asked about  the Southampton  context  –  why  are we 
exploring the eCert approach? This has been answered: it is two-fold – 
the research is a direct response to the scenario specified in the JISC bid; 
but it has also been exploring the extent to which it is firstly possible, 
and  secondly  desirable,  to  implement  an  electronic  equivalent  of  the 
paper awards, which are still widely used in practice. This research is 
also currently exploring the potential application of such technology to 
other areas such as passports, driving licences, and other secured forms 
of identity confirmation. 
o  Another  discussion  topic  was  the  concept  that  perhaps  ePortfolios 
should not provide validated information, but information which can be 
validated externally. This has been very helpfully expanded at length in 
Simon Grant’s blog
16. 
7.3.1.3  Outcome Analysis 
The second phase was to analyse how the group viewed the issues, what was 
agreed, what not, and what needed further action. 
No issues were raised concerning the accuracy of the use cases on which the 
eCert design is based. It was understood that these were a satisfactory basis for the 
                                                 
16 Simon Grant’s blog regarding ePortfolio information validation 
http://blogs.cetis.ac.uk/asimong/2010/04/19/portfolios-need-verifiability/ (lass accessed: 29/06/2013) eCert 
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design of the eCert code library and demonstrator. There were a significant number of 
issues of rationale raised that need to be explored. These are as follows. 
  How  does  the  eCert  approach  compare  and  contrast  with  that  taken  by 
Digitary?  Unfortunately,  Andy  Dowling  (CEO  Digitary)  was  unable  to 
complete his trip to Nottingham, so a separate meeting was arranged – this 
took place on the 28th April 2010 through Skype. Also, Jonathan Dempsey, 
CTO of Digitary, provided useful information through emails. As a result, a 
comparison between eCert and Digitary was carried out, which is detailed in 
Appendix D. 
  Bearing in mind that the perception of security is as important for adoption 
as  the  reality,  it  will  be  helpful  to  outline  the  issues  that  distinguish  a 
distributed solution from a centralised one, and to articulate the advantages 
and disadvantages of each approach. 
  The issue of longevity needs to be explored in greater depth. Linked with 
this  idea  is  the  concept  that  the  eCert  protocol,  and  similarly  the  code 
library,  should  transcend  specific  implementations,  so  that  it  can  utilise 
whatever techniques and algorithms might become available in the future. 
  The  issue  of  data  backup  also  needs  to  be  investigated  further.  In  this 
context, what is the theoretical approach to ensuring a paper award can be 
validated if the awarding institution closes, and what happens in practice? 
How robust are the procedures? How does this differ depending on the type 
of award considered? 
  In order to address issues of loading and performance, it would be helpful to 
obtain an indication of the level of requirement from EdExcel. 
  It might be helpful at some stage to produce some scenarios to illustrate and 
highlight  the  issues  relating  to  competition  for  claims  to  ownership  of 
student  award  data.  The  (UK)  Data  Protection  Act  1998  might  provide 
helpful insights, as might equivalents from other countries. 
  Some thought will need to be given to the mechanism by which the student 
controls access to their data. Rather than making an assumption about the 
mechanism,  it  might  be  helpful  if  the  code  library  made  provision  for eCert 
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control  to  be  managed  by  various  means  (e.g.  centrally,  or  through  an 
ePortfolio system, for example). 
  It  will  be  helpful  to  think  through  whether  there  are  any  specific 
implications  if  one  takes  the  view  that  an  ePortfolio  should  provide 
verifiable, rather than verified information. 
  The eCert project is tasked with producing an eCert digital award certificate 
system library and demonstrator. If the resources can be suitably managed, 
it would be helpful if, in addition, the project could show how the approach 
would work within (i) an ePortfolio system, and (ii) a different context, such 
as a mobile identity confirmation system. 
7.3.1.4  Actions taken after the workshop 
The third phase of Delphi was to further explore the areas of disagreement and 
unaddressed  issues.  As  a  result,  the  system  design  was  revisited  according  to  the 
workshop feedback, which included: 
  more study into the certificate’s lifetime issue, in terms of the award, the CA, 
and the issuing institution; 
  some additional functions have been designed to enhance the usability and 
security,  such  as  version  support  to  deal  with  technology  upgrades  in  the 
future; 
  more research into document certification related systems, such as Digitary, to 
provide  clearer  vision  and  descriptions  of  the  eCert  innovation  and 
advantages; 
  more research into ePortfolios to explore the ePortfolio artefact verification 
requirements. 
7.3.2 The Second Round – the Second eCert Workshop 
After system adjustment and further development, a second workshop was run. 
The first and second phases of the Delphi were repeated in this second round. It was 
hoped that the variety of opinions would decrease and tend towards convergence. eCert 
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The  second  eCert  workshop  was  held  at  the  end  of  the  system  demonstrator 
completion stage. The aim of the workshop was to evaluate the system design from the 
technical  level,  and  work  through  the  potential  practical  issues  that  might  be 
encountered in the introduction of such a system. It took place during ALT-C2010, the 
17th International Conference of the Association for Learning Technology, which was 
held at the University of Nottingham. 
7.3.2.1  The method 
Following the Delphi method,  the system  was  again  presented to  the  domain 
experts.  All  participants  from  the  first  workshop  had  been  invited  to  the  second 
workshop,  but  not  everyone  could  make  the  second  round.  However,  all  new 
participants who joined the latter workshop were experts in the domain, including the 
conference  workshop  facilitator,  eLanguages  technical  developer,  head  of  New 
Ventures  at  the  Scottish  Qualifications  Authority,  and  the  Project  Manager  of 
Cambridge Assessment. 
During the workshop, the possibilities and potential problems of the eCertificate 
system were revisited. After being introduced to the improved system design through 
the system demonstrator presentation, the participants were organised into 4 groups 
with a set of questions to revisit the system’s possibilities and potential problems. The 
questions were redesigned to reflect the topics that concerned the first workshop. 
  Group A: 
o  Have we a need for the eCert system in our institution? 
o  Would our students want this? 
o  Whose data is it anyway? 
  Group B: 
o  Would  there  be  problems  for  staff  implementing  this,  or  would  this 
help? 
o  Are there infrastructure problems that might create difficulties? 
o  Would this be useful for other purposes? 
  Group C: 
o  Would there be institutional barriers to introducing an eCert system? 
o  What gains would we foresee in using an eCert system? eCert 
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o  Would this be useful for other purposes? 
  Group D: 
o  Have we a need for eCertificates in ePortfolios in our institution? 
o  What about the “club” scenario, would this be attractive? 
o  Whose data is it anyway? 
All conversations during group discussion and feedback were recorded. 
A copy of the second workshop PowerPoint presentation is available in Appendix 
H. Information of the workshop, including venue, date, participants, and format can be 
found in Appendix I. 
7.3.2.2  Feedback Summary 
The workshop had a positive result. There was no strong disagreement as all 
participants liked the idea of eCert. One of the participants, who is the head of New 
Ventures UK Awarding Body
17, wrote  in his blog:  “… Some really useful example 
uses from across UK… can be used to verify exam results, project work, e-portfolios. 
… can see lots of applications for this, … potentially useful links to Bologna process 
and E-Certification E-pass work.” The feedback from the workshop indicated that the 
eCert system would be of use, and provide applications that would be enthusiastically 
welcomed. 
Besides the suggested discussion topics, participants were also interested in the 
fine detail of the system, and the legal, societal and institutional barriers that would get 
in the way. The general feedback from the groups: 
  Legal – international legal issues; insurance costs 
  Systems would have to run in parallel – cost 
  Who is going to pay? In general terms? 
  System for employers would have to be really easy to use 
  EdExcel and the other bodies would have to sign up 
                                                 
17 Joe Wilson, Head of New Ventures UK Awarding Body, wrote about the eCert system in his blog: 
http://www.joewilsons.net/2010/09/e-cert-programme.html eCert 
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o  Puts their reputation on the line 
o  Insurance/money 
  You would have to train students to manage their eCerts, not to lose them, how 
to share them 
o  Some students wouldn’t be able to do this 
  You would have to integrate with many other systems – portfolios, class lists, 
Banner, etc. 
  At the moment the system is a generic verification engine that is being put into 
the context of education 
o  Consider giving the system some semantic knowledge of the educational 
qualification structure and qualification requirements 
  Bologna Process integration – huge market – people are really 
struggling 
  This system would be very useful for lifelong learning and expiring certificates: 
FSA, Doctors, Lifeguards 
  People seemed less interested in certifying qualifications, but very interested in 
certifying evidence and portfolios. EdExcel have been working on the problem 
for years and keep returning to watermarked paper, etc. 
o  However,  people  were  very  interested  in  validating  international 
certificates, as it is very expensive to do now. 
  There are so many vocational qualification bodies who will have to be signed 
up 
  You would need secure infrastructure links from institutional systems in eCert 
  It would change working practice for student-records staff 
  Open up parts of student records, e.g. for a particular course – prerequisites. eCert 
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7.3.2.3  Outcome Analysis 
In  this  second  phase  of  the  second  round,  the  feedback  from  the  workshop 
indicated that the eCert system would be of good use, and provide applications that 
would be enthusiastically welcomed. 
Feedback related to the system’s running cost and integration with other systems 
were dealt with during the system design stage. For example, it will be open source, 
free for all users and institutions, but will require maintenance costs for system support 
and  technical  updates;  and  some  requirements  for  eCertificates  to  be  used  within 
ePortfolios have been added. 
Feedback  related  to  organizational  sign-up  was  considered  during  the  system 
design, so that: 
  The system is free for any registered education institution who wants to use the 
system. 
  The eCert system was designed to work for any size of federation: the system 
can start to operate with one registered organization, and can provide services 
for all member registered educational organizations throughout the UK. 
  No access to the issuing subsystem will be provided for non-registered bodies; 
and even assuming unauthorized access has been gained, the resulting issued 
eCertificates will not pass the validation process. 
Feedback related to easy use of the system will be reflected in the system HCI 
design, with more instructions and messages added to increase usability. 
Feedback relating to security issues, such as links from Institutional systems to 
eCert, was  addressed:  once the eCertificates are issued, there are no links  between 
institutional systems and the eCert system. There is no database access to any of the 
issuing institutions for viewing or the verification process. However, all institutions 
need to report their CRLs (certificate revocation list) to their CAs, which the eCert 
system will access during the verification process. eCert 
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Many of the questions raised were due to unclear information provided during the 
limited presentation time. The explanation was not deep enough; people had lots of 
clarification  issues.  These  resulted  from  shifting  away  from  the  cloud  computing 
paradigm, contrary to participants’ expectations. 
During  the  workshop,  only  the  eCert  system  aims  and  how  it  works  were 
discussed, but not the differences between eCert and other existing methods (e.g. digital 
signing)  and  systems  (e.g.  Digitary),  which  led  to  confusion.  The  missing  crucial 
information would have helped with the explanation, but also have given an inside 
view of eCert’s features. Without a good understanding of the system, participants were 
not able to provide more useful feedback. This type of information should be added in 
any future presentations. 
There  were  also  vocabulary  issues:  Certificate  as  used  in  Public  Key 
Cryptography  and  Certificate  as  used  in  qualification;  eCert  as  used  in  bundle  of 
encrypted data and eCert as used in the more generic idea of an eCertificate. These 
need to be clearly defined in any future presentations. 
Answers  to  open-ended  questions  were  too  long  to  write  down.  Most  of  the 
participants did not record their thoughts, or write in sentences. This made recording 
feedback from the groups more difficult. A more efficient solution to collect feedback 
from groups is needed next time. 
7.3.3 The Last Phase of Delphi – Final Evaluation 
In addition to the two workshops with the domain experts, a few more workshops 
and  presentations  also  took  place  at  national  and  international  computing  security-
related conferences to collect the opinions from a wider range of domain experts. These 
included: The 2nd International Conference on Computer Modelling and Simulation 
(ICCMS  2010),  held  in  San  Ya,  China;  The  World  Conference  on  Educational 
Multimedia,  Hypermedia  &  Telecommunications  (EdMedia2010),  held  in  Toronto, 
Canada; London Learning Forum, held in London, UK; Federated Access Management 
2010 (FAM10), held at Cardiff, UK; and The World Congress on Internet Security eCert 
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(WorldCIS2011),  held  in  London, UK. The  eCert system  was  adjusted  accordingly 
each time round. 
After each round, feedback was reflected upon, and the system (including the 
design,  demonstrator,  documentation,  and  reports)  were  adjusted  accordingly.  For 
example: the eCert file structure now includes the transcript file to enhance its usage 
nationwide; a photograph of the student can now be added as one of the evidence files 
and bound with the eCertificate to enhance the security, but optional when preferred for 
the  sake  of  privacy;  more  work  has  been  spent  on  comparing  the  new  design  and 
existing systems; and the explanation of the chosen approach has been given in more 
detail. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  project,  much  positive  feedback  was  received  from 
conferences and workshops internationally while negative feedback was mainly related 
to the future work that cannot be completed within the current project. The Delphi 
method was, therefore, effective in achieving a convergence of opinions. 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
Referring to the system requirements set in Chapter 5, the proposed eCertificate 
system has been tested and evaluated in three steps: demonstrator testing to evaluate its 
technical  satisfaction;  ePortfolio  integration  testing  to  evaluate  its  adaptability;  and 
workshops with a mini-Delphi methodology to evaluate the design from the theoretical 
level. 
As a result, this has all proved that the eCertificate system can not only be used 
standalone, but can also be plugged into other applications, such as ePortfolios. The 
eCert system’s accessibility and scalability were improved after taking into account a 
considerable  number  of  observations  and  recommendations  from  the  evaluation 
processes. 
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Chapter 8   The Abstracted eCert 
Protocol and Proof of Hypothesis 
This chapter summarizes the abstracted eCert protocol and its evaluation in two 
applications, and through these, proof of the research hypothesis. 
The implementation of the Mobile eID system summarized in section 8.2.5 was 
contributed by a Masters student. It is expressed in the researcher’s own words. All 
other sections in this chapter are the researcher’s own work. This chapter has been 
published  in  conference  paper  [36],  journals  [31,  179],  and  on  the  eCert  project 
website[28]. 
8.1 The Initial eCert Protocol 
At the heart of the eCertificate system is the initial eCert protocol (the eCert file 
structure design, system design, eCert signing method, and the supported code library). 
It provides a unique, secure and trusted system for the management of eCertificates in a 
web-based environment with a secure user-centric approach. This user-centric focus is 
the key to this research. 
The Delphi methodology  [88] was  used  for the evaluation  of  the eCertificate 
system  design  throughout  its  development  stages,  alongside  the  SORM  research 
methodology [173]. Following this methodology, a group of domain experts in the UK 
were selected for their knowledge of security system design, ePortfolio studies, and to 
represent  putative  stakeholders.  This  included  employment  managers,  IT  security 
experts, examination board managers, and ePortfolio researchers. Two workshops were eCert 
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run during the development to collect the professional opinions from these experts: one 
at the end of the system design stage, aiming to evaluate and adjust the system at the 
strategic level; and the other workshop when the demonstrator was completed, aiming 
to evaluate the system at the technical level. 
The  system  was  subject  to  further  evaluation  under  a  subproject  named 
Integrating eCert in ePortfolios [29], to test the usage of the design principle. In this 
project,  the  eCertificate  system  was  integrated  with  the  UK  ePortfolio  system,  the 
eFolio [60], and Mahara [113], an Australian system. Both systems can now be fully 
utilized. 
Going through all these testing and evaluation processes  resulted in the eCert 
protocol being adjusted and improved to suit the eCertificate requirements. 
The case of eCertificate represents typical eDocument transmitting issues (that 
involve  non-static  content,  authentication  requirements,  lifelong  availability, 
maintenance  of  ownership  rights,  and  the  need  to  be  transmitted  to  two  or  more 
parties).  It  is  believed  that  the  solution  presented  here  could  solve  eDocument 
transmitting issues in other cases. Therefore, with the aim of proving this claim, and 
evaluating the applicability of the eCert protocol in a wider domain, a Mobile eID 
project and a eHealthcare patient data case study were set up. 
8.2 The Mobile eID Project 
With  the  aim  of  proving  that  the  eCert  concept  could  be  applied  in  a  wider 
eDocument transmission domain, the eCert protocol was tested under a project, named 
Mobile eID, to explore the issues that arise in implementing the eCert protocol within a 
mobile platform to provide certified and verifiable identity information. 
8.2.1 Background Research 
Technological development enables electronic identity (eID) to be employed in 
daily life, such as smart cards, online user accounts, and public key certificates. With eCert 
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the aim of replacing paper-based ID documents, these developments provide flexibility 
and efficiency with transportability. 
Mobile  devices  have  been  constantly  developed  with  a  high  computational 
complexity, providing flexible mobility, multi-functionality, and personal settings, and 
have  become  an  indispensable  daily  object,  used  more  commonly  than  any  other 
technical device, such as the PC. 
By  combining  the  eID  development  with  the  mobile  environment,  using  the 
mobile device as the eID platform could realise the maximum benefit. In that case, all 
an individual’s ID cards and documents can be left at home, and the mobile phone will 
be the only device needed. 
However, combining these two also results in their problems being combined, 
which are of a wide variety but mainly about security. The challenges in this emerging 
area of technology adoption need to be considered and addressed. 
8.2.2 Scenario 
Consider the following situation: young-looking Bob goes out clubbing and often 
has to certify his age to enter. By presenting his paper ID, he is forced to disclose all 
the sensitive information on that document, as well as his age. Unfortunately he left the 
required ID document at home, and even though his wallet contains a lot of other ID 
cards, nothing else is acceptable. Disconsolate, Bob comes back home. 
The idea was to apply the eCert protocol to present an ID document as digitally 
signed,  owner-controlled  ID  certificates through mobile devices.  The eCert for eID 
managed in mobile devices proved itself as the permanently available tool to provide a 
huge variety of ID in order to avoid the previous scenario. 
8.2.3 Analysis 
eID application development: an eID is an electronic document for online and 
offline identification, providing digitally the same (or more) information as the paper-
based ID document in many cases, with more secure, flexible, and accessible functions. eCert 
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An  eID  is  usually  a  plastic  smart-card  (or  EIC),  and  has  the  format  of  a  regular 
bankcard,  besides  the  embedded  microchip.  It  also  contains  the  printed  identity 
information,  e.g.  personal  details  and  a  photograph.  The  chip  will  also  contain  the 
issuer’s signature keys and certificates. To use an EIC, the user will also need the card 
reader and the middleware software. Another form of eID is the public key certificate. 
As mentioned earlier, on the eCert system, a public key certificate is also known as an 
identity certificate, digital certificate, or eCertificate; it is an eDocument that uses a 
digital signature to provide verifiable identity, which verifies that a public key belongs 
to an individual.  
Mobile  application  development:  Mobile  application  software  is  developed 
specially  for  small  low-power  handheld  devices  such  as  mobile  phones.  These 
applications are either pre-installed on phones during manufacture, or downloaded by 
customers from app stores and other mobile software distribution platforms. 
Mobile  software  is  developed  using  different  platforms  and  programming 
languages  based  on  the  target  mobile  device.  Each  of  the  platforms  for  mobile 
applications  also  has  a  development  environment  which  provides  tools  to  allow  a 
developer to write, test, and deploy applications into the target platform environment. 
Many different hardware components are found in mobile devices, so their applications 
are developed using different software architectures. 
eCertificate  vs. eID:  The eCertificate and eID are both aimed at providing a 
secured and trusted system for the management of the verified personal data. However, 
even though the eCertificate and eID are quite close in concept, their structures and 
execution environments are different. 
  In a face-to-face situation, such as the clubbing scenario above, the eID system 
is a quick way of passing the eDocument to a reviewer for verification, rather 
than  sending  a  request  through  email  or  accessing  a  website  that  the 
eCertificate system does. 
  An eCert file is a collection of selectable support files, individually signed 
with  references  embedded  in  the  main  content,  before  it  is  signed  and 
encrypted with the access control metadata. On the other hand, the ideal eID eCert 
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file  will  be  a  collection  of  selectable  text  information  with  an  ID  image 
gathered  into  a  single  signed  file  and  encrypted  together  with  the  access 
control metadata. The eCert protocol needs to be adjusted to adapt the new 
eID file structure, so that it can be recognized by the verification process. 
  The eCert protocol makes use of the eCertificate owner’s institution account in 
the issuing process, which allows the eCertificate to be issued directly into the 
access controlled environment. In the eID, these accounts are unlikely to exist. 
Hence, a new encryption method to secure the issue process between the issuer 
and the eID owner is required. 
  Unlike the eCertificate system, in which all issuers are under the umbrella of 
education institutions, and can have the issuers chased all the way back to the 
a top education body, such as the UK Department for Education, the eIDs may 
be  issued  from  a  wide  range  of  organizations.  These  could  be  the  Driver, 
Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), the General Register Office (GRO), or 
the Home Office. The eID system needs to be adjusted to suit this multiple top 
certification authority (CA) situation for the verification process. 
8.2.4 Design 
The  aim  of  the  Mobile  eID  system  is  to  focus  on  the  user-centric  approach 
supported by the eCert protocol. Therefore, most of the eCert protocol features needed 
to be maintained. The initial eCert file structure needed be adjusted, and the related 
functions needed to be modified to suit the eID’s needs. 
As anyone can potentially fake an eID on their own mobile phone, the process of 
verifying an eID needs to depend on the reviewers’ devices. Therefore, even when an 
eID is presented face-to-face by its owner to the reviewer, a quick data transfer method 
is  required  to  address  the  unique  eID  situation.  After  investigating  current  mobile 
communication techniques, such as email, Bluetooth, bar code, QR code
18, and text 
messaging, the QR code with its increasing popularity and wide availability of  a QR 
                                                 
18 http://www.denso-wave.com/qrcode/index-e.html, accessed 22 Mar 2011. eCert 
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reader within mobile devices, has turned out to be the best solution for the eID data 
transfer. 
8.2.5 Development 
Based on the design decisions made, a project specification for a mobile eID 
application was set up and passed on to an MSc student, Michele Zenise, to develop a 
working  system  as  a  demonstrator.  The  development  work  for  the  Mobile  eID 
application summarized in this section is Zenise’s contribution. As project manager, I 
made the decisions alongside the processes to control the direction of development. We 
have published this work in a journal paper [179] as joint authors. 
Zenise  also  carried  out  some  related  research  himself.  After  studying  the 
eCertificate  system  and  the  mobile  eID  requirements,  he  agreed  that  the  QR  code 
would be the best way forward, as a quick pass method, to address the eID system’s 
unique requirement. He also noted that even though the concepts of the eID and the 
eCertificate are quite close, they are different in many ways. The eCert protocol that 
was initially designed for managing eCertificates in a web environment is not able to 
manage eID in a mobile environment straight away – a reverse engineering process to 
adapt the system is needed [178]. 
With  no  arguments  against  the  design,  Zenise  then  carried  out  the  system 
implementation as set out in the specification. As a result, the Mobile eID application 
was implemented on the Android platform. The core of the application that employed 
the eCert methods was written in Java and linked to the Android interface with the use 
of PHP. The eCert file structure was adjusted, the related functions were modified to 
ensure the new file structure could be retained throughout the system, and a supporting 
function was added to deal with the multiple top CAs situation, so that eIDs would 
remain valid as long as they could be tracked down to any of the top CAs. For example, 
on a successful eID validation, the system will display the name and photo, along with 
the selected information, within the time set by the owner. This is shown in Figure 8-1, 
published in [179]. eCert 
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Figure 8-1 eIDeCert: Verify an eID 
8.2.6 Evaluation 
Through  the  Mobile  eID  project,  problems  for  the  employment  of  the  eCert 
protocol  in  a  mobile  environment  were  identified  and  the  eCert  code  library  was 
adjusted  accordingly.  Initial  results  indicate  a  real  possibility  of  using  the  eCert 
protocol  to  manage  eIDs  in  the  mobile  environment,  supporting  user-centric 
management of sensitive information. 
Besides the positive outcome of system testing, a paper describing the protocol 
also successfully passed the domain experts evaluation processes and was published in 
the International Journal for Infonomics, [179]. 
As a result, the successful mobile eID application, which implemented a working 
demonstrator system on an Android platform, proved that the eCert protocol can be 
applied in other eDocument transmitting domains. eCert 
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However, the proposed system was only developed and tested “in house”, no end 
users being involved. More issues need to be explored in this area in future study. 
8.3 The eCert for eHealthcare Study 
The current eHealthcare document transmitting issues provide unique challenges, 
such as  security design for patient  data privacy  and ownership  vs. emergency  data 
access, which are excellent for testing the eCert protocol. To further test the claim that 
the eCert protocol can be applied to a wide eDocument transmitting domain, a study of 
eCert protocol for eHealthcare patient data transmission was carried out. 
This  section  presents  a  system  design  for  the  management  of  healthcare 
information in the form of a securely distributed eHealthcare document, the eHealth-
eCert, which can be owned and managed by the patient. By analysing the eHealthcare 
problem  domain,  a  system  was  derived  with  both  eCert  supported  functions  and 
eHealthcare unique features. However, due to the time and human resources available, 
there  has  been  no  system  implementation.  This  work  has  been  published  as  a 
conference paper [36]. 
8.3.1 Introduction 
While  patient  paper-based  records  and  documents  are  gradually  digitized, 
security  concerns  about  how  such  electronic  data  is  stored  and  transmitted  have 
increased. This has a serious impact on the healthcare information system, as it contains 
sensitive patient data. The prevention of unauthorized modification and loss of records 
is  highly  important  in  the  healthcare  sector.  Such  concern  is  compounded  by  the 
knowledge  that  institutions  that  we  ought  to  be  able  to  depend  upon  are  in  fact 
unreliable. In this context, it is understandable that plans to computerize patient records 
in the US have caused public anxiety. 
Besides  the  potential  for  human  error,  there  is  also  legitimate  concern  that 
confidential patient data could be passed on to other organisations for financial gain. 
Without a system of checks in place, there is no guarantee that confidential patient data eCert 
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will not be abused. Information owners have increasing demands regarding their rights 
of ownership. 
As a result of a wave of security breaches, there are now pressing calls for an opt-
in system to be implemented for healthcare systems, giving patients the opportunity to 
choose whether or not to have their healthcare information collected and recorded. The 
security  of  healthcare  information  in  the  context  of  a  networked,  sensor-enabled, 
pervasive  and  mobile  computing  infrastructure  is  at  the  core  of  both  the  main 
challenges and potential risks of Healthcare ICT adoption. 
8.3.2 Current eHealthcare Information Systems 
There are various levels at which healthcare data is typically communicated, for 
example: 
  National level across communities 
  Regional level across organisations 
  Enterprise level within the healthcare organisation 
  Global information reach 
Traditionally, healthcare data has been stored in filing cabinets. In progressing to 
computerised systems, the filing cabinet metaphor has typically been applied to digital 
database design. 
The  current  security  controlled  system  for  eHealthcare  information  is  very 
complicated. People who work in/with the NHS were interviewed about how patient 
data is accessed, stored and transmitted. Their responses indicated that access to patient 
data is very strict and in some cases could be difficult; patients have no control of who 
can access  their data;  and patient  data transmission  is  generally  consisted of paper 
records being put into envelopes and sending them by post, which lead to incidents of 
records being lost: 
  Dr  Nicola  Englyst,  a  researcher  and  lecturer  in  Physiology,  Faculty  of 
Medicine,  University  of  Southampton,  said  that  after  successfully  gaining eCert 
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permission to access the NHS system as a researcher, she can access  regional 
lab results and in some cases national records, for example, diabetes patients 
in the UK. All data accessed is read only. She stores the achieved data with her 
research data together in her own system,  completely separate to the NHS 
system. For security purposes, no reference can be found on her system to 
identify the patients in the NHS system even when the database is hacked. 
  Dr Ildar Abdoulline, a GP at Aldermoor Healthcare centre, Southampton, said 
that  GPs  can’t  access  patients’  hospital  records  and  hospital  doctors  can’t 
access the GPs’ records either. Transfer of patient data is not through email or 
online systems, but by post, fax, or phone calls. For example, when a GP 
refers a patient to another healthcare professional, a letter that explains the 
situation and contains the selected patient data will be sent by post. A paper-
based Summary Care Record is also available on request which can be passed 
on by the patient themselves.  
  In  an  emergency  situation,  information  is  critical.  Dominique  Mylod,  a 
midwife  at  Princess  Anne  Hospital,  Southampton,  said  that  besides  the 
demographic details (e.g. name and next of kin), pathology results (e.g. blood 
tests),  and  Chronic  conditions  details  (e.g.  diabetes  and  severe  allergy), 
information for previous birth and safeguarding are also very important. If a 
patient admitted in an emergency has been registered with the regional trust, 
then she will have the patient’s data on the system. Otherwise, she will rely on 
the  pregnancy  notebook  that  the  patient  brings  in,  which  is  a  paper-based 
record of notes made by midwifes after every check-up. This should have all 
the required data.. If neither of these is available then she will need to phone 
the hospital that the patient is registered with and ask them to check on their 
system. 
  Compared  to  non-NHS  staff,  patient  data  privacy  issues  are  even  more 
complicated within the healthcare sectors. Dr Nicola has raised an interesting 
question: how can NHS staff prevent their superiors/colleagues from seeing 
their patient records? - Currently, patients have no right to control who can 
access their data. eCert 
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The challenge for the healthcare scenario is how to make patient data available as 
required  to  those  who  need  to  know,  whilst  preventing  data  being  transmitted  to 
organisations and individuals who have no right to know. 
There  are  two  competing  aims  that  need  to  be  considered  when  designing  a 
secure system for the sharing of healthcare data. First, patients may wish their data to 
be made available without reservation or delay in emergency scenarios; they do not 
want  doctors  to  be  hindered  in  treating  them  because  their  patient  data  cannot  be 
accessed. However, they may also wish to ensure that sensitive personal details are not 
visible to those who have no right to see them. These two aims are in conflict with each 
other. The safest way to ensure a doctor in A&E can see whatever they need to in order 
to treat a patient is to make all patient data visible to anyone at any time. However, this 
then means that patient data is now visible to those who the patient does not wish to see 
it. 
A full healthcare information system includes the full data relating to a patient’s 
care and includes information on support systems, for example. However, in this study, 
the focus is specifically on patient data only. The study will focus on the security issues 
of patients’ data management, known in this paper as the Patient Record System (PRS). 
8.3.3 eHealthcare Scenario 
Sharing  healthcare  records:  Increasingly,  medical  records  are  being  stored 
electronically. This creates potential problems for patients, doctors and clinicians who 
may need to provide partial access or time-limited access to other people such as third 
party  health  providers  and  medical  insurance  companies.  As  with  any  eDocument, 
validation  is  essential,  but  it  is  also  paramount  that  patient  confidentiality  is  not 
violated,  and  that  sensitive  private  information  cannot  be  forwarded  to  potentially 
malicious agents such as newspapers. 
Scenario  1:  Professor  R  in  a  Psychology  Department  needs  to  release  some 
patients’ health history records to her fellow researchers. However, by transferring the 
documents  directly  without  going  into  them  to  delete  some  sensitive  information eCert 
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individually, will lead to sensitive data being leaked, and she still cannot ensure that the 
distributed documents will not be modified without authorisation, abused, or stolen. 
Loss of healthcare records: Medical records are crucial to patients’ healthcare. 
Data corruption (e.g. unauthorized modification of records due to hacked databases or 
human errors)  will lead to  an incorrect  diagnosis,  while loss of  records  will  waste 
inestimable amounts of valuable time. 
Scenario 2: Patient A has a history of heart problems and has been taken to a 
hospital for emergency treatment. Normally, doctors can retrieve A’s health record to 
make an informed decision, but unfortunately, this time, A’s record is nowhere to be 
found, either in paper form or on a database. As a result, treatment has to be delayed, as 
doctors have to assess A as a new patient, and carry out new tests beforehand. 
8.3.4 The Aim 
In applying the eCert protocol to the eHealthcare problem, the goal is to provide a 
mechanism for user-centric distribution of data, which means giving patients control of 
who is allowed to see their data. It is aimed as an alternative option that could benefit 
patients, rather than a replacement of the current PRS. 
In order to achieve this aim, security controls for the issue and distribution of 
data, and a verification service for this distributed data, are required. 
8.3.5 Underlying Technologies 
eCert  protocol  as  policy  for  the  signing  and  key  management:  The eCert 
protocol defines a secured and signed document that enables the user to determine what 
a reviewer is allowed to see and for how long, which is very close to the eHealthcare 
document transmitting requirements. Therefore, it is possible that it can be employed to 
provide a solution for eHealthcare issues. 
eCertificate  and  mobile  eID  as  applied  examples:  The  eCert  protocol  was 
successfully  applied  to  two  eDocument  transmitting  use  cases,  the  eCertificate  for eCert 
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ePortfolio,  and  the  eID  in  mobile  environments.  These  can  be  taken  as  working 
examples for the eHealthcare system throughout its analysis and design stages. 
8.3.6 Stakeholders 
Three  stakeholders  were  identified:  the  issuer,  the  patient  owner,  and  the 
reviewer.  Ownership  of  eHealthcare  data  is  complicated,  as  it  involves  multiple 
government bodies and organizations. In the eHealth-eCert system, the issuer and the 
reviewer can be from the same organization, and a reviewer can be an issuer at the 
same time, and they can both be the owner. 
However, for this eCert for eHealthcare study, the ownership was focused on the 
patients, as the system is designed to give patients control over their healthcare records. 
The patient should have ownership of the issued eHealth-eCert file. This is similar to 
the eCert system, where the student owns the awarded eCertificate. 
8.3.7 Use Case 
Three PRS use case scenarios were developed to highlight the benefits and issues 
related  to  data  transfer  in  the  healthcare  sector:  Sharing  healthcare  information  is 
shown in Table 8-1; Record healthcare history is shown in Table 8-2; Transferring 
healthcare information is shown in Table 8-3;. These use cases are framed in terms of 
using a PRS. 
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Table 8-1 eHealthcare use case – Sharing healthcare information 
Description  A professor in a psychology department wishes to share the patients’ 
healthcare information with fellow researchers on a case study, as the 
researchers have no access to the PRS 
Actors    Professor 
  Professor’s fellow researchers 
Scenario  1. The professor retrieves the specified patient records from the PRS, 
and sends them to fellow researchers 
2. The researchers receive and access the records 
Variations  N/A 
Benefits    Researchers: can gain access to the required information 
  Professor: electronic transfer of the required information can provide 
efficient data sharing for group research activities 
Issues    Neither the professor nor the researchers can be sure that the sent or 
received information is from the respective person, and it has not 
been modified without authority or hacked (e.g. information leaked) 
during the transfer 
  The professor may need to manually select or delete information 
from the records to avoid some patients’ personal information being 
exposed 
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Table 8-2 eHealthcare use case – Record healthcare history, published in [36] 
Description  A healthcare sector member staff wishes to record a patient’s 
healthcare information after providing the treatment 
Actors    Patient 
  Healthcare sector staff member 
Scenario  1. Patient requires treatment and provides related information 
2. Staff member retrieves the patient’s healthcare history from PRS, 
and assesses the patient 
3. Patient receives treatment 
4. Staff member records the treatment process and result in PRS 
Variations  If the patient has no record in the PRS yet, the staff member can create 
a new account  
Benefits    Patient: all treatment history is on record, no need to memorise 
them, specially the details in medical terms 
  Healthcare sector: maintain patients’ healthcare history can provide 
efficient assessment, enable informed decision, and therefore, better 
treatment result 
Issues  Records in PRS have risks: e.g. unauthorized modification, human 
errors, and database attacks. 
  Incorrect record will lead to wrong treatments 
  Loss of record or a whole database will affect the efficiency of 
assessments 
It is not easy for a patient to find out what is being held about them in 
the system, or to retrieve the information for any personal purposes 
(e.g. to forward it to a private healthcare provider) 
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Table 8-3 eHealthcare use case – Transferring healthcare information 
Description  A staff member at healthcare sector A wishes to transfer a patient’s 
healthcare information to a staff member at healthcare sector B 
Actors    A staff member at healthcare sector A 
  A staff member at healthcare sector B 
Scenario  1.  A patient at healthcare sector A is being referred to healthcare sector B 
2.  A staff member at healthcare sector A retrieves the specified patient 
record from PRS, and sends it to a staff member at healthcare sector B 
3.  The staff member at healthcare sector B receives and accesses the 
record 
Variations  If the staff members at healthcare sectors A and B can access the same 
PRS, then only the patient’s account information for retrieving the record 
is needed.  
Benefits    Patient: no need to handle the documents themselves 
  Healthcare sector: electronic transfer of the required information can 
provide efficient assessment, enable informed decision, and therefore, 
better treatment result 
Issues    The staff member at healthcare sector A cannot be sure that the 
receiver is the respective staff member at healthcare sector B, and the 
record has not been modified without authority or hacked (e.g. 
information leaked) during the transfer 
  The staff member at healthcare sector B cannot be sure the received 
information is sent from the respective staff member at healthcare 
sector A, and the record has not been modified without authority or 
hacked (e.g. information leaked) during the transfer 
The patient cannot be sure what is being transferred – patient’s privacy is 
not satisfied 
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The relations of these stakeholders and use cases are shown diagrammatically in 





















Figure 8-2 eHealthcare use case analysis 
 
8.3.8 eHealthcare vs. eCertificate with eID 
Comparison  of  the  use  cases  of  the  three  different  systems  shows  that  the 
implementation  of  the  eCert  protocol  for  eHealthcare  is  a  mixed  version  of  the 
eCertificate and eID applications, but with some unique features: 
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Figure 8-3 Comparison of eCert file structures 
 
  File structure: Unlike eCertificate and eID which are issued for personal 
use, an eHealthcare document may contain group information for research 
purposes,  as  well  as  for  individual  use.  It  should  be  constructed  with 
optional text sections as in eID (e.g. to bind in some relevant data when 
required), and secured support files as in eCertificate (e.g. an image of a 
scan or x-ray). This is shown in Figure 8-3. 
  Usage  control:  In  both  the  eCertificate  and  eID  applications,  further 
transfer of the eDocument from the reviewer is prevented. However, in 
the  case  of  eHealthcare,  this  should  be  allowed  as  the  reviewer  will 
normally also be a staff member in a certified healthcare sector, and they 
have the need and right to transfer the document further to the desired 
department. Therefore, not only the owner, but all stakeholders, should 
have  usage  control  of  the  document.  However,  to  protect  information 
privacy, we need to ensure that only the specified reviewer can access it, eCert 
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and no one should be able to access more information than they have 
received  (no  hidden  information  should  be  made  available  on  further 
transmission). This is shown in Figure 8-4, published in [36]. 
  Technical skills: Unlike the case of eCertificate and eID, the information 
owners in the eHealthcare case are patients, who can be of any age, may 
be  new  to  computing  technologies,  or  may  have  no  capability  of 
managing their own documents. A way needs to be found so that they can 
have the required data in a simple but secure method. 
issuer(education institution)
further reviewer (any, e.g. job agency)










reviewer (healthcare sector) owner (patient)
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Figure 8-4 Document transmission paths eCert 
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8.3.9 The Design 
The eHealthcare application will be formed from two subsystems: issuing, and 
reviewing.  These  two  subsystems  will  be  installed  locally  in  registered  healthcare 
providers, and linked to the central eCert server. While these installed subsystems will 
only be accessed by authorized staff, there will also be an online publicly-accessed 
central reviewing subsystem for patients to view, set controls, and distribute their own 
documents. 
The  issuing  subsystem  will  collect  the  required  information  from  the  PRS 
according to the specified input criteria, and will then sign and encrypt the document 
using the eCert protocol. 
The  reviewing  subsystem will take the uploaded eHealth-eCert file as input, 
decrypt and verify the document against content modification, status validation, signing 
key revocation, access time limit, and then display the enabled visible sections. The 
user  is  allowed  to  set  further  access  controls  on  the  document  after  a  successful 
verification process. 
By  applying  the  eCert  protocol  to  eHealthcare,  a  digitally-signed  eHealthcare 
document, an eHealth-eCert, can be created according to the specified criteria. Such an 
eHealth-eCert will follow the eCert user-centric approach, and will be secure to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and availability during its issue, distribution, management, and 
verification processes. This is shown as use cases in Figure 8-5, published in [36]. 
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eHealtheCert issuer

















Figure 8-5 eHealthcare system use cases 
 
Confidentiality is also called secrecy or privacy. It ensures that computer-related 
assets  are  accessed  only  by  authorized  parties.  To  address  the  information 
confidentiality issue in the case of the sharing of healthcare records, senders need to be 
able to select the required data that will be made available to which receiver and for 
how long. As all stakeholders can be both sender and receiver, they will all have the 
right to set access control values. 
To ensure that no one can access more information than that which they have on 
receipt, they will not be able to make visible any optional non-display sections, and 
non-display files will not be included in further transfer. However, the title(s) of the 
hidden section(s) will be indicated, and the original document issuer can be traced. 
Therefore, the hidden information can be requested from the document issuer if needed. eCert 
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Staff members will all have their own unique key pairs within the system. When 
transferring eHealth-eCert documents  between healthcare sectors, unique encryption 
keys will be employed for each document to ensure that only the specified reviewer can 
access them. 
When issuing the initial eHealth-eCert document to the patient, the system default 
encryption key will be employed to enable all stakeholders to access it. This appears to 
militate against privacy, but provides availability in an emergency situation when the 
information must be provided by an incapable patient. Patients can set a unique key to 
their  documents  through  the  reviewing  subsystem  when  preferred.  To  backup  the 
security issue, a log of access IPs will be maintained. In addition, a list of encrypting 
options could be provided for advanced users with specified privacy requirements. This 
use of keys is indicated in Table 8-4, published in [36]. 
Integrity in computing security implies that assets can be modified only when 
they are under authorized control, specifying who or what can access which resources 
and in what ways. In applying the eCert technique,  the eCert signature method was 
employed with the corresponding system structure design so that the document access 
key would be verified, together with its signing key status, content status, expiry time, 
and access time. These should all be validated, with any unauthorized modifications 
being detected. 
For an individual healthcare history, an eHealth-eCert can be created and made 
available to the patient. This can act as a backup to the PRS, in that it will not only 
address the availability issues in the case of loss of records, but will also benefit some 
patients.  This  is  especially  so  for  those  who  know  they  may  require  emergency 
treatment. They can even carry it with them, such as a bracelet style USB, to provide 
their certified identity and healthcare history. What is more, issuing an eHealth-eCert to 
a  patient  also  gives  them  back  control  of  their  data.  It  addresses  the  information 
ownership right, since patients are now free to choose where, to whom, and how to 
present their personal data. They can even afford to choose “not to have their healthcare 
information collected and recorded in the healthcare information system”[143], as the 
eCert technique enables the document to be owner-controllable, verifiable, securely 
transferred, with lifetime validation, and easily backed up. eCert 
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Table 8-4 eHealthcare system keys 
Signing and verifying process 
Signing key  Issuer private key 
Verifying key  Issuer public key 
Encrypt and decrypt on issuing process 
Issuing path options  Encrypt key  Decrypt key 
Within healthcare sector  Receiver public key  Receiver private key 
Healthcare sector to patient 
with open access 
System default public 
key 
System default private 
key 
Healthcare sector to patient 
with controlled access 
Patient public key  Patient private key 
Encrypt and decrypt on access control process for further transfer 
Transfer path options  Encrypt key  Decrypt key 
Within healthcare sector  Receiver public key  Receiver private key 
Healthcare sector to patient   System default public 
key 
System default private 
key 
Patient to any reviewers (Open 
access) 
System default public 
key  
System default private 
key 
Patient to already known 
receiver 
Receiver public key  Receiver private key 
Patient to unknown specified 
receiver 
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8.3.10 Issues 
The balance between data confidentiality and availability under security control 
in healthcare is extreme: on the one hand, the patients’ data is considered as highly 
sensitive, and requires a high level of security; on the other hand, the information needs 
to be available in emergency events without any trapdoors. 
The eHealthcare system was designed to maintain high level security when the 
document is transferred between healthcare sectors (signed, encrypted, and required 
unique access key), and low level security when issuing to the patient (with open access 
by default), but providing functions for the patients to upgrade the security level if 
required. This is aimed at availability, especially if the document is the only available 
verifiable  information  that  is  provided  on  an  incapable  patient  in  an  emergency 
situation. Whether this  approach is suitable or not could become the main security 
argument. 
8.3.11 Evaluation 
Through  the  eCert  for  eHealthcare  study,  the  issues  around  eCertification  in 
eHealth documents were identified. As a result, the eCert protocol was again reviewed, 
and  a  detailed  eHealthcare  system  design  was  proposed.  From  the  design,  the  file 
structure  of  the  eCert  protocol  had  been  improved  to  suit  various  types  of  eCert 
document,  and  additional  support  functions  are  added  to  provide  security  control 
options. Although there is currently no system demonstrator to take the eHealthcare 
design  forward,  the  changes  could  be  easily  made  following  this  design  once  the 
implementation takes place. 
By  employing  the  eCert  protocol,  the  eHealth-eCert  document  can  be  used 
standalone  or  in  parallel  with  the  PRS,  as  a  secured  and  independently  verifiable 
backup to the existing PRS. It could be the answer to the current healthcare information 
system security problems. It also provides advantages over the existing system, as it eCert 
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satisfies the information ownership right, and enables the owner to have control of their 
data. The design is independent of any particular implementation. 
The outcome of the eHealthcare study indicates that the eCert protocol can be 
applied in a wide eDocument transmitting domain. 
This study was evaluated by domain experts and published as a conference paper 
at the International Conference on Information Society (i-Society 2011)[36] 
However, the proposed system was only developed at the theoretical level, and no 
system implementation and testing have been carried out at a technical level yet. Issues 
when theory is applied to practice still need to be explored. 
8.4 The Abstracted eCert Protocol 
After being evaluated in three different applied domains, the eCert protocol was 
improved to suit a wide range of file structure that may be required, for all types of user 
(including all ages, IT levels, and capabilities), in various environments. 
8.4.1 Features 
File  structure:  an  eCert  file  will  contain  three  types  of  data:  metadata,  text 
outputs, and file outputs (that can be in any format). These are constructed in three 
sections: metadata, main content section, and detached supported files section. Both the 
text content and the support files can be subdivided into two types: compulsory and 
optional. The text output will form the main content, whether compulsory or optional; 
the  compulsory  file  outputs  will  be  embedded  within  the  main  content,  while  the 
optional files will be attached. The improved file structure of the eCert protocol is 
shown in Figure 8-6, along with the comparison of the earlier designs. 
Signing  method:  optional  files  will  be  signed  individually  using  a  detached 
signature. Their signature values and the reference URI will then be embedded within 
the main content under the corresponding display conditions. The document will then 
be signed using an enveloped signature, and encrypted before being distributed. eCert 
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Keys  management:  the  system  will  use  the  issuer’s  private  key  to  sign  the 
document, and use the system’s default public key, or the receiver’s public key to 
encrypt the document, depending on the applied situations or specified selected options. 
On review, the corresponding decrypt key, and the issuer’s public key will be used for 
verification. 
System structure: all supported systems will be installed locally in registered 
institutions, and linked to the eCert central server. In addition, an online central service 
will provide public access for the required management and verification service. In 
some cases, an identity management system will be involved in access control. 
Usage control: the owner can choose who can see what and for how long by 
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Figure 8-6 eCert protocol file structure design 
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8.4.2 Advantages and Innovation 
Secure: The eCert approach is based on digital signing, but also addresses what 
is called the “eCertificate squared” problem. Not only must the non-repudiation and the 
authenticity of the document be ensured, but the current validity to cover the potential 
revocation of the data must be detected as well as the classical case of the revocation of 
the signing key. This means it is more secure than conventional digital signing. 
User-centric: By taking this approach, the ownership rights are addressed. The 
owner can not only store, manage, share and track their personal data, but can also 
tailor their documents to best support their needs. In this way, the information is “under 
their control, with their consent, and for their benefit [133].” 
Lifetime  Validation:  The  eCert  signing  method  and  system  structure  design 
ensure  that  all  issued  eCert  files  are  independent  of  the  issuing  body.  They  can 
therefore be validated for life even if the issuing body ceases to exist. 
Verifiable  distributed  data:  The  eCert  signing  method  also  enables  the 
distributed eDocument to be verified through a supported service, without the need for 
storing the data. This provides the advantage of saving huge storage and dramatically 
avoids database attacks. 
8.5 Proof of Hypotheses 
From this research, it has been shown that Hypothesis 1 (the current technology 
has  the  required  features  that  can  be  used  or  adapted  to  support  the  design  and 
implementation  of  the  eCertificate  system,  so  that  an  eCertificate  can  be  secured, 
rendered permanently verifiable and allow the student owner to have control over its 
use  independently  from  its  issuing  body.)  has  been  met.  It  has  been  described  in 
Chapter 6 and has been tested and evaluated in Chapter 7: 
1. Adapting the digital signature CRL method, maintaining the revocation lists 
for  both  the  signer’s  key  and  the  issued  eCertificate,  together  with  an 
automatic checking service against both  of them. This  not only  solved the eCert 
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eCertificate  squared  issue  but  also  improved  the  security  of  the  traditional 
digital signing with the verification process. 
2. Employing a new file structure and a new signing method, allows the owner to 
set  controls  on  the  signed  eCertificate  through  its  metadata  without 
invalidating the signature. This addressed the security issues of the new eCert 
system and satisfied the owner control requirement. 
3. Applying number 1 and 2, together with a new system structure design, and 
providing a central management and verification system independent from the 
issuing body, solved the lifelong availability nationwide usage issues. 
This  research  has  also  shown  that  the  Hypothesis  2  (the  concept  of  the 
eCertificate solution can be applied to related domains, such as other eDocuments that 
face similarly complex situations, to solve their security and ownership issues.) has 
been met. It has been demonstrated in Chapter 8: 
4. Applying the eCert protocol to Mobile eID demonstrated that the concept of 
the eCertificate solution can be applied in a mobile environment 
5. Applying the eCert protocol to the eHealthcare domain demonstrated that the 
concept of the eCertificate solution can be applied to the complex situations of 
patient data transmission 
From the designs, demonstrators, and approval processes that have taken place, 
the hypothesis has been proved not only from the theoretical level, but also in practice. 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
The initial eCert protocol was formed through the development of the eCertificate 
system. It was tested through the eCert for ePortfolio subproject, and was evaluated 
through  the  Mobile  eID  subproject  and  the  eHealthcare  study.  Step-by-step,  the 
protocol was adjusted to suit the applicability requirements in various environments. 
The  evaluation  outcome  indicated  that  the  improved  eCert  protocol  can  be  applied 
successfully in a wide range of eDocument transmitting domains. 
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Chapter 9   Summary, Conclusion, 
and Future Work 
This  chapter  summarizes  the  research,  outlines  the  journeys  to  achieving  the 
outputs and outcomes, along with the lessons learned and the impacts. The dissertation 
ends with the conclusion, and proposals for future work. 
This  chapter  is  entirely  the  researcher’s  own  work.  Some  sections  have  been 
published in the eCert project website [28]. 
9.1 Research Summary 
Through  this  research,  a  solution  for  a  secured  and  user-centric  eCertificate 
management system has been proposed. It has successfully addressed the eCertificate 
squared problem that exists within the traditional digital signing method when it is 
applied to non-static content eDocuments. It has defined an eCertificate file structure, 
so that it contains not only the qualification award information, but also the transcript 
information  and  any  supporting  evidence  files,  which  can  be  in  any  format.  It  has 
proposed a new digital signing method to cooperate with the file structure and to meet 
the eDocuments’ ownership rights. The new signing method not only binds the related 
files together, but also allows the eCertificate owners to set access control on who can 
see the signed eDocument for what and for how long. Meanwhile it retains the integrity 
of the signature, without the need of re-signing by the initial issuing body; an additional 
encryption key  is added after the signing to  ensure that only the receiver with  the 
corresponding decryption key can access the file. The research has also proposed a 
newly designed centralized verification service for such digitally signed and access eCert 
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controlled  distributed  eCertificates.  The  system  provides  security  control  for 
verification  against  eCertificate  expiry  time,  access  period,  ownership,  signing  key 
status,  qualification  award  status,  and  owner  controlled  section  display.  The  whole 
design works together to ensure the issued eCertificates can be securely distributed and 
verified  independently  from  the  issuing  body  and  satisfy  ownership  rights,  without 
requiring storage in the verification system. This method also provides huge advantages 
of lifetime validation and the avoidance of database attacks. 
The protocol was tested and evaluated through its demonstrator by following the 
selected research methodology. The design principle was tested through a subproject, 
integrating  eCert  in  ePortfolios,  to  evaluate  the  usage  of  eCertificates  in  other 
applications. The concept of the eCert solution was tested through a subproject, the 
Mobile eID, and a study of eCert for eHealthcare, to evaluate the applicability of this 
concept  in  wider  situations.  All  the  test  and  evaluation  results  were  successful, 
indicating  that  the  proposed  eCert  protocol  will  not  only  meet  the  eCertificate 
challenge,  but  also  solve  the  eDocument  transmission  security  issues,  and  can  be 
applied to a wider domain. 
9.2 Journeys to Achieving the Outcomes 
The  research  topic  was  raised  initially  from  personal  interest  in  online 
certification  for  ePortfolios.  After  the  background  research,  a  secured  eCertificate 
system was identified as the research focus. Two years into the research, a call for a 
government-funded project matched the research topic exactly, and with successfully 
winning the bid, the project named eCert enabled the researcher to lead a development 
team to visualise and construct a user-centric solution to the problem of maintaining 
confidentiality in a world of linked data. As the research has generated interest and 
gained momentum, it has become possible to explore the initial concept in more depth, 
to  define more clearly  what  is  at  the heart of  the  “eCert”  concept,  and to  develop 
examples of how the protocol may be applied in widely varying contexts. It has also 
been possible to develop some of these examples as practical demonstrators, which has 
led to a great depth of understanding the issues that arise when the theory is applied in 
practice. eCert 
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The  research  has  generated  global  interest  from  Australia  to  the  USA  and 
Canada,  and  led  to  10  publications.  Whilst  focusing  on  dissemination  in  the  UK, 
interaction with expert audiences worldwide has been extremely helpful in assessing 
and refining the eCert concept. 
9.3 Hypotheses and Contributions 
The  eCertificate  study  is  a  new  field  in  research  worldwide.  Through  this 
research, the researcher proposed an eCertificate system, and proved that (hypothesis 1) 
the current technology has the required features that can be used or adapted to support 
the design and implementation of the eCertificate system, so that an eCertificate can be 
secured, rendered permanently verifiable and allow the student owner to have control 
over its use independently from its issuing body. 
The researcher has also proposed the abstracted eCert protocol, and proved that 
(hypothesis  2)  the  concept  of  the  eCertificate  solution  can  be  applied  to  related 
domains, such as other eDocuments that face similarly complex situations, to solve 
their security and ownership issues. This includes: 
  identifying and addressing the (eCertificate)
2 problem, which is a content 
validation  issue  raised  in  the  verification  process  of  digitally  signed 
documents that contains non static content; 
  defining  the  file  structure  of  a  complex  eDocument  that  involved  non 
static content, contained a wide range of file types, needed to be digitally 
signed and enabling authorized modification to access control values; 
  designing a new signing method to enable owner control over the access 
of a digitally signed document without the need for digital re-signing; 
  designing a new system structure to accompany the new signing method, 
which provides a centralized verification framework for digitally signed 
and owner-controlled distributed eDocuments;  
The  eCert  protocol,  which  was  proved  through  two  evaluation  studies,  can 
provide a number of innovation advantages when it is applied to other eDocument eCert 
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transmission  and  verification  domains,  such  as  eGovernment,  and  eBusiness,  this 
includes: 
Security: The new signing method is based on digital signing while improving its 
security through addressing the (eCertificate)
2 problem. It validates the current status of 
the document content as well as the revocation of the signing key, which means it is 
more secure than conventional digital signing. 
User-centric:  The  ownership  rights  are  addressed  such  that  the  owner  of  the 
document can not only store, manage, share and track their personal data, but can also 
tailor their documents to best support their needs, so that it is “under their control, with 
their consent, and for their benefit [133].” 
Lifetime  Validation:  The  eCert  signing  method  and  system  structure  design 
ensure  that  all  issued  eCert  files  are  independent  of  the  issuing  body.  They  can 
therefore be validated for life even if the issuing body ceases to exist.  
Verifiable distributed data: The eCert signing method also enables the distributed 
eDocument to be verified through a supported service, without the need for storing the 
data.  This  provides  the  advantage  of  saving  huge  storage  and  dramatically  avoids 
database attacks. 
9.4 Research Methodologies 
Two research methodologies were employed in this research: Service Orientated 
Reference Model (SORM) [173] and Delphi [88].  
The SORM methodology was used to investigate the eCertificate system as it can 
help  to  better  understand  how  services  fit  together  to  provide  the  required 
functionalities  within  the  eFramework.  The  eCertificate  research  was  developed 
following the four layers of the SORM methodology: 
  In Chapter 3 and 4, literature review and domain research were carried out 
for  the  first  layer,  Domain  Definition,  to  look  into  eCertificate-related 
areas  to  find  out  what  is  being  studied  in  the  field  and  explore  what eCert 
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systems/projects  are  already  available  besides  literature,  what  can  be 
adapted,  and  what  limitations  need  to  be  overcome.  The  outcome  of 
identified issues and useful information were summarised and passed on 
to  the  next  layer  as  the  required  Common  Usage  Patterns  of  the  new 
system;  
  With the usage patterns defined, the second layer of Use Cases study was 
carried out in Chapter 5 to formalise user activities; the corresponding gap 
analysis was also performed to identify if any of the use cases required 
services need to be addressed 
  Based  on the  gap analysis result, a series  of Service Profiles  for  each 
required use case were generated in Chapter 6. At this third layer, existing 
services that could be used or adapted, and the techniques to address the 
issues of required services were investigated. 
  With  the  above  preparation  and  the  ideas  of  approaching  the 
requirements, the fourth layer of Reference Implementation was finally 
carried  out  to  implement  the  eCertificate  system  in  Chapter  6  and 
evaluated in Chapter7. 
The Delphi methodology is a “high accuracy forecasting tool” that can provide 
professional opinions efficiently. As the eCertificate is a new field of research, so at 
this starting point, the development and evaluation of the system was focused on the 
theoretical  level,  such  as  whether  the  related  issues  have  been  understood  and  the 
design is appropriate, rather than on the production level of how well the demonstration 
system performs. With this focus in mind,  the  Delphi methodology  was employed, 
step-by-step  alongside  the  SORM  methodology,  to  guide  the  decision  making  and 
evaluate whether the proposed design meets all system requirements. These include: 
  A panel of domain experts, include employment managers, IT security 
experts, ePortfolio experts, and exam board officers have be selected at 
national level to represent the eCertificate stakeholders; 
  Two workshops were run during two stages of the development to collect 
professional opinions from these experts  eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 202 
o  The first workshop was run at the system design stage to evaluate 
and  adjust  the  design  at  the  strategic  level.  Comments, 
disagreements,  and  suggestions  from  the  domain  experts  were 
collected,  analysed,  fed  back,  and  the  system  design  was  also 
adjusted accordingly. 
o  The  second  workshop  was  run  at  the  system  demonstrator 
completion stage to evaluate and adjust the design not only at the 
theoretical level but also at the technical level. Again, comments, 
disagreements,  and  suggestions  from  the  domain  experts  were 
collected,  analysed,  fed  back,  and  the  system  design  was  also 
adjusted accordingly. 
  In addition to the two workshops with the selected domain experts, a few 
more presentations also took place at national and international computing 
security-related conferences to collect the opinions from a wider range of 
domain experts. After each round, feedback was reflected upon, and the 
system was adjusted accordingly. 
  Towards the end of this research, positive feedback was received from 
conferences and workshops internationally while negative feedback was 
mainly related to the future work that could not be completed within the 
current  project.  So  the  Delphi  method  was  effective  in  achieving  a 
convergence of opinions. 
9.5 Lessons Learned 
The research set out to investigate the viability of putting certified information in 
the hands of the user, and giving them the opportunity to set the scope and time frame 
for which others might be able to view such data. At the outset of the research, one 
domain expert confidently stated that users could not be trusted with their own data, 
and  that  such  an  approach  would  ultimately  compromise  data  security.  Having 
implemented the eCert system, and having also deployed it in three practical scenarios, 
it is evident that the approach works, and is no less safe than centralised approaches. eCert 
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The evaluation subprojects were initiated to implement the eCert concept, and 
they looked to be something that would provide valuable alternative tests. In the event, 
they proved not only successful, but also generated lots of interests. 
As the research progressed, it became apparent that the eCert protocol is widely 
applicable to a range of scenarios where certified information needs to be transmitted 
securely, whilst giving the owner the opportunity to retain control over their data. 
At a different level, lessons have also been learnt about how to manage changes 
in plan, especially when dealing with a project. The eCert project has had its fair share 
of problems, including the departure of the main code developer halfway through the 
development cycle. This has been an object lesson in noting that risk assessment is not 
an arbitrary exercise done to meet requirements, but an essential part of pre-project 
planning. 
9.6 Future Work 
As a result of running the eCert project alongside the research, it is now known 
that  the  eCert  protocol  will  work  in  practice  in  a  variety  of  contexts,  giving  users 
control over who may see their data and for how long, thus giving them improved 
protection against identity theft, for example. The eCert code library was tested by two 
different groups of developers through the two subprojects, and refined to ensure it is 
easy to use. 
The next step is to roll out an eCert-based system and evaluate it with real users. 
Because  this  involves  the  security  of  real  user  data,  the  researcher  would  prefer  a 
carefully-planned, phased roll out. Thus it would be good to see: 
1. A  carefully-monitored  trial  with  a  specific  group  of  students  in  a  local 
institution (e.g. on a single course), with the paper-based system as a fallback 
scenario. 
2. An institution-wide roll-out, again with students located within the institution. 
3. A roll-out that crosses institutions, for example covering a local area, and with 
FE/HE cross-over, focussing on, say, the HE admissions boundary. eCert 
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4. Alongside the ePortfolio roll-outs, it would be good to see a prototype system 
set up to evaluate the potential for student data to be kept on smartphones, so 
that university smartcards could be replaced by a smartphone app. The eCert 
project  has  demonstrated how this  may  be achieved securely  and operated 
simply. 
5. The eCert for ePortfolio implementation subproject indicated that there are 
issues  relating  to  the  implementation  of  eCert  within  different  ePortfolio 
systems. This could be worth evaluating, although it does not relate to the 
value of the eCert protocol itself, but on the design of the ePortfolio system. 
6. A further development of the eCert protocol would be to use it to cover areas 
of student-related documentation that are currently problematic, such as files 
relating  to  disability,  periods  of  ill-health,  and  matters  relating  to  “Special 
Considerations”. The eCert protocol gives a solution to enable time-limited 
access  for  restricted  groups  to  sensitive  information.  Thus  a  member  of  a 
“Special Considerations” panel could be granted access to a student’s personal 
information for the duration of the panel meeting only. This application is 
currently only at the design stage, so it needs to be built and tested first to 
ensure that it works before it can be evaluated in practice. 
9.7 Conclusions 
There is a tension in the world of security between a desire to keep control of data 
centrally, and putting control into the hands of the user. In the world of ePortfolios, 
confirmation  of  award  data  is  currently  only  possible  via  a  centralised  service. 
Following the SORM and Delphi methodologies, this research has proposed a new 
eDocument  signing  method,  along  with  other  supported  functions  and  new  system 
designs,  has  solved  what  is  called  the  “eCertificate  squared”  problem,  and  has 
developed a test system to investigate the issues that arise when control of award data is 
put in the hands of users. 
With further evaluation subprojects of eCert for ePortfolio, Mobile eID, and the 
study of eHealthcare, the abstracted requirements for secured eDocument transmitting eCert 
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have been captured. Step-by-step, the eCert protocol has been adjusted and improved 
accordingly. 
The  eCert  protocol  is  an  entirely  new  concept.  Both  the  use  of  eCert  in  an 
ePortfolio  context,  and  the  use  of  eCert  in  a  mobile  eID  context  have  created 
considerable interest. Interest has been expressed by eWork, the Australian Flexible 
Learning  Framework  project,  with  regard  to  ePortfolio  usage,  interest  from  the 
University of Sapienza with regard to developing the mobile eID aspect of eCert, and 
interest in eCert with regard to the secure transfer of documents. From the results of 
this research, it is clear that the eCert protocol is not just a solution to the problem of 
putting control of ePortfolio award data into the hands of the user, which was its initial 
intention;  it  is  now  a  useful  solution  to  a  wide  range  of  problems.  The  outcome 
indicated that the improved eCert protocol can be applied successfully in a wide range 
of eDocument transmitting domains. 
The eCert protocol design has been published, together with the applied example 
systems, source code, and related documentation. It is therefore available for anyone to 
use and to implement an eCert solution in their own applications. 
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Appendix A: Supporting 
Documents 
The supporting documents for this research are about the experiments (the eCert 
project and its sub-projects), which can be found on the eCert project website. These 
include: 
eCert Project documents 
  Project Plan: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/publications/eCertProjectPlan.pdf 
  Final Report: 
http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/publications/eCertProjectFinalReport.pdf 
  First Workshop Report: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/publications/eCert-
1stWorkshop.pdf 
  Second Workshop Report: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/publications/eCert-
2ndWorkshop.pdf 
eCert Code library 
  Source code: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/source/eCert.zip 
  JavaDoc: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/ecertdoc/ 
eCert Demonstrator 
  Source code: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/source/eCert.war 
  Online demo system: http://152.78.189.130:8080/eCert/ 
  Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlrETHZeHeA 
  Documentation: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/document/eCert.pdf 
eCert in ePortfolio eCert 
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  Source code: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/source/eport.zip 
  Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9lc9vS3Eyg 
  Report: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/document/eport.pdf 
eCert for Mobile eID 
  Source code: http://ecert.ecs.soton.ac.uk/development/source/eID.zip 
  Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYn7c6uVFl8 
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Appendix B: Copyright 
Part of the work summarized in this thesis has been published and the copyright 
has been transferred to the publishers. The items involved are: 
  Reference paper NO 11, Copyright by AACE, copyright policy can be accessed 
from http://www.aace.org/conf/copyright.htm 
  Reference papers No 32 and 36, Copyright by IEEE, copyright policy can be 
accessed from http://www.ieee.org/documents/ieeecopyrightform.doc 
  Reference papers No 168 and 31, Copyright by Infonomics Society, copyright 
policy can be accessed from http://www.infonomics-
society.org/IJI/IJI%20Copyright%20Form.pdf and http://www.infonomics-
society.org/IJISR/IJISR%20Copyright%20Form.pdf 
Part of the work was carried out during the JISC-funded project eCert, and has 
been published on the eCert project website. 
In order to address these, permissions for re-using the published materials have 
been  obtained,  and  copyright  procedures  have  been  followed  according  to  the 
individual publisher’s requirements, such as the provided citations, notice of copyright, 
and acknowledgement of publishers. Below are the permission examples: Figure B-1 
shows the permission from AACE; and Figure B-2 shows the permission from Chris 
Brown, the JISC program manager. 
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Figure B-0-1 Permission from AACE 
 
 
Figure B-0-2 Permission from JISC   eCert 
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Appendix C: System Development 
with SORM Methodology 
The process of eCertificate system development with the SORM methodology is 
summarized in Table C-1 below. 
  First, system requirements (SR) were raised from Domain definition and Common 
usage patterns 
  Second, technical requirements (TR) were raised from Use cases and Gap analysis 
  Third, design approaches (DA) were raised from Service profiles 
  Finally, system implementation (SI) was raised from Reference implementation 
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SR-01  TR-01  DA-01  SI-01 
SR-02  TR-02  DA-02  SI-02 
TR-03  DA-03  SI-03 
SI-04 
TR-04  DA-04  SI-05 
SI-06 
SR-03  TR-05  DA-05  SI-07 
TR-06  DA-06  SI-08 
TR-07  DA-07  SI-09 
TR-08  DA-08  SI-10 
DA-09  SI-11 
DA-10  SI-12 
SR-04  TR-09  DA-11  SI-13 
DA-12  SI-14 
SR-05  TR-10  DA-13  SI-15 
SI-16 
DA-14  SI-17 
TR-11  DA-15  SI-18 
TR-12  DA-16  SI-19 
TR-13  DA-17  SI-20 
TR-14  DA-18  SI-21 
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System requirements (SR) 
SR-01  can be used stand alone or served within an ePortfolio 
SR-02  security  control  throughout  the  whole  eCertificate  lifecycle:  from 
generation,  issue,  distribution,  to  verification;  involves  hardware, 
software, database, information, and human control 
SR-03  can be verified in a legal context, support withdrawal of eCertificate 
and the content status  validation as  well as  the signing key status 
validation 
SR-04  ensure  that  the  owner  can  have  control  over  the  usage  of  their 
eCertificates 
SR-05  effective usage: easy to use, support lifetime validation, and can be 
widely verified and recognized throughout the UK 
Technical requirements (TR) 
TR-01  system  adaptability  and  compatibility  so  that  the  system  can  be 
embedded as a plug-in within other systems, e.g. eFolio 
TR-02  Security control: includes hardware, database, and network 
TR-03  system access control for students, reviewers, and any third parties 
TR-04  eCertificate  access  control  for  students,  reviewers,  and  any  third 
parties 
TR-05  support content modification validation 
TR-06  support withdrawal of an eCertificate 
TR-07  support revocation of signing key 
TR-08  can be verified and proof of issuer 
TR-09  the student owner of the eCertificate can have control over who can 
see it and for how long, without the need for re-signing by the issuer eCert 
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TR-10  stimulate large-scale uptake, enable eCertificate to be widely verified 
and recognized throughout the UK 
TR-11  support lifetime validation, can be independent from the issuing body 
TR-12  easy to use, suit low IT skill users, both students and reviewers 
TR-13  minimize system storage 
TR-14  establish stakeholder trust between all involved parties 
Design approaches (DA) 
DA-01  Use XML to enable easy transaction between systems with different 
platforms 
DA-02  for  the  eCertificate  generation  and  issuing  process,  the  hardware, 
database, and network security, and human control for both staff and 
students, will be guarded by the issuing body 
DA-03  adapt  Federated  Identity  system  technique;  access  control  to 
eCertificate system will be based on system roles 
DA-04  access control to eCertificate will be restricted to authorized users 
only 
DA-05  employ digital signing technique to support the content modification 
validation 
DA-06  design  a  new  function  for  eCertificate  content  status  validation, 
address the unique eCertificate squared problem, support withdrawal 
of an eCertificate 
DA-07  design a new function to support the auto verification of signing key 
CRL 
DA-08  design  a  new  structure  for  eCertificate  so  that  it  can  contain  the 
various information files which can be legally accepted and verified eCert 
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DA-09 adapt the XML signature technique to support the verification of the 
various information types involved in an eCertificate 
DA-10 employ timestamp technique to enhance the signature integrity 
DA-11 employ XML metadata for eCertificate access control values 
DA-12 design  a  new  signing  method  that  allows  the  modification  of 
eCertificate metadata while maintaining  the integrity of the digital 
signature, so that the owner can set access controls on an eCertificate 
without the need for re-signing by the issuer 
DA-13 adapt  SOA  to  provide  an  architecture  for  participation  which  will 
enable large-scale uptake 
DA-14 adapt  a  national  unique  number  system  to  enable  the  eCertificate 
system to be rolled out throughout the UK 
DA-15 an independent system to provide the required services 
DA-16 provide  functions  with  user  friendly  interface  to  deal  with 
complicated technical requirements, such as key management 
DA-17 avoid storing sensitive data, minimize system storage to reduce the 
attraction of database attacks 
DA-18 employ PKI, establish stakeholder trust between all involved parties 
System implementation (SI) 
SI-01  The  system  was  developed  using  XML  to  enable  easy  transaction 
between systems with different platforms 
SI-02  The  security  control  of  hardware,  database,  and  network  for  the 
eCertificate  generation  and  issuing  processes  is  handled  by  the 
issuing institution eCert 
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SI-03  As  explained  in  the  Federation  Management  vs.  eCert  System 
Management  section,  a  locally  built  access  control  system  was 
implemented instead of a federated identity system. 
SI-04  Based  on  their  system  role,  only  authorized  staff  can  access  the 
issuing  system  and  only  authorized  students  can  access  the 
management system, but everyone can access the verification system. 
SI-05  Students can only set controls on their own eCertificates through the 
management system.SI-06  Only reviewers with correct access key 
can access the corresponding eCertificate 
SI-07  Traditional digital signing technique is used as the foundation of the 
signing process to support the content modification validation 
SI-08  Took the signing key CRL as an example, a new qualification CRL 
was created and its validation process was added to the traditional 
digital signing process to solve the eCertificate squared problem 
SI-09  A function was added to call for the verification of the signing key 
and display the result every time an eCertificate is accessed, 
SI-10  A new file structure for eCertificate was defined, which contains all 
elements  that  a  paper-based  certificate  has,  as  well  as  the  new 
elements that meet the eCertificate and ePortfolio requirements, such 
as the evidence file. 
SI-11  The XML signature was adopted with a new wrapping method for the 
various  file  types  structured  in  the  eCertificate  to  increase  the 
signature security in the verification process 
SI-12  A timestamp has been added to the signature so that an eCertificate 
will be digitally signed, certified signature time, and therefore, tamper 
evident and non-repudiation 
SI-13  Owner controlled access token, access section, and access time limit 
values have been placed in metadata eCert 
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SI-14  A  new  signing  method,  eCert  signature,  has  been  proposed  and 
implemented,  which  allows  eCertificate  owners  to  modify  the 
metadata of a signed eCertificate without invalidating the signature 
SI-15  The system was implemented with SOA 
SI-16  Standards and policies have been set up for all institutions who use 
the system 
SI-17  As explained in the Unique Student ID and eCertificate ID section, a 
self maintained numbering system was implemented 
SI-18  An  online  centralised  system  has  been  implemented  to  provide 
eCertificate  management  and  verification  services.  As  the  newly 
designed file structure and signing method enable the modification of 
access  control  values  without  re-signing,  the  system  can  be  used 
independent of the issuers (with the last updated CRLs). 
SI-19  Implemented  support  functions  to  handle  the  complicated 
requirements  from  the  back  end,  such  as  signing  and  key 
management;  therefore,  front  end  web  user  friendly  interface 
development can be easily set up by calling the support functions 
SI-20  The system only proves the service, no personal sensitive information 
is stored, and only stores the CRLs for the validation purpose 
SI-21  As the implementation is based on traditional digital signature, the 
PKI is maintained to provide trust between the stakeholders eCert 
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Appendix D: A Comparison 
between eCert and Digitary 
System architecture 
The main difference between Digitary and eCert is the system architecture. From 
the point of the system usage, Digitary provides a distributed solution because each 
institution  accesses  a  separate  system  for  document  issuing  and  verification,  while 
eCert is a centralized solution because it is supposed to be a national system that is 
responsible  for  document  creation,  distribution,  and  verification  (since  there  is  no 
stand-alone program for issuers to issue the e-certification). From the storage model of 
signed documents, Digitary is centralized because the signed documents are only kept 
in the institutions; eCert is distributed because the signed documents are distributed to 
their owners (students). The difference in system architecture decides the difference in 
system implementation, maintenance and update. Generally speaking, Digitary is more 
convenient for the e-certificate issuing process, but is a little “clumsy” for reviewers 
who need to verify e-certificates from a wide range of institutions. Also, Digitary needs 
the  institutions  to  store  all  issued  e-certificates,  placing  more  burden  on  system 
maintenance. 
Technical elements 
Digital signatures: digital signature is the fundamental technology for the system 
implementation of the eCert and Digitary system. However, as implementation of the 
digital  signature  alone  is  insufficient  to  address  the  issue  of  long-lived  graduation 
documents, additional elements must be incorporated. In Digitary, a facility for the 
creation of long-lived digitally signed and timestamped documents compliant with the eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 230 
XAdES standard has been used. In the eCert approach, only a timestamp is added to the 
digital-signed  documents  at  this  moment.  Since  the  eCert  system  is  still  in  the 
development stage, it can be improved with a similar facility in the Digitary approach. 
Services  for  distribution:  there  is  no  distribution  service  in  Digitary  because 
signed  documents  are  kept  in  the  location  where  they  were  signed.  In  the  eCert 
approach, the signed documents will be sent to students by email. 
System access control: In Digitary, three groups are defined: issuers, students, 
employers,  for  users  signing  into  the  system  to  access  required  functions.  eCert 
provides a similar approach for user access control: three sub-systems with different 
URLs are built for issuers, students and reviewers respectively. Users can only log into 
the sub-system to which they are allowed. 
E-document access control: In Digitary, random URIs, including the document 
information and its access control are transmitted to reviewers. The reviewers are able 
to  access  online  documents  through  secure  hyperlinks.  In  eCert,  the  access  control 
information  is  added onto  the signed  e-certificates, and students  are able to  set  up 
access control in the central system and send processed e-certificates to reviewers. 
Verification of documents: In Digitary, reviewers are able to get the verification 
information through the URIs from students. In eCert, reviewers need to upload the 
files received onto the central verification system. The verification system will analyze 
the files, and display the verification results to the reviewers. 
System maintenance 
Key management: In Digitary, since the signed documents are not distributed to 
owners, only issuers’ keys (not sure if it is a key pair or a symmetric key) are used. In 
eCert, the issuer private key is used to sign the digest of the document, and the student 
public  key  is  used  to  signed  the  whole  e-Certificate  document  (including  original 
documents, access control information, digital signature, and timestamp). 
Document backup: Digitary does not store any copies of all issued e-Certificates 
for all institutions. It is the responsibility of institutions to make issued e-Certificates 
secure. In eCert, as the issued e-Certificates are distributed to students, institutions do eCert 
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not need to back up issued e-Certificates. If students lose their e-Certificates accidently, 
institutions are able to re-issue them through the eCert system. 
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Appendix E: The eCert Approach 
for eWork Use Cases 
The eCert system is designed with a user centric approach. An issued eCertificate 
is an independent, verifiable, and owner controllable application. It can be accessed 
through an organization, serviced within any ePortfolio, or used in standalone mode. 
Therefore, eCert enables one solution to be employed for all the eWork use cases. 
1.  RTOs issue eCertificates to the VET learners using the eCert system. Each of 
these eCertificates includes the award certificate, the skill assessment that the 
certification  was  based  on,  and  the  qualification  transcript  with  course 
information. 
2.  The issued eCertificate will be either: 
a.  issued to the learner through a secured mailing system; or 
b.  stored by the RTO. The learner can download copies of the eCertificate 
through the RTO and store them in his/her preferred repository, e.g. a 
personal ePortfolio system or PC. 
3.  The learner can set new access control values for their eCertificate in the RTO 
or the preferred repository. 
4.  The learner can provide the eCertificate as the qualification information to the 
reviewer, by either: 
a.  providing the relevant eCertificate (and access keys if set) along with the 
application form or ePortfolio to the reviewer; or eCert 
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b.  giving permission to the RTO to provide the relevant eCertificate; and 
following the process as mentioned in the use case scenario (varying 
from use case to use case) to provide the access path for the reviewing 
party. 
5.  The reviewer can verify the eCertificate by either using the eCert central system 
or the downloaded eCert application, and progress forward once confirmation is 
received that the learner meet the requirements. 
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Appendix F: The Usage of a 
Standalone eCertificate 
Figure  F-1  shows  the  process  of  an  eCertificate  from  issue,  to  set  control, 
distribute, and verify, when used standalone. 
 
Figure F-0-1 An eCertificate used in standalone mode 
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Appendix I: eCert workshops 
information 
First workshop information 
  Venue:  Centre for International ePortfolio Development, University of 
Nottingham 
  Date:  Thursday 15th April 2010 
  Participants: 
o  Christopher Brown – JISC Program Manager 
o  Angela Smallwood – Associate Professor, ePortfolio expert in 
Centre for International ePortfolio Development, University of 
Nottingham 
o  Kirstie Coolin – eBusiness analyst in Centre for International 
ePortfolio Development, University of Nottingham 
o  Scott Wilson – HE, security, and ePortfolio expert in JISC-CETIS 
o  Simon Grant – HE, security, and ePortfolio expert in JISC-CETIS 
o  John Harrison – owner of Edentity 
o  Clive Church – Development Manager at EdExcel 
o  Shane Sutherland – owner of PebblePad ePortfolio 
  Format:   
o  10:30 Arrive, Register, coffee & biscuits 
o  11:00 Welcome to the day 
o  11:10 Morning presentation: “eCertificate issues and problems” 
o  11:25 Discussions (in groups) – defining the problem areas 
o  11:45 Report back eCert 
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o  12:15 Lunch 
o  13:15 Coffee and reassemble 
o  13:30 Introduction to the afternoon 
o  13:35 Afternoon presentation: “Towards solving the problems: the 
eCert plan” 
o  13:55 Round Table discussion on the proposed design and related 
issues 
o  14:30 Plan for the future; follow-on event, Monday 6th September 
2010 (immediately before ALT-C); what do the delegates want 
from this project? 
o  15:00 Coffee and cakes 
o  15:30 Workshop closes 
 
Second workshop information 
  Venue:  17th International Conference of the Association for Learning 
Technology (ALT-C2010) 
  University: of Nottingham 
  Date:  7th September 2010 
  Participants: 
o  John Clayton – workshop facilitator, Manager of Wintec 
o  Katharine Iles – Training Manager of JANET 
o  Andrew Davey – technical developer of eLanguages 
o  Kirstie Coolin – eBusiness analyst at the University of Nottingham 
o  Matt Haigh – Project Manager of Cambridge Assessment 
o  Joe Wilson – head of New Ventures at the Scottish Qualifications 
Authority 
o  Annette Odell – Learning Technology Advisor at the University of 
East London 
o  Peter Silvester – Web Applications Programmer at the University 
of Southampton eCert 
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o  Iwi Ugiagbe-Green – Senior Lecturer at the Leeds Metropolitan 
University 
o  Alex Furr – eLearning consultant and developer at the University 
of Southampton 
o  Plus several others (names not recorded) 
  Format:  The workshop lasted for 60 minutes 
o  5 minutes of welcome and introduction 
o  15 minutes of introducing the “linked data” problem and the eCert 
solution 
o  5 minutes for a brief clarification 
o  25 minutes of group discussions for possibilities and potential 
problems 
o  10 minutes of feedback and conclusion 
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Appendix J: Terms of eCertificate 
The relationships of the terms and processes for the proposed eCertificate system 
are analyzed and displayed in the system structure design in Figure J-1. eCert 
A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 264 
 






e.g. exam or test
identification
- who you are
e.g. passport, birth 
certificate, or student records 
verification
- what you got
e.g. a pass for the exam that 
the qualification entitled 
validation
- the proof documents 
are acceptable 
e.g. are in the list of the 
acceptable documents, 




certificate contents in 
digital form


















e.g. unique student id and 
unique eCert id
eCert formatting and 
standard control process
Existing Certification process
The eCert issue system  The eCert management system  
- access control, student can set access tokens on who and 
for how long the documents can be accessed
student
has












e.g. valid access token, 
and has not expired
general information
e.g. student id + 
qualification id + 
award title
sensitive data












Set new eCert 
access token
e.g. who can see 







A Secure and User Centric eDocument Transmission Protocol 
– Solving the Digital Signing practical Issues 
 
    P a g e  | 265 
Appendix K: Comparison of 
Shortlisted Research 
Methodologies 
During  the  research  methodology  selection  process,  four  appropriate  research 
methodologies have been shortlisted. The methods are summarised and compared in 
the appendix. More details of the final selected methodologies (SORM and Delphi) can 
be found in Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
Compare Category 1 – Design and Decision Making Methodologies 
Design-based research (DBR) methodology
19 is a set of analytical techniques 
with  “iterative  analysis,  design,  development,  and  implementation”  that  based  on 
“collaboration among researchers and practitioners in real-world settings”, and hence 
“leading to contextually-sensitive design principles and theories”. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Wang, F., and M. Hannafin, Design-Based Research and Technology-Enhanced Learning 
Environments in Educational Technology Research and Development, 2005. 53(4): p. 5-23 eCert 
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Figure K-0-1 The Design-based research methodology 
20 
 
The  Delphi  methodology 
21is  a  “structured  communication  technique  that 
originally developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method which relies on a 
panel of experts”. 
 
Figure K-0-2 The Delphi Methodology 
22 
                                                 
20 Image reprint from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/2400400104001.png  
21 Linstone, H.A. and M. Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications. 2002. p. 618. eCert 
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Table K-0-1 Delphi vs. DBR 
  Delphi  DBR 
Comment   Evaluate design through participants’ opinions  
Have a number of iterative activities 
Viewpoints  from  the  feedbacks  will  be  identified,  filtered,  and 
analysed 
The design will be adjusted according to the analysis result at each 
round. 
Differences  Participants  are  the  experts  in 
the field 
Any level of users, do not have 
to be experts 
Experts  will  review  their 
opinions  in  light  of  the  others 
after each round 
No related information found 
Benefit   Can  gain  the  latest  opinions 
from experts in the field 
 
As  the  experts  can  take  into 
account of the others’ opinions, 
the  variety  of  answers/opinions 
will  decrease  after  each  round 
and tend towards one direction 
Participants  can  be  easily 
selected and organized  
 
Better ties between researchers 
and practitioners, and hence the 
research theory and practices 
Limitation   Not  easy  to  engage  experts  to 
take  the  activity  for  all  the 
required rounds  
Quality  of  feedback  may 
various  and  hence  affect  the 
outcome 
 
Compare Category 2 – Development Methodologies 
Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
23 is a conceptual model, commonly 
used in project management. Various SDLC methodologies have been developed to 
                                                                                                                                              
22 Image reprint from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/2400400104001.png 
23 Blanchard, B. S., & Fabrycky, W. J. (2006) Systems engineering and analysis (4th ed.) New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. eCert 
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suit different purposes. The initial SDLC involved six stages: from an initial feasibility 
study through maintenance of the completed application.  
 
Figure K-0-3 A extended SDLC methodology 
24 
 
The  Service-Oriented  Reference  Model  (SORM) 
25 is a “community-driven” 
methodology for “understanding how services fit together to provide functionality for a 
particular  domain”.    It  was  initially  invented  to  develop  the  e-learning  framework 
reference model for assessment in 2006.  
 
Figure K-0-4 The SORM methodology 
26 
                                                 
24 Image reprint from http://klutzyuben.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/spiral1.gif  
25 Wills, G., D. Millard, S. Chennupati, E.R. Jam, I. Tulloch, L. Gilbert, and Y. Howard FREMA: e-
learning framework reference model for assessment. FREMA Project Journal  2006; Available from: 
http://www.frema.ecs.soton.ac.uk/publications/index.htm . 
26 Image reprint from http://www.frema.ecs.soton.ac.uk/projectJournal/ eCert 
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Table K-0-2 SORM vs. SDLC 
  SORM  SDLC 
Comment   Both cover the stages of development life cycle 
Differences  More effect is put into the early 
stage of the life cycle to get the 
system requirements right 
All stages are equal 
Benefit   Focus  on  the  early  life  cycle 
which suit the research nature of 
discovering the unknown issues 
of a new eCertificate system 
  
It  was  initially  invented  to 
develop  the  e-learning 
framework reference model.  By 
using  the  same  SOA  approach, 
this  will  not  only  support  the 
research  for  a  suitable  
eCertificate framework, but also 
maximise  the  interoperability 
between the new system and the 
other  systems  across  the  e-
Framework 
Most  well  known,  well  tried 
and tested 
 
Development  divided  into 
distinct  phases/stages  which 
lead to easy management 
Limitation   Still new, not been well tested  Inflexible,  hard  to  cope  with 
requirements changing 
 
Not  easy  to  capture  the  true 
needs of users 
 
There are in fact millions of software development methodologies, too 
many to summarise and compare here, but SDLC is the most well known. eCert 
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